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This PhD thesis studies the facilitation of trade in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). It considers the fact that there have been 
several regional and international agreements that the SADC countries have 
entered into with the objective of alleviating trade facilitation obstacles in their 
region. In addition to these agreements, the states have devised national 
strategies to implement their regional and international commitments. 
However, despite all of these efforts, the effects on the easing of obstacles to 
trade facilitation have been minimal and the positive impact on the 
development of these countries predicted by mainstream trade theory is not 
evident. This is the first conundrum or question that this study explores. 
Second, while there have been several studies on the general challenges 
related to treaty compliance and implementation in the Southern African 
Development Community, few have attempted to explain why there has been 
poor compliance in these countries. This study uses the insights from several 
theoretical frameworks to illuminate this question. Third, the study reviews 
the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement and explores 
whether it’s unique advantages may enable it to be more effective in resolving 
the trade facilitation challenges of the SADC member states.  
 
The study consists of a desk review of relevant academic literature, as well as 
an empirical study of the state of trade facilitation in the SADC region in 
general, and in the Kingdom of Lesotho, in particular. This entails the use of 
case studies and interviews with trade policy makers, trade negotiators, 
border officials as well as traders. The study concludes that the previous 
agreements suffered from inabilities to secure the compliance of state parties. 
In addition, the states themselves faced a plethora of domestic 
implementation challenges. The study observes that the WTO Trade 
Facilitation Agreement has unique features that address the compliance and 
implementation issues in innovative ways. It is argued that its distinctions 
make it likelier to be a more successful tool for the countries in the Southern 
African Development Communities to use to improve trade facilitation in their 
 iii 
region. This research is a contribution to the academic literature on trade, law 
and development and seeks to provide policy insights to developing country 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
 
1.1. Background to the Research  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
defines international trade as a process that involves either importing or 
exporting.1 ‘Importing’ occurs when products are brought into the territory of 
a state for their consumption by its residents or for their further processing. 
Conversely, ‘exporting’ involves products being taken out of the territory of a 
state for their consumption or further processing in other states.2 Trade can 
also occur where goods are transmitted through one state on their way to 
another destination state. This is referred to as ‘transit trade.’3 These simple 
definitions make it sound as though the processes are uncomplicated. 
However, in reality the movement of goods across national borders can be 
fraught with numerous obstacles. These include:  
 
§ requirements for excessive documentation for approval to trade 
§ time-consuming and complicated border processes 
§ exorbitant service fees and penalties which make trading expensive 
§ human resources deficiencies (for example insufficient, unskilled or un-
coordinated workers) slowing down service delivery. 
 
These, and other delay-inducing and cost-compounding factors, contribute to 
the lengthening of the time that goods take to cross borders and to the 
 
1 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,  Glossary of Statistical Terms: 
International Trade, (2007), available at https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1405 
accessed  on 3 April 2017). 
2 R Schaffer, B Earle & A Filiberto International Business Law and its Environment 4 ed (1999) 
at 7. It is not only goods which are traded, services can also be traded. This happens via four 
modes of trade, namely: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, 
and through the movement of natural persons (art I:2 of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS)). However, the scope of this current research is limited to examining trade in 
goods to the exclusion of trade in services. 
3 Transit trade has been the subject of policy and treaty focus, in documents such as the 
Vienna Programme of Action, the Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit (1921), the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), the Convention on the High Seas (1958), the 
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States (1965) and, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. 
 2 
escalation of the costs of trade.4 This could have negative ramifications on 
traders as well as on the general economy of the country that is experiencing 
these challenges. The discourse that addresses this phenomenon is called 
trade facilitation. Moïsé and Sorescu define trade facilitation as ‘policies and 
measures aimed at reducing trade costs by improving efficiency at each stage 
of the international trade chain’.5 Wilson, Mann and Otsuku explain that 
trade facilitation relates to ‘the logistics of moving goods through ports’.6  Nora 
Neufeld writes that it is concerned with ‘quickening the movement of goods 
across borders by measures such as faster clearance and release of goods’.7 
The common thread among all of these definitions is that trade facilitation 
measures are efficiency-enhancing and cost-reducing measures.8  
 
One strategy that countries resort to in order to try to facilitate trade is to 
enter into regional and multilateral agreements wherein they commit to 
reducing the delays and costs that are associated with cross-border trade.9 
This is because, if countries were to only apply domestic reforms, in the 
absence of international cooperation, this would be of limited utility. Goods 
typically move across several borders in regional and global value chains 
 
4 Michel M Kostecki International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO) (2000) at 113.  
5 E Moïsé & S Sorescu Trade Facilitation Indicators: The Potential Impact of Trade Facilitation 
on Developing Countries’ Trade, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Trade Policy Papers 144 (2013) at 7. 
6 John Wilson, Catherine Mann & Tsunehiro Otsuku, Assessing the Benefits of Trade 
Facilitation: A Global Perspective, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, (2005) 
at  842–843. 
7 Nora Neufeld Implementing the Trade Facilitation Agreement: From Vision to Reality, World 
Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division, Working Paper ERSD-2016-
14 (2016). 
8 Other definitions of the concept are given by various international organisations. The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) defines it as the ’simplification and harmonisation of international 
trade procedures’ available at http://gtad.wto.org/trta_subcategory.aspx?cat=33121 
accessed on 30 June 2017). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) defines trade facilitation measures as those which seek to ‘establish a transparent, 
consistent and predictable environment for border transactions based on simple and 
standardised customs procedures and practices, documentation requirements, cargo and 
transit operations, and trade and transport conventions and arrangements’.  UNCTAD Trade 
Facilitation Handbook: Part 1: National Facilitation Bodies: Lessons and Experience (2006) at  
6. 
9 States also implement domestic reforms through policies and laws, and they enter into 
bilateral agreements on trade facilitation. However, these will not form the focus of this 
particular work. 
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(RVCs and GVCs) or global production networks (GPNs). 10 Therefore, even if 
one border is made more efficient (by the implementation of successful 
domestic reforms) goods may still be blocked when they have to pass through 
other borders. This is why cooperation in implementing regional and 
international reforms is crucial. This sentiment is echoed by Wilson et al who 
note that “a country’s trade flows will change not only through its own reforms 
but also the reforms of its trading partners.”11 For the members of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC)12 - these frameworks 
comprise of the following instruments: 
 
§ The Southern African Development Community Protocol on Trade13  
§ The Agreement establishing the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU)14  
§ The Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA)15  
§ The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA)16 
§ The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)17 and other 
instruments of the World Trade Organization (WTO), such as the 
Agreement on Import Licensing 
§ Instruments of the World Customs Organization (WCO), such as the 
Revised Kyoto Convention.18   
 
 
10 Kano, L., Tsang, E. and Wai-chung Yeung, H., Global Value Chains: A Review of the 
Multidisciplinary Literature, Journal of International Business Studies (2020) 577–622. 
11 Op cit note 6 at 841. 
12 https://www.sadc.int/member-states accessed 4 November 2020. 
13 It was signed in 1996 and it entered into force in 2000. 
14 It was signed in 2002 and it entered into force in 2004. 
15 It was signed in 2015 to establish a free trade area (FTA) between the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and SADC. It 
has not yet entered into force due to an insufficient number of ratifications. 
16 It was signed in 2018 and it entered into force in 2019. 
17 It was signed in 1947. It was only in force provisionally until it was adopted as one of the 
WTO’s multilateral agreements on trade in goods (i.e., as GATT 1994). The WTO Agreement 
itself entered into force on January 1, 1995, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legalexplgatt1947_e.htm, accessed on 6 
October, 2019). 
18 The original Kyoto convention entered into force in 1974. It was revised in 1999 and the 
revised convention entered into force in 2006. World Customs Organization Revised Kyoto 
Convention: Let’s Talk: Your Questions Answered (2006) available at 
https://www.wcoesarocb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/1.-WCO-Revised-Kyoto-
Convention.pdf, accessed on 6 October 2019). 
 4 
The most recent international agreement, which is aimed at addressing 
impediments to the conduct of cross-border trade, is the World Trade 
Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). 19 It was concluded at the 
Bali Ministerial Conference in 2013 and it entered into force on February 22, 
2017. This research investigates the potential contribution of this new 
agreement on the facilitation of trade in the Southern African Development 
Community region.20  
 
The International Law Commission defines a treaty as ‘an international 
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation’.21 States enter 
into treaties in order to cooperate on the attainment of mutually-beneficial 
objectives. Doing so keeps them accountable to one another and allows for 
monitoring and for enforcement should there be non-compliance. The 
conclusion, by SADC states, of agreements to facilitate trade was expected to 
have led to the easing of the costs and delays that are associated with trade 
in the region. The indicators that the treaties are being effective would be, for 
example, decreased time to move goods through borders, decreased costs of 
trade, increased trade flows between the states and possibly even improved 
regional development. However, these results have not materialised.22  
 
World Bank statistics indicate that, on average in SADC, it takes 63.8 hours 
to fulfil documentary compliance for exporting and 56.6 hours to fulfil 
 
19 Protocol Amending the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
General Council Decision of November 27, 2014, WT/L/940. 
20 In this work, the ‘Southern African Development Community (SADC)’ is taken to refer to a 
continental sub-region that comprises Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, eSwatini, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. Although there are island states in SADC, they are excluded from the scope 
of this work. This is because this work focuses on trade facilitation challenges that are related 
to land borders only, and not ports. The island states experience slightly different trade 
facilitation challenges than those faced by the land-based states. 
21 United Nations Organisation Yearbook of the International Law Commission ‘Draft Articles 
on the Law of Treaties (with commentaries) art 2 (1) (a)’ (1966) II. 
22 The World Economic Forum has reported that ‘Sub-Saharan Africa remains, on average, 
one of the weaker performing regions on the Border administration pillar’. World Economic 
Forum, Global Enabling Trade Report, (2016) at 22. 
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documentary compliance for importing.23 The same report finds that it takes, 
on average, 97.3 hours to fulfil border compliance when exporting and 102 
hours when importing.24 Therefore, there continue to be delays in moving 
goods across borders. One of the culprits of the delays is the manner that 
inspections are carried out. They are generally not conducted on the basis of 
risk assessment and they are not efficiently executed.25  
 
Despite commitments to make trade cheaper,  trade costs continue to remain 
high in the region. Some of these costs are: toll fees, fuel levies, transit fees, 
value added tax (VAT) and fees for the provisional import of goods. The World 
Bank reports that the average cost of exporting is USD 605.8 for border 
compliance and USD 194.9 for documentary compliance.26 The figures for 
importing are USD 636.2 and USD 188.4 respectively.27 The South African 
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) reports on a complaint about the cost 
of trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
The multiplicity of taxes levied on imports in the DRC is also striking: at least 
eight public services collect taxes on imports at DRC´s borders:  State 
Customs Agency (DGDA), International Trade Bureau, Export and Import 
Control Agency (OCC), Health Service, Industry Promotion Fund (FPI), General 
Office of Sea Freight (OGEFREM) and the General Services of Taxes (DGI).28 
 
23 World Bank, Doing Business: Training for Reform, Regional Profile of the Southern African 
Development Community, 16th edition, 2019, at 47 and 51. 
24 Ibid at 45 and 49. 
25 Namibia Dairies is a dairy processor. It has reported a complaint that inspections at some 
SADC borders can take weeks. Because they trade in time sensitive products which have a 
short shelf-life, these inefficiencies cause significant damage and loss to them. Namibia 
Dairies- https://saiia.org.za/saiia-toolkit/namibia-dairies/, accessed 4 May 2019. 
26 Op cit note 23 at 46 and 50. 
27 Ibid at 48 and 52. 
28 Based on information provided by Shenimed, a firm involved in the distribution of cigarettes 
http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-business-case-studies/shenimed, accessed 4 May 2019. 
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Trade flows between SADC members have also not been increasing, as 
expected.29 Furthermore, there has not been much improvement in the 
development levels of the states, nor in the livelihoods of the people over the 
past two decades.30 Several treaty commitments remain unimplemented. For 
example, the states pledged to harmonise their trade procedures and 
requirements and to standardise their trade documents.31 However, there 
have been reports that this ambition has not been realised.32 This failure 
contributes to the creation of confusion and resultant delays for traders at 
SADC borders.33 Trade facilitation efforts in SADC also continue to be 
 
29 James Maringwa notes that intra-regional SADC trade fell to below 10% of total exports 
between 2000 and 2006. Trade Policy and Trade Flow Analysis: SADC Regional Integration: 
What Role Have Bilateral Trade Agreements Played in Promoting Intraregional Trade? 
December 2009 at 13. Marie-Agnès Jouanjean, Dirk Willem te Velde, Neil Balchin, Linda 
Calabrese & Alberto Lemma report that African states typically trade more with nations from 
other regions than with each other. Regional Infrastructure for Trade Facilitation: Impact on 
Growth and Poverty Reduction (2016) at 44. The SADC’s Selected Economic and Social 
Indicators (2018) provide statistics on intra-SADC imports and exports as a percentage of 
total imports and exports. Between 2010 and 2018 the former declined from 19.8% to 19.1% 
with a peak of 20.7% in 2016 and a low of 17.7% in 2014. The latter slightly increased from 
17.9% in 2010 to 19.3% in 2018 with a peak of 22.6% in 2016 and a low of 16.5% in 2011. 
Available at  
https://www.sadc.int/files/6215/6630/2592/SADC_Selected_Indicators_2018.pdf, 
accessed on 6 June 2020). 
30 For example, statistics from the World Bank show a decline in annual growth in Gross 
Domestic Production (GDP) for the region from 6.2% in 2005 to 2.8% in 2015, available at  
https://databank.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/1ff4a498/Popular-
Indicators, accessed on  6 June 2020). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Human Development Report (2019) shows that the region has the lowest human development 
index of all the regions, with very little growth over the years – from an index of 0.402 in 1990 
to 0.541 in 2015. United Nations Human Development Report (2019) at 307,  available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf,accessed  on 6 June 2020). The same 
report, at 321, also shows that 44.7% of the population in the region live below the poverty 
line. The SADC Selected Economic and Social Indicators (2018) show poor indicators in indices 
such as life expectancy, enrolment and unemployment, available at 
https://www.sadc.int/files/6215/6630/2592/SADC_Selected_Indicators_2018.pdf, 
accessed on 6 June 2020). 
31 Annex II to the Southern African Trade Protocol on Trade manifests the states’ intention to 
simplify and to harmonise their trade laws and procedures. It calls for the creation of a SADC 
Sub-Committee on Customs and a Sub- Committee on Trade Facilitation. These are intended 
to be forums for cooperating on harmonising trade laws, procedures and documentation.  
32 Jan Bronauer and Ji Yoon cite the lack of harmonisation as being one of the factors that 
is sabotaging integration efforts in SADC. They advise that “the region must prioritise the 
coordination and harmonisation of regulatory frameworks” in order to meet their trade and 
economic aspirations. Regional Economic Development in SADC: Taking Stock and Looking 
Ahead, South African Institute of International Affairs, August 2018 Report, at 48. 
33 Rab Processors is a Malawian exporter of agricultural products. The firm has complained 
that inconsistencies in the procedures that are applied by the customs authorities of different 
SADC member states is a major contributor to border delays. Rab Processors Ltd, 
http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-business-case-studies/rab-processors-ltd, accessed 24 April 
2019. 
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subverted by the generally poor state of infrastructure. The SADC Regional 
Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP) (2012 – 2027) was adopted 
in 2012 to strategize the upscaling of infrastructural development in support 
of regional development.34  However, Daniel Mlambo argues that both hard 
and soft infrastructure continue to be under-developed in the region.35 Rupa 
Ranganathan and Vivien Foster report that, among others, the transport 
corridors are in a state of disrepair, there are low levels of access to power and 
many of the landlocked states have limited connectivity to submarine cables, 
thus impairing their access to Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) services.36 Almost ten years after the Plan these challenges continue to 
persist. Current statistics of the African Development Bank (ADB) show the 
SADC region as being among the lowest performers, in terms of 
infrastructural development, on the African continent.37 This renders reforms 
related to expediting trade processes difficult to achieve due to the 
unavailability of technology and access to reliable energy etc. Some SADC 
firms have argued that lack of automation hampers the ease and efficiency of 
trade clearance.38 
 
The above picture provokes us to question why these obstacles persist despite 
commitments to address them. Furthermore, to consider whether any 
improvements could arise from the implementation of the new World Trade 





ter_Plan_Executive_Summary.pdf, accessed 13 November 2020. 
35 Daniel Mlambo, Unearthing the Challenges and Prospects of Regional Integration in Southern 
Africa, Wiley Journal of Public Affairs, Volume 19, Issue 1, February 2019. 
36 Rupa Ranganathan and Vivien Foster, African Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, The 
SADC’s Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective, June 2011, at 6. 
37 The report is produced by the African Development Bank to chronicle the status of 
infrastructural development across the African continent. Out of 54 countries, the SADC 
countries rank among the worst performers. For example, Tanzania is at position 40, 
Mozambique 44, Madagascar 47 and the Democratic Republic of Congo at position 50. African 
Development Bank, Africa Infrastructural Development Index, June 2020. 
38 Walvis Bay Corridor Group (Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa ) -  
https://saiia.org.za/saiia-toolkit/walvis-bay-corridor-group/, accessed 4 May 2019. 
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1.2. Problem Statement  
The problem that is of interest in this work is that, despite participating in 
several regional and international trade facilitation treaties, the SADC 
countries have experienced limited positive results therefrom. This would be, 
for example, in the form of quicker and cheaper trade and the expected 
positive impacts on their overall development trajectory.  
 
1.3. Research Questions 
This thesis addresses the following questions:  
 
1. How can trade facilitation support development? 
 
2. What have been the challenges to compliance with, and implementation 
of, regional and multilateral trade facilitation treaties, which have 
rendered these frameworks ineffective in facilitating trade in the 
Southern African Development Community? 
 
3. Can the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement be 
leveraged by the countries in the Southern African Development 
Community to increase their implementation of trade facilitation 
measures in support of their development? 
 
This thesis has three broad arguments. First, that facilitating trade can be 
beneficial for development. Secondly, that participating in trade agreements 
is an important component of a country’s strategy to facilitate trade. It 
recognises that there are many challenges to compliance with, as well as to 
implementation of such treaties. Left unaddressed, these challenges can 
negate the effectiveness of the treaties. Therefore, an understanding of the 
challenges is necessary, along with sound policies to address them. Thirdly, 
that the Trade Facilitation Agreement has distinct advantages over pre-
existing treaties, which advantages render it likelier to have a greater impact 
on facilitating trade in SADC than what currently obtains. However, this is 
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not a given. The countries will need to adopt prudent strategies on how to get 
the most out of the TFA. 
 
The study relies on three sets of theories:  
 
§ on trade and development,  
§ law and development and  
§ theories on state compliance with international commitments.  
 
These theories are introduced in chapter 2 of this work. The chapter debates 
various theories on trade and development, including mercantilism, the 
classical theory of international trade and heterodox theories of international 
trade. It concludes that the theories of heterodox economics are the most 
useful in analyses that focus on developing country perspectives because, 
unlike the former theories, heterodox economics strongly recognises that the 
effect of trade openness on development can be affected by the development 
levels of the country concerned. In particular, developing countries have 
certain vulnerabilities that may render traditional views on the positive 
correlation between trade openness and development questionable. 
 
The law and development theory provides us with insight that, while law may 
be important to support development, this will depend on factors such as the 
regulatory design, regulatory compliance and the quality of implementation of 
the law. Enmeshment theory and the managerial approach to compliance 
support the view that the quality of norms, the nature of institutional 
arrangements and state capacity are important determinants of treaty 
compliance. Embedded liberalism adds to our understanding of compliance 
from a perspective on the World Trade Organization  in particular. It is a 
theory that views the WTO regime as one where non-compliance is not 
necessarily tantamount to cheating, or evading regime rules. It argues that 
there is explicit recognition (for instance by the allowance of measures such 
as safeguards, exemptions, exceptions, etc.) that governments require 
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flexibility in implementing interventions, as may be required by domestic 
exigencies. 
 
In asking these questions and exploring these issues this thesis contributes 
to the academic literature in at least three significant ways. First it provides 
a detailed review of the legal and academic literature on trade facilitation in 
SADC. Second, the case study on Lesotho provides an empirical analysis of 
the legal frameworks and challenges to the implementation of trade 
facilitation reforms in a land-locked and Least Developed Country (LDC). 
Third, the thesis contributes to an understanding of the theory of law and 
development by exploring its application in a new context (SADC) and to a 
novel discipline (trade facilitation). The thesis also contributes to the policy 
discourse on trade facilitation by suggesting the considerations that should 
be taken on board by policy makers seeking to improve the effectiveness of 
domestic, regional and multilateral trade facilitation reforms. 
 
1.4 Research Justification 
This research deals with a very relevant and significant topic for countries in 
the Southern African Development Community. Studies have shown that 
inordinate delays and high transaction costs at SADC borders are impeding 
trade every moment of every day. This is argued to have negative impacts on 
business profitability, consumer welfare, government revenues and, 
consequently, on the regional economy as a whole.39 Therefore, it is imperative 
to have an analysis of the causes and the impacts of this phenomenon so that 
we can have a better understanding of the appropriate policies to implement 
to correct the problem. This is what this study sets out to do.  
 
Secondly, there have been many interventions that have been undertaken by 
the SADC states as they have tried to facilitate their trade. However, the 
challenges have continued unabated. Therefore, it is critical to have dedicated 
research on why these have failed and what approaches the countries could 
 
39 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Overcoming Border 
Bottlenecks: The Costs and Benefits of Trade Facilitation (2009) at 11. 
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consider going forward, that would be more effective. Lastly, the entry into 
force of the Trade Facilitation Agreement makes this study all the more timely. 
This is because it is vital to consider and to anticipate the potential impacts 
(both positive and negative) of this new instrument on the improvement of 
trade facilitation in the region. Being a new agreement, not much has been 
written about its potential impacts on SADC, in particular. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology and Scope of Study 
Moses and Knutsen argue that it is up to individual researchers to select 
different ontologies depending on what they will be studying and that the 
research methods that they ultimately employ for their study will differ 
according to their chosen ontology.40 Adding to this Kothari explains that 
 
There are two basic approaches to research, viz quantitative approach and the 
qualitative approach. The former involves the generation of data in quantitative 
form which can be subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis in a formal and 
rigid fashion. Qualitative approach to research is concerned with subjective 
assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviour. Research in such a situation 
is a function of researchers insights and impressions. Such an approach to 
research generate results either in non-quantitative form or in the form which 
are not subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis.41 
 
This research has elected a qualitative approach. Firstly, it undertakes a desk 
review of relevant literature, (such as academic writing, the reports of regional 
and international organisations, as well as regional and multilateral 
agreements). This is done to formulate an understanding of the nature of trade 
facilitation, the trade facilitation commitments of the SADC states as well as 
the extent of the border impediments in the region. Fieldwork is undertaken 
in order to uncover the peculiar challenges that exist at one of the SADC 
border posts (the Maseru Bridge, which lies between the Kingdom of Lesotho 




40 Jonathon W. Moses & Torbjørn L. Knutsen, Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in 
Social and Political Research, 3rd edition, (2019) at 5. 
41 C. R. Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (2004) at 5. 
 12 
§ evaluation of the policies and laws that affect cross-border trading 
§ observations of the trading processes at the border 
§ interviews with the government agencies that are responsible for 
regulating cross-border trade, as well as with border officials and border 
users.  
 
Although the exercise of conducting the case study involved the use of 
quantitative methods (for example, the employment of questionnaires during 
some interviews) the intention of this was not to eventually report quantitative 
results. This work does not have any hypothesis which is being tested. Its 
objective is to discover the unique perspectives and experiences of the various 
stakeholders in the trade facilitation discourse, as it relates to Lesotho. The 
case study provides a practical lens from which to study the phenomenon of 
trade facilitation and its challenges in a focused manner.  
 
1.6. Chapter Outline 
This work consists of eight chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
The first chapter presents a background to the study, the problem statement 
and the research questions. It outlines the thesis arguments as well as the 
methodology and the justification for the work. 
 
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework 
This chapter introduces the key theories on which this thesis is based: the 
theory of international trade, the law and development theory and theories on 
compliance. Heterodox economics theorises that that there can be a positive 
correlation between trade openness and development, but that this 
relationship is not a given. The law and development theory posits that there 
may be a positive relationship between law and development if due attention 
is paid to regulatory design, regulatory compliance and the quality of the 
implementation of the law. Theories on compliance explain the factors that 
 13 
can affect treaty compliance. These theories are used in the following chapters 
to analyse a different facet of the overall research topic. 
 
Chapter 3–Trade Facilitation and its Relationship to Development 
This chapter tackles the research question of how trade facilitation can be 
supportive of development. It explores trade facilitation as a concept: its 
definition, content and the controversies that surround the implementation 
of its measures. The chapter utilises heterodox economics to analyse the 
relationship between trade facilitation and development. It argues that there 
can be positive development outcomes from trade facilitation. It explains the 
benefits to traders, consumers, governments and to the economy at large. 
However, it cautions that facilitating trade does not always automatically 
correlate with the touted benefits (for example, increased trade flows, and 
improved development). 
 
Chapter 4 – The Regional and Multilateral Frameworks for Trade Facilitation 
in the Southern African Development Community 
This chapter describes the regional and multilateral agreements that SADC 
countries participate in, in an effort to facilitate their trade.42 It employs 
insights from compliance theories to understand why these frameworks have 
remained largely ineffective in facilitating trade in the region. The 
enmeshment theory helps us to understand how normative and institutional 
weaknesses partly explain the lack of effectiveness. The lack of capacity 
building is another explanation that is proposed by the managerial approach 
to compliance. This is especially so because trade facilitation reforms are 
 
42 The regional agreements are: the Southern African Development Community Protocol on 
Trade, the Southern African Customs Union Agreement, the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. The international agreements consist of 
instruments of the World Customs Organization and of the World Trade Organization. The 
former are: the Customs Convention on the A.T.A Carnet for the Temporary Admission of 
Goods, the International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, 
Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences, the Convention on Temporary Admission, 
the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
and the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs 
Procedures). The latter are: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Agreement on 
Rules of Origin, the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection, the Customs Valuation 
Agreement, the Import Licensing Agreement, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Inspections. 
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usually heavily resource-dependent and require some support to be given to 
less developed state parties. The argument that is made in the chapter is that 
committing to arrangements is not enough to deliver benefits. The agreements 
have to consider the compliance challenges of their members and devise 
strategies to mitigate these. Failing which, compliance will be impeded, 
regardless of the quality of the instruments or the good intentions of the 
parties.  
 
Chapter 5–Trade Facilitation and Implementation Challenges in the Southern 
African Development Community 
The law and development theory is used in chapter 5 to consider the general 
implementation challenges that are experienced in the SADC states. It 
recounts the various impediments to trade facilitation that are often reported 
in the region. It does so with reference to studies that have been conducted 
by regional and international organisations, as well as to complaints that have 
been submitted by traders in the region. It advances the argument that, 
despite the extensive regulatory regime that was explored in chapter 4, 
barriers to cross border trade continue to abound in SADC due to challenges 
to the parties’ implementation abilities. It argues that this contributes to the 
retardation of development in the region and that, thus, there is a need to 
address implementation challenges if trade is to have any impact on the 
attainment of development gains. 
 
Chapter 6 – An Exploration of the Challenges to the Implementation of Trade 
Facilitation Measures in the Kingdom of Lesotho 
After having detailed the efforts that the SADC countries have made to 
facilitate their trade (in chapter 4), and having argued that these have had 
limited results on the ground (in chapter 5), chapter 6 contains a focused case 
study of one of the SADC states. This is done so that we can better understand 
the nature of the challenges. The law and development theory is instructive 
in explaining the dichotomy between the commitments, on the one hand, and 
the poor development outcomes on the other. Applying the theory, the key 
factors include: poor regulatory design, institutional weaknesses and lack of 
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trader compliance. It is argued that these are some of the deficits that 
countries in the Southern African Development Community will need to 
redress in order to benefit from the laws that are in place to facilitate trade. 
 
Chapter 7 – The World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement: 
Prospects for Advancing Trade Facilitation in the Southern African 
Development Community 
The aim of this research is to debate the potential utility of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement to the SADC trade facilitation project. Therefore, this 
chapter discusses the TFA in detail so that such an analysis can take place. 
It traces the evolution of the agreement and discusses its structure and 
contents. It analyses, in particular, its suitability for addressing the peculiar 
trade facilitation challenges that are faced by the SADC countries, (as have 
been examined in chapter 5 of this work). As with the analysis of the pre-
existing instruments using theories on compliance, this chapter uses the 
same analytical lens to determine whether this agreement addresses 
compliance challenges in a more robust way, which is likely to render it more 
effective than the other agreements have been. The thesis argues that the TFA 
addresses the challenges and that its contents and approach can assure it 
improved prospects of success in resolving the trade facilitation impediments.  
 
Chapter 8–Thesis Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter concludes on the potential of the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
to assist the SADC countries to address their trade facilitation challenges. It 
argues that participating in trade facilitation agreements is an important 
component of a country’s trade strategy to achieve the developmental benefits 
of trade. However, the agreements need to be sound, not only in terms of the 
normative frameworks, but also the compliance mechanisms that are built 
into them. In addition to this, the parties themselves need sound 
implementation strategies. The chapter concludes that the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement is not a perfect instrument. However, it has unique features that 
give it distinct advantages over previous trade facilitation agreements, which 
advantages make it likely to be more impactful in resolving trade facilitation 
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impediments in the SADC region. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations on how best the states could exploit the agreement in a 
manner that will meet their needs, interests and peculiar circumstances. 
 
The next chapter reviews the literature on the theories of trade and 
development, law and development and theories on compliance. It builds the 
theoretical framework that is utilised to analyse the empirical framework in 

























Chapter 2- Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
This thesis aims to contribute to efforts to understand the factors that can 
affect the facilitation of trade. The ultimate goal of trade facilitation is 
development. Therefore, this chapter first begins with an exploration of the 
concept of development. It argues that development is not purely an economic 
construct, but that it is a multifaceted phenomenon. The chapter then 
introduces the main theories that will drive the thesis analysis. Two of the 
theories aim to explain the conditions that can influence development. The 
international trade theory posits that there is a nexus between trade and 
development. However, this work argues that the freeing of trade, in and of 
itself, will not necessarily lead to development. The law and development 
theory proposes that the nature of a country’s laws (regulatory design, 
regulatory compliance and the quality of implementation) can affect the laws’ 
ability to be development-inducing. This thesis argues that these theoretical 
insights may be helpful in analysing the cogency of the legal reforms that the 
SADC countries have undertaken in the hope of facilitating their trade. 
 
Finally, because this thesis analyses the effectiveness of trade agreements, 
three theories on compliance with treaties are introduced in this chapter. 
These are: enmeshment theory, the managerial approach and embedded 
liberalism. This thesis argues that there are many intervening factors that 
may hinder a state’s ability to comply with its treaty commitments, thus 
diminishing the impact of the instrument. These three theories capture some 
of the factors that are relevant in the case of the SADC countries. 
 
2.2.  The Concept of Development 
Traditionally, development was perceived purely as an economic 
phenomenon. With this conceptualisation, development was to be evidenced 
by indicators such as increases in the national income and the structural 
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transformation of an economy.43 However, with time this economics-centred 
view of development changed. Seers was one of those who asked ‘why do we 
confuse development with economic growth?’44 This was because there was a 
growing disillusionment with the promises of this economics-centred 
definition of development. Economic advancement alone was not translating 
into improved living conditions for the broader society. Despite rising national 
incomes and structural transformation there also arose less-desirable fruits 
from economic growth, such as environmental degradation, rising inequality 
and social upheaval.45 This led to scholars becoming critical of the limited 
conceptualisation of the term ‘development’ and realising that economic 
indicators alone can be misleading as exclusive markers of development.46 
 
Thus, over time, ideas about what ‘development’ really means began to 
change. It became accepted that development did not only refer to 
improvements in economic indicators, but that it also required improvements 
in political, social, cultural and other aspects of human existence.47  
Amartya Sen, in his work Development as Freedom, similarly argues that it is 
narrow-minded to define development exclusively in terms of improved 
economic indicators.48 Instead he defines it as ‘a process of expanding the real 
freedoms that people enjoy.’ 49 This means that it is the ends that are 
important. This thesis adopts this evaluation of the concept of development. 
That is, the notion of development stretches beyond the economic aspect 
alone. It has a wider and more multi-dimensional connotation. The relevance 
of economic indicators in development discourse is indisputable. However, the 
argument is that we should move away from a purely economic and 
 
43 This can be seen, for example, in the linear development theories of economists such as 
Walt Whitman Rostow ‘Stages of Economic Growth’ Economic History Review (1959)   XII (1). 
44 David Lehmann (ed) The Meaning of Development in Development Theory: Four Critical 
Studies, (1979) at.9. 
45 Gilbert Rist ‘Development as a buzzword’ (2007) 17 (4/5) Development in Practice at 488. 
46 Barbara Ingham, ‘The Meaning of Development: Interactions between “new” and “old” 
Ideas’( 1993) 21 (11) World Development at 1819. 
47 For example, Ha Joon Chang ‘Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: How development 
has disappeared from today’s ‘development’ discourse’ in Shahrukh Rafi Khan & Jens 
Christiansen (eds)  Towards New Developmentalism: Market as Means Rather than Master 
(2010). 
48 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (1999) at 3. 
49 Ibid. 
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productionist understanding of the concept of development and include in it 
social, political, environmental and other factors as being equally important 
elements of the concept.50  
 
We see this holistic interpretation of development reflected in instruments 
such as the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). 
These are a set of principles that underpin the Bank’s international 
development agenda. The premise of the framework is that development 
encompasses several interdependent elements being - social, structural, 
human, governance, environmental, economic and financial.51 The same 
understanding is further captured in the United Nations sustainable 
development goals. These are a collection of seventeen goals that, together, 
are intended to support sustainable development for all. The goals are: no 
poverty; zero hunger; good health and well-being; quality education; gender 
equality; clean water and sanitation; affordable and clean energy; decent work 
and economic growth; industry, innovation and infrastructure; reduced 
inequalities; sustainable cities and communities; responsible consumption 
and production; climate action; life below water; life on land; peace, justice 
and strong institutions and partnership for the goals.52 
 
The argument is that this broader definition of development should be the 
central objective of SADC states when they elect to participate in initiatives to 
facilitate their trade; that is: can those initiatives help them to achieve this 
multi-faceted nature of development? 
 
 
50 http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01013/WEB/0__PAGEP.HTM accessed on 2 
January, 2020. Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) concept of 
sustainable development, presented in its The Sustainable Goals Report (2019) 
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2019/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-
2019.pdf, accessed on 2 January 2020. 
51 Available at  http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01013/WEB/0__PAGEP.HTM 
accessed on 2 January, 2020. Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
concept of sustainable development, presented in its The Sustainable Goals Report (2019) 
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2019/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-
2019.pdf, accessed on 2 January 2020. 
52 https://sdgs.un.org/goals, accessed 24 October 2020. 
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After defining development, the next question becomes: how is development 
to be achieved? Many theories abound on this. This thesis considers two of 
them. The first is the theory of international trade, which has been 
controversially used to argue that there is a positive correlation between trade 
and development. The second theory is the law and development theory. It 
proposes that law is an important tool for positively influencing development.  
 
2.3. Theories on Development 
2.3.1. International Trade Theory 
Perspectives on the relationship between trade and development can be 
broadly traced back from the era of mercantilism, to the classical theory of 
international trade, to heterodox economics theories. It remains controversial 
whether promoting free trade will lead to the improvement of development. 
 
2.3.1.1. Mercantilism 
Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries mercantilism was the 
dominant trade policy of states.53 It championed the view that, in order to 
develop, governments needed to gain a positive balance of trade over their 
trading partners by increasing their exports and restricting imports. 
Mercantilism viewed trade as a zero-sum game where only one state could 
win as against its competitors. This economic domination was to be the key 
to political supremacy.54 There were several mercantilist proponents across 
the whole of Europe at the time. For instance, in Italy in 1613  Antonio Serra 
wrote about the imperative of a state to accumulate an abundance of gold and 
silver by achieving greater financial inflows than outflows.55  In France, Jean-
Baptiste Colbert wrote about the need to conquer new markets by, for 
instance, granting state aid and subsidies to exporters so as to boost their 
 
53 A seminal work on the various facets of mercantilism is Eli F. Heckscher’s Mercantilism 
(1935). 
54 Patrick J McGowan, Scarlett Cornelissen & Philip Nel (eds) Power, Wealth and Global 
Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa 3 ed (2006), at 72–73. 
55 Antonio Sierra A Short Treatise on the Wealth and Poverty of Nations tr Jonathan 
Hunt(2011). See also Italian mercantilist Giovanni Botero’sCause della Grandezza e 
Magnificenza delle Città (Causes of the Greatness and Magnificence of Cities) (1589). 
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competitive advantages.56 In England Thomas Mun advised that a nation 
should employ measures such as quantitative restrictions, customs duties, 
discriminative taxation, and currency manipulation in its trade policy.57  
 
Understanding mercantilism is useful for our analysis because it is 
informative about the reasons why governments, to this day, continue to 
restrict trade in various ways. For example, the “America First” trade policy 
under President Donald Trump58 and Britain’s exit from the European Union 
after a 2016 referendum on the issue. Mercantilism explains the fears that 
governments can have that trade will harm their domestic producers. It also 
explains the aspirations that governments hold of economic dominance by 
out-competing others in trading. Such sentiments and policies are generally 
now argued to be counter-productive and anti-developmental. Thus, 
countries are being advised to eschew them and to, instead, liberalise and 
facilitate trade. 
 
2.3.1.2. The Classical Theory of International Trade 
Mercantilism has faced centuries of criticism from economists. For example, 
David Hume argued that free trade was important as a means by which a 
state could learn the skills, arts and innovations of others, to its own 
 
56 Philippe Minard Altern The Market Economy and the French State: Myths and Legends 
around Colbertism (2008/1) 37 L'Économie Politique at 77–94. Another influential French 
mercantilist was Jean Bodin.  
57 Thomas Mun Englands Treasure by Forraign Trade. or The Ballance of our Forraign Trade 
is The Rule of our Treasure 1st pub 1664 (1895) available at 
https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YCypQuKRhcUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=tho
mas+mun&ots=jyqP1j7H5C&sig=CsOD5po_L-
OgK795NjapIPR3QiY&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=thomas%20mun&f=false, accessed  23 
November 2019. Another English mercantilist was Edward Misselden who, in his treatise Free 
Trade (or the Meanes to Make Trade Flourish) (1622), opined that  ‘the general remote cause 
of our want of money, is the great excesse of this Kingdom, in consuming the Commodities 
of Forreine Countries’, available at  https://www.sapili.org/subir-depois/en/mc000214.pdf, 
accessed 23 November 2019. 
58 This has led to measures such as United States’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) (https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP accessed 24 October 2020); the 
renegotiation of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to the United States – 
Mexico – Canada Agreement (USMCA) (https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement, accessed 24 October 2020); its trade 
war with China, and its blocking of the appointments of the World Trade Organization’s 
Appellate Body members. 
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betterment.59 John Stuart Mill added that foreign exchanges allowed for the 
division of labour and for each country to acquire a specialisation.60 However, 
the most prominent critics of mercantilism were Adam Smith61 and David 
Ricardo.62 They were advocates of the classical trade theory. Smith wrote that 
limiting trade did not make economic sense. He argued that restrictive policies 
could spark retaliation from trading partners, thus leading to a race to the 
bottom and to trade wars, which would, ultimately be to the detriment of all 
nations. Thus, Smith proposed that each country should specialise in 
products in which it has an advantage (can produce most efficiently and 
competitively) and trade freely in those products in exchange for those that it 
is not competitive in producing. This is the theory of absolute advantage. 
 
If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we 
ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of 
our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage.63  
 
This raised the question of whether gains flowed from free trade only when a 
country had an absolute advantage in the production of certain goods. What 
if it had an absolute advantage in everything? Or an absolute disadvantage in 
everything? These questions were addressed by Ricardo who moved the 
classical theory of international trade further by arguing that an absolute 
advantage was not necessary for gains to flow from trade. He proposed that a 
nation, which focused its production where its advantage was greater, or its 
disadvantage least (their comparative advantage) would still benefit from the 
gains of trade. 
 
 
59 David Hume ‘Of the jealousy of trade’ (1771 –1785) Hibernian Magazine  at 623–625,  
https://search.proquest.com/openview/e5ffc5c71ac23c89/1?cbl=7060&pq-
origsite=gscholar, accessed on 23 November 2019. 
60 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848) at 349. Others were Thomas Robert 
Malthus’s Principles of Political Economy (1820) and John Baptiste Say’s  A Treatise on Political 
Economy: or the Production, Distribution, and Consumption of Wealth (1836). 
61 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) bk IV 
ch. III (part II). 
62 David Ricardo On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). 
63  Op cit note 61 at  bk IV, ch I. 
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[A] nation, like a person, gains from trade by exporting the goods or services 
in which it has its greatest comparative advantage in productivity and 
importing those in which it has the least comparative advantage.64 
 
However, one of the shortcomings of Smith and Ricardo’s models was that 
they did not explain exactly how a country could determine its absolute or its 
comparative advantage. The Heckscher-Ohlin Factor Proportions Theory65 
addressed this gap by proposing that a country should examine its factors of 
production (for example, land, labour, capital etc.) and export those products 
that best took advantage of its factor endowments. For example, a country 
that had abundant capital should export capital intensive goods and one that 
had abundant labour should export labour-intensive goods. 
 
These three theories (Smith’s theory of absolute advantage, Ricardo’s theory 
of comparative advantage, and the Heckscher and Ohlin’s factor proportions 
theory) became the backbone of the classical theory of international trade. 
This  propounded that trade restrictions were economically harmful and that 
trade liberalisation was more beneficial for development.66 The theories 
correlate free trade with increased employment, economic growth, 
improvements in the standard of living and increased global prosperity and 
peace.67 Nevertheless, classical economics did acknowledge limited 
circumstances which could justify the imposition of some restrictions to trade, 





64 Op cit note 62. 
65 This theory was the creation of two Swedish economists, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. 
66 Roger Bennett, International Business  2ed (1999); W.M Corden ‘The normative theory of 
international trade’ in P B Kenen &  R W Jones (eds) Handbook of International Economics  vol 
1 (1984) at 63–130. 
67 These ideas are supported by other writers of the time, such as Jeremy Bentham in his In 
Defence of Usury, (1787). They are still championed by more contemporary writers such as 
Richard M Ebeling in his The timeless wisdom of Adam Smith (2016), available at 
https://fee.org/articles/the-timeless-wisdom-of-adam-smith, published by the Foundation for 
Economic Education, accessed on 2 January  2019.  He writes that free trade has led to the 
‘betterment of the world’ and that Adam Smith had ‘underestimated the power of his own 
ideas’. 
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The only case in which, on mere principles of political economy, protecting 
duties can be defensible, is when they are imposed temporarily (especially in 
a young and rising nation) in hopes of naturalizing a foreign industry, in itself 
perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country.68  
 
The classical theory of international trade grew to influence governments to 
reduce their barriers to trade. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) repealed 
its Corn Laws.69 It also influenced the prescriptions of International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs).70 Initially the theory was used to primarily influence the 
removal of tariffs because tariffs were, originally, the most prominent form of 
trade barrier. This move was referred to as trade liberalisation. However, over 
time, as nations dismantled high tariffs, they began to replace them with non-
tariff barriers (NTBs), such as the enforcement of standards and 
phytosanitary measures etc.71 Therefore, the theory was extended to similarly 
censure such measures. Thus, the idea emerged that trade should not only 
be liberalised but that also it should also be facilitated in order for 
development to be realised.72  
 
There are many different definitions of the concept of trade facilitation. 
However, despite the different phrasing, all of the definitions have certain 
features in common regarding what trade facilitation entails. It is about 
 
68  Mill Op cit note 60 at 922. Another example of an acceptable exception could be the 
institution of safeguard measures to give domestic producers temporary reprieve against 
inflows of more competitive foreign products that threaten their viability. 
69 These were laws that had regulated the internal trade, importation and exportation of grain 
from 1660. They had instituted high tariffs in order to restrict grain imports. Donald Grove 
Barnes A History of English Corn Laws from 1660–1846 (1930). 
70 For example, Shang-Jin Wei & Zhiwei Zhang  found that between 1993 and 2003 ninety-
nine countries participated in the structural adjustment programmes of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In 78% of the cases, the countries were required to implement trade 
openness as a condition of the programme. See their ‘Do external interventions work? The 
case of trade reform conditions in IMF supported programs’ (2010)  92(1) Journal of 
Development Economics at 71–81. 
71 For example, in the first five multilateral negotiation rounds of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the CONTRACTING PARTIES focused exclusively on negotiating 
tariff reductions. These rounds were: Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Torquay (1950), Geneva 
(1956), and the Dillon Round (1960). Non-tariff barriers were first tackled only in the Kennedy 
Round of 1964. This resulted in the adoption of an anti-dumping code. See Dilip K Das The 
Evolving Global Trade Architecture (2007) at14. 
72 The international trade theory posits that, where trade barriers are reduced, it then 
becomes easier for products to penetrate export markets. This can increase business profits 
from trading activities and government revenue through the taxation of business profits. This 
revenue can be applied for developmental purposes. 
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quickening the movement of goods across borders, reducing trade costs and 
ensuring the security of trade. World Bank publications have defined it as 
addressing 
 
the logistics of moving goods through ports or more efficiently moving 
documentation associated with cross-border trade. In recent years, the 
definition has been broadened to include the environment in which trade 
transactions take place, to include transparency and professionalism of 
customs and regulatory environments, as well as harmonization of standards 
and conformance to international or regional regulations. In addition, the 
rapid integration of networked information technology into trade means that 
modern definitions of trade facilitation need to encompass a technological 
concept as well.73 
 
Capaldo explains that ‘liberalization and facilitation share the same basic 
logic: reducing trading costs leads to higher net exports and economic 
activity’.74 Thus, the international trade theory gave birth to both the concept 
of trade liberalisation as well as that of trade facilitation. The only difference 
being that one evolved before the other, due to changes in the trade policies 
of states over time. Grainger agrees that ‘trade facilitation can be viewed as 
an extension of the efforts to liberalise international trade’.75 
 
The classical theory of international trade becomes important to this work 
because of its postulation that trade correlates positively with development. 
This is because this thesis considers the possible implications of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement on development in the Southern African Development 
Community. Some scholars have proposed that positive results can emanate 
from nations pursuing free trade for development.76 Some empirical studies 
have confirmed this position. For example, Andersen and Babula conducted 
 
73 John Wilson, Catherine Mann & Tsunehiro Otsuki Trade Facilitation and Economic 
Development: Measuring the Impact, (2003) at 4. 
74 Jeronim Capaldo Trade Hallucination: Risks of Trade Facilitation and Suggestions for 
Implementation, No 14-02, GDAE Working Papers, GDAE, Tufts University (2014) at 2.  
75 Andrew Grainger ‘Customs and trade facilitation: from concepts to implementation’  (2008) 
2(1) World Customs Journal at 20. 
76 Alan Winters proposes that trade liberalisation assists with economic growth and that this 
should, in turn, alleviate poverty. He, however, recognises that there are winners and losers 
in trade liberalisation and that compensatory policies should be used to ameliorate the effects 
on the poor. L Alan Winters ‘Trade policies for poverty alleviation’ in Bernard Hoekman, 
Aaditya & Philp English (eds) Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook at 28–38. 
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a study after which they concluded that, generally, empirical evidence shows 
that there is a positive relationship between international trade and economic 
growth.77 Another found a correlation between trade openness and greater 
income equality.78 However, it is argued that such perspectives, although 
important to show the potential value of trade to development outcomes, do 
not tell the full story. Because this research studies African developing 
countries in particular, it is imperative to consider theorists who interrogate 
the trade and development nexus from the perspective of the unique position 
of such countries. 
 
2.3.1.3. Heterodox Theories of International Trade 
Heterodox economics challenges the orthodox economic thinking of the 
classical trade theory. It cautions that markets are imperfect and that 
openness, in and of itself, will not necessarily lead to development. For 
example, the classic theory assumes that all countries are productive enough 
to export something competitively and to gain from their exports. However, 
where these preconditions do not exist, freeing trade will not lead to improved 
development for the states concerned. One of the classic heterodox 
economists was Frederich List (1789–1846). He disagreed with the classical 
theory of trade and argued that emerging states (which were France, Germany 
and the United States at the time) could not compete with established empires 
(primarily England) and that they needed to exercise some measure of 
 
77 They, however, drew a caveat that the theory seems inappropriate to assist developing 
countries to gain productivity growth through trade liberalisation. See also Lill Andersen & 
Ronald Babula ‘The link between openness and long-run economic growth’ (2008) United 
States International Trade Commission Journal of International Commerce and Economics,, 
available at https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/openness_growth_link.pdf,  
accessed on 7 October 2019. 
78 Stephen Dobson & Carlyn Ramlogan ‘Is there an Openness Kuznets curve?’(2009): 62 (2) 
Kyklos  International Review for Social Sciences, at 226–238. The authors studied 18 Latin 
American countries and advised that developing countries should not only pursue trade 
openness, but that  they should also implement redistribution policies simultaneously in 
order to reduce any possible adverse effects of trade liberalisation. 
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protectionism in order to catch up.79 He argued that the benefits of free trade, 
as espoused by Smith et al, only make sense if states are equally developed, 
not between states that are at different levels of economic development. Thus, 
he did not dispute the benefits of free trade but cautioned that the policy is 
appropriate or inappropriate regard being had to the status of the countries 
that are involved.80  
 
a person who… does not possess the power of producing objects of more value 
than he consumes… will become poorer. The reverse is also true: a person 
may be poor; if he, however, possesses the power of producing a larger amount 
of valuable articles than he consumes, he becomes rich.81  
 
Modern heterodox economists continue to criticise the assertions of the 
classical theory of international trade. They argue that the economic 
vulnerabilities of developing countries require more state intervention in the 
economies and that a free market system will not be beneficial for their 
development. For example, Stiglitz argues that liberalism has led to 
globalisation82 which, in turn, has not born positive fruits for developing 
countries in particular. In Globalization and its Discontents83 he contests the 
traditional notion that if all countries trade freely then they will all benefit 
(i.e., that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’ and ‘trickle-down economics’). Wade 
concurs that evidence shows that globalisation has not led to convergence 
 
79 In his The National System of Political Economy (new ed) (2014) at 5 List commented that ‘a 
small state, as against great empires, cannot apply or maintain beneficially that system, and 
that a power having once, by the help of restrictions, attained manufacturing and commercial 
ascendency, must return to the principle of free trade as soon as it becomes safe to do so 
https://vernonpress.com/file/148/57a0740e5a149d62a31372e62a7d119b/1388082146.p
df, accessed on  28 July 2019. 
80 Das Nationale System der Politischen Ökonomie (The National System of Political Economy) 
(1841). Translated by Sampson S Lloyd  in The National System of Political Economy (1909). 
81 Fredrich List Outlines of American Political Economy,  (1827) at 133. Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew 
Warner also conducted a study of the experiences of openness, or otherwise, on development 
in developing countries. They concluded that free trade was not a cause of development, but 
that development was a consequence of wider economic reforms. See their ‘Economic reform 
and the process of global integration’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1995)26  (1)1–
118. 
82 Peter Temin in his ‘Globalization’ (1999) 15 (4) Oxford Review of Economic Policy at 76–89 
defines globalisation as the institution of a global economy i.e., where all economies of the 
world are integrated into a single economy. One of the consequences of this is that shocks in 
one economy reverberate in other economies because of the inter-linkages. 
83 Joseph Stiglitz Globalization and its Discontents (2002). 
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and catching up.84 He opines that developing countries are often worse off 
after having followed the advice to concentrate on the areas of their 
comparative advantage - mainly to export commodities. He says that their 
economies have suffered and they have found themselves at the mercy of the 
West for market access and decisions on the terms of trade.85 Others blame 
liberalisation as the major source of corruption, worker exploitation and 
inequality in the developing world, especially in Africa. 86  
 
It becomes important to consider the ideologies of heterodox economics 
because the application of laissez-faire economics seems to have not had its 
peddled advantages in the developing world.87  Some empirical studies seem 
to confirm that free trade can be injurious to the economies of developing 
countries. One study illustrated how Mexico, by adopting liberalism under the 
then North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) relations won in some 
 
84 Robert Hunter Wade, ‘Return of industrial policy?’ (2012) 26(2) International Review of 
Applied Economics,  at 223–239. 
85 Robert Hunter Wade (2003) ‘What strategies are viable for developing countries today? The 
World Trade Organization and the shrinking of ‘development space’’ (2003) 10 (4) Review of 
International Political Economy at  631. Further, Dillon writes that ‘the story of trade between 
the north and the south reflects “vestiges of colonialism, global racism, and a long past of 
global exploitation.’ S. Dillon ‘A farewell to “linkage”: International trade law and global 
sustainability indicators’ (2002), 55 (1) Rutgers Law Review at 152. 
86 Yong-Shik Lee, Gary Horlick, Won-Mog Choi & Tomer Broude (eds) Law and Development 
Perspective on International Trade Law (2011), at.8. See also Wade Op cit note 85. 
87 See, for example, Francisco Rodríguez & Dani Rodrik ‘Trade policy and economic growth: 
A skeptic's guide to the cross-national evidence’ in Ben Shalom Bernanke & Kenneth S Rogoff  
(eds) NBER Macroeconomics Annual (2002). They suggest that, instead of there being an 
outright relation between trade and development, ‘the relationship is likely a contingent one 
which is dependent on a host of country and external factors, and not just the one factor of 
trade openness’. Rodrik reaches this conclusion in several other works. For instance, in In 
Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth (2003) and Dani Rodrik, Arvind 
Subramaniah & Fransceso Trebbi in ‘Institutions rule: The Primacy of Institutions over 
Geography and Integration in Economic Development (2000) 9 Journal of Economic Growth at 
131–165.  Here the authors conclude that ‘openness, in and of its own, is a weak factor in 
determining the propensity for growth at 153. See also Dani Rodrik  & Mark R Rosenzweig 
(eds) ‘Development policy and development economics: An introduction’ in Dani Rodrik 
&  Mark Rosenzweig (eds) Handbook of Development Economics vol 5 (2010) at xvi in which 
they surmise that ‘the policies that impact development are wide-ranging, all the way from 
broad macroeconomic policies such as monetary and exchange-rate policies to interventions 
in microfinance… one cannot associate the field of development with policies in just a narrow 
set of domains’ at xvi. 
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respects but lost heavily in others.88 Although its economy grew, it continued 
to battle problems such as poverty and inequality. The study argues that free 
trade is not a panacea for developing countries.  
 
This thesis finds the heterodox approach to be the most instructive and 
insightful in helping us to understand the relationship between trade and 
development, particularly in the context of developing nations. The classic 
theory of trade is valuable in explaining that freeing trade can have some 
beneficial effects on development. However, it ignores that openness may be 
harmful to some states under some circumstances. The heterodox position 
appears to be more moderate and appropriate for the countries that are being 
studied herein – viz developing countries. From the inception of the GATT, 
developing countries have always argued that some of the laissez faire 
principles are unfair because they do not take account of their unique 
economic, political, geographical and other characteristics.89 Developing 
countries need to produce competitively in order for their trade to lead to 
development. Prematurely liberalising trade when they are not competitive 
may be damaging to their economies. This thesis examines the extent to which 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement’s framework balances the desire to reduce 
trade barriers to achieve development, with the imperative to maintain 
appropriate policy interventions to contain any possible negative ramifications 
that may arise from its implementation. 
 
2.3.2. The Law and Development Theory 
This theory postulates on the relationship between law and development. One 
argument is that law is crucial for development to take place. By way of 
 
88 Eduardo Zepeda, Timothy A Wise &  Kevin P Gallagher Rethinking Trade Policy for 




NAFTA.pdf,  accessed on 17 August 2019. 
89 See, for example, submissions made by Brazil in 1946 and 1947 at meetings of the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), for example, Preparatory Committee of the 
International Conference on Trade and Employment Amendment to the American Suggested 
Charter, note  by the Brazilian Delegation (1946-) available at 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UN/EPCT/CII-6.PDF, accessed on 6 May 2020. 
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example it is said that, in order for capitalism to have emerged and flourished, 
laws were needed to protect property rights and to ensure contract 
enforcement.90 This is an illustrative and very basic example that the 
realisation of economic goals can be supported by complementary laws. Other 
legal developments that have been introduced to influence economic 
consequences include: the criminalisation of corruption (aimed to incentivise 
investment by improving a country’s business climate) and the provision of 
free and compulsory education (which may improve education rates thus 
leading to a higher skilled labour force that could be more productive).  
 
The SADC states wish to develop. One of the research questions that was 
posed herein is whether legal instruments are important tools to assist SADC 
member states to advance their development. The countries have already 
signed onto many agreements that have trade facilitation provisions. However, 
seemingly, these agreements have yielded limited results as far as improving 
their development is concerned. This us leads to question whether there is 
indeed a relationship between the laws that they have put in place and the 
development outcomes that they are experiencing.  
 
The relationship between law and development has been discussed in the 
academic literature since the 1950s.91 However, despite this, there had been 
no comprehensive theory to support the practices of reformers, i.e., there had 
not, as yet, emerged a general theory of law and development. More recently, 
Yong-Shik Lee has attempted to develop such a comprehensive theory.92 
According to this scholar, in order for law to have an impact on development, 




90 Amartya Sen  ‘What is the role of legal and judicial reform in the development process?’ 
(2006) 2 The World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity, and Development at 42. 
91 David M Trubek & Alvaro Santos The Third Moment in Law and Development: Theory and 
the Emergence of a New Critical Practice (2006). 
92 Yong-Shik Lee, Law and Development: Theory and Practice, (2019). 
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§ regulatory design (how optimally the law is designed to achieve its 
regulatory objectives) 
§ regulatory compliance (the conduct of the general public in complying 
with the law) and 
§ quality of implementation (the degree to which a state undertakes the 
mandate to fulfil the objectives of the law). 
 
Y.S. Lee applied this theory to determine the extent to which it might explain 
countries’ development successes or failures. He found that, in South Korea, 
the government used formal law to implement development-led policies. For 
example, it used laws that enabled it to provide support for certain identified 
manufacturing industries93 and to support exports in particular.94 In addition 
to this, the country had effective institutions95 that were able to secure 
compliance. Finally, it had good quality implementation of laws by an efficient 
and well-organised administration. He concluded that all of these aspects 
contributed to South Korea’s successful attainment of development. 
Conversely, in post-apartheid South Africa, there has been a lack of 
development-facilitating laws and no effective institutional architecture to 
secure compliance by the general populace. The quality of implementation 
has been constrained by the lack of resources and educated/skilled human 
resources, corruption and inconsistent political will. These are some of the 
explanations offered as to why South Africa had not achieved the same 
development success as Korea, according to Lee’s law and development 
theory. 
 
Lee writes that laws can ‘facilitate or inhibit development by influencing actors 
in the economy and society’.96 However, his Analytical Law and Development 
 
93 For example, the Act for Temporary Measures for the Grant of Export Subsidies (1961), 
Export Promotion Act (1962), Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (1965). 
94 For example the Act on Temporary Measures for Textile Industrial Facilities (1967), 
Shipbuilding Industries (1967), Electronic Industries (1969), Petrochemical Industries (1970) 
and Steel Industries (1970), etc. at 72 e.g. by loans, tax exemptions, subsidies, rants, rebates, 
etc. 
95 Such as the Economic Planning Board which coordinated all other government 
departments, and financial institutions such as the Korea Development Bank. 
96 Yong-Shik Lee, General Theory of Law and Development, Cornell Int'l LJ, 2017 pp 415-468 
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Model (ADM) proposes that, in order for law to be effective in reforming 
economies, laws, legal frameworks, and institutions97 are all equally 
important elements. The theory holds that the causal relationship between 
law and development cannot be divorced from the context of the socio-
economic conditions in a state. Socio-economic conditions will affect the 
effectiveness of law reform projects and thus they must be considered when 
engaging in an analysis of regulatory design, compliance and 
implementation.98  
 
This thesis similarly argues that, although law is necessary for development, 
it is not sufficient. For a positive developmental outcome, laws are required to 
be appropriate in relation to the characteristics of the society or country in 
which they are applied. For instance, the state will have to have the 
infrastructure and the institutions that are needed to enforce the laws. 
Context is everything.99 This fact is sometimes not acknowledged or catered 
for in international agreements where there are diverse participating countries 
that are at different levels of development. Rodrik et al explain that the 
 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cintl50&div=21&g_sent=1&casa_t
oken=&collection=journals accessed 5 November 2019. 
97 Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramaniah & Fransceso Trebbi Op cit note 64 at 131–165  discuss 
how economists have attributed economic differences between countries either as being due 
to geography, international trade (integration) or institutions (in particular property rights or 
the rule of law). After conducting some studies, they conclude that the institutional 
environment plays a stronger role than the others. 
98 Lee explains these three concepts thus: ‘”Regulatory Design” means a law that is optimally 
designed to meet its objectives. ‘Compliance’ refers to the conduct of the public in complying 
with the law. ‘Implementation’ is the degree to which the state works to fulfil the objectives of 
the law, for example, through legislative, administrative and judicial action. State capacity 
and political will is therefore crucial for law to impact development. Yong-Shik Lee ‘General 
theory of law and development (2017) Cornell International Law Journal  at 419, 469. 
99 Dani Rodrik Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy (2018) available at 
https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/stable/j.ctvc779z4, accessed on 20 April, 2019.  In 
Yong-Shik Lee et al  Law and Development (Op cit note 86 at 224) the authors explain that 
economists used to hold a ‘universalist’ conception of institutions. This caused them to 
presume that what worked well in one country could suitably be transplanted in another. 
This informed the workings institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development which tried to model 
institutional reform in the developing world on western templates, ignoring the ‘context 
specificity of institutional designs’,  i.e., what institutions are required and in what form will 
depend on country-specific context (at 94). They advise, therefore, that countries should 
apply regulations and institutions which they believe will better serve them, instead of having 
other countries or organisations imposing such choices on them under fear of sanctions or 
other pressures (at 224). 
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question is not ‘does it work’; instead it is a question of ‘when does it work 
and when not and why?’100 This means that there are no rules of thumb and 
that context is important. Therefore, it is important to consider whether the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) is sensitive to the different contexts of its 
member states. Also, whether the SADC countries will be able to implement 
its reforms in light of their idiosyncratic socio-economic characteristics. Laws 
are only as effective as the compliance and implementation capacities of the 
parties. These have real challenges in SADC and partly explain why trade 
facilitation has not improved by much in the region. Therefore, this thesis will 
investigate the extent of these challenges and also whether, and how, the TFA 
can address them. 
 
2.4.  Theories on the Compliance of States with International Law  
Another research question that this thesis considers is: why do excessive 
cross-border costs and delays continue, despite the several treaties that SADC 
members participate in to address these challenges? Theories on why states 
comply with international law, and why they sometimes do not comply with 
international law, might be insightful in assisting us to understand why there 
is this dichotomy.  
 
There is a distinction between the concepts of compliance, implementation 
and effectiveness. Jacobson and Brown Weiss have devised very useful 
definitions of these concepts. They write that “implementation refers to 
measures that states take to make international accords effective in their 
domestic law” (i.e., if the treaty is non-self-executing).101 ‘Compliance’ refers 
to whether states adhere to the substantive and procedural provisions, as well 
 
100 Rodrik & Rosenzweig Op cit note 87. 
101 Beth Simmons defines it as ‘the adoption of domestic rules or regulations that are meant 
to facilitate, but do not in themselves constitute, compliance with international agreements 
‘in  ‘Compliance with international agreements’ (1998) 1 Annu Rev Polit Sci. at 77–78. 
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as to the spirit of a treaty.102 ‘Effectiveness’ refers to a treaty achieving its 
stated objectives, or addressing the problems that had led to its creation. 
Compliance with a treaty may not necessarily lead to its effectiveness – 
compliance is not sufficient for effectiveness.103  
 
A famous quotation asserts that ‘almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of 
the time’.104 This work does not seek to measure the exact extent of the SADC 
states’ compliance with trade facilitation treaty obligations. Rather, it 
interrogates whether compliance challenges could be one of the explanatory 
factors of why there has been little progress with facilitating trade on the sub-
continent. 105 There are various arguments on why states comply with their 
international obligations. It could be out of a conviction that there is a moral 
obligation for them to do so. This is captured in the maxim pacta sunt 
 
102 Oran R Young explains it thus: “compliance can be said to occur when the actual behavior 
of a given subject conforms to prescribed behavior, and noncompliance or violation occurs 
when actual behavior departs significantly from prescribed behaviour.” In  Compliance and 
Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications (1979) 104. This definition is also 
followed in Sylvia I Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen &  Antto Vihma ‘Comparing the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of global hard and soft law: An analytical framework’ (2009) 3(4) Regulation & 
Governance 405. See also Roger Fisher Improving Compliance with International Law (1981). 
103 Harold K Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss ‘Strengthening compliance with international 
environmental Accords: Preliminary observations from a collaborative project‘ ( 1995)  1(2) 
No. Global Governance, Vol 2 ( at 125–127). Their research emanated from a research 
consortium to explore the extent to which countries implement and comply with international 
environmental treaties. They found that the factors that may influence a country’s compliance 
with a treaty are the following: (a) the characteristics of the treaty, (b) country characteristics 
(i.e., the social, cultural, political, and economic characteristics of the country), (c) a country’s 
policy history in relation to the subject matter of the treaty, (d) leadership, (e) availability of 
information on the treaty issues, (f) the role played by nongovernmental organisations, 
multinational corporations and international governmental organisations and (g) the actions 
of other states (whether they are complying or not).. 
104 Louis Henkin How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 2ed (1979) at 4. See also Jose 
Alvarez, ‘Why nations behave’ (1998) 19 (2) Michigan Journal of International Law. 
105 Many writers argue that it is impossible to measure the exact extent of treaty compliance. 
For example, Young Op cit note 102 at  104–105 and Jacobson Weiss Op cit note 103 at 123. 
They conclude that compliance is never perfect and that substantial compliance is what is 
sought by those who advocate for treaties and agreements. 
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servanda, which refers to the sanctity of contract.106 It could be out of habit 
of continued observance107 or to preserve their reputation.108 Finally, 
Trachtman has an interesting theory that a state’s compliance depends more 
on domestic decision-making processes than on external conditions. He 
argues that “… there will ordinarily be target state constituencies that benefit 
from compliance and target state constituencies that are harmed by 
compliance. The decision to comply will depend on the relative influence 
exercised by these constituencies.”109 
 
The above insights show that there are many views on the causes of 
compliance. However, this thesis will concentrate on three theories in 
particular that might be helpful, not only in understanding compliance 
challenges in the current trade facilitation treaty architecture as far as it 
applies to the SADC states, but also in debating whether the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement may fare better in terms of securing the compliance of members. 
These theories are: 
 
§ Enmeshment theory 
§ The Managerial approach to compliance 
§ Embedded liberalism 
 
106 Malcolm P Sharp ‘Pacta sunt servanda‘ (1941) 41 (5) Columbia Law Review. Harold Hongju 
Koh  ‘Why do nations obey international law’  (1996-1997) 106 Yale L.J. writes that Natural 
Law that applied during the classical period of the development of international law held that 
states should obey their commitments because international law was part of a higher law of 
nature. Thus, treaty compliance had religious/theological/moral undertones to it. See also 
Alfred Verdross's ‘Le fondement du droit international’ (1927) 16 RdCI and Nathaniel Berman 
The paradoxes of legitimacy: Case studies in international legal modernism(1991) 32 Harv 
Int'l LJ at 585. 
107 Henkin Op cit note 107 at 58. 
108 Robert Keohane ‘Compliance with international commitments: Politics within a framework 
of law’ (1992) 86 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law),  
at 178;  IFI Shihata The attitude of new states toward the International Court of Justice 
(1965) 19 (2) International Organizations203–222; Tanja A Börzel, Tobias Hofmann, Diana 
Panke & Carina Sprungk ‘Obstinate and inefficient: Why member states do not comply with 
European Law‘ (2010) 43 (11) Comparative Political Studies at 1363–1390; George W Downs 
& Michael A Jones ‘Reputation, compliance, and international law’ (2002) 31 (S1) The Journal 
of Legal Studies; Roda Mushkat NIB ‘State reputation and compliance with international law: 
Looking through a Chinese lens‘(2011) 10 (4), Chinese Journal of International Law at 703–
737. 
109 Joel P Trachtman International law and domestic political coalitions: The Grand Theory 
of Compliance with International Law‘ (2010) 11 (1) Chicago Journal of International Law at 
135. 
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2.4.1.  The Enmeshment Theory on Compliance with International Law 
Enmeshment is said to occur when a state’s interests mirror those of the 
international regime. Thus, a state will obey regime rules where they match 
its own interests. When this happens, according to the theory, the regime 
rules will become self-enforcing. Kelly explains that ‘as nations' interests and 
the regime's interests become coextensive, states will self-enforce regime rules 
and the regime will become a constraining regime’.110 Keohane argues that 
enmeshment is critical to compliance because, apart from it, states will not 
have incentive to refrain from cheating regime rules.111 For enmeshment to be 
able to secure compliance by motivating states to self-enforce rules, the 
nature of the commitments and that of the institutions are critical.  
 
The Nature of the Commitments 
According to the theory, for enmeshment to follow, the international rules 
must be precise, obligatory, and interpretable.112’ Precise’ means that a treaty 
should not contain vague statements of principles or ambiguous provisions 
that would lead to a broad interpretation of what is acceptable. Precise 
language is more favourable for ensuring future compliance. Precision, 
therefore, requires detailed prescriptions of concrete actions that are to be 
taken and those that are to be avoided. ‘Obligatoriness’ means that the 
language should indicate that conduct is mandatory (i.e., that states are 
legally bound to comply). Compliance mechanisms may also be built into an 
agreement as an indication of the compulsory nature of commitments.113 The 
 
110 Claire R Kelly ’Enmeshment as a theory of compliance’ (2005) 37(2) New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics at 305. 
111 Keohane Op cit note 108 at  179. He falls into the same school of thinking as Axelrod and 
Young, e.g. Robert M Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation (1984); Robert M Axelrod An 
evolutionary approach to norms’, (1986) 80 Am Pol Sci Rev. See also Michael Taylor Anarchy 
and Cooperation (1976); Michael Taylor The Possibility of Cooperation (1987)at 127. See  also  
Op cit note; Oran R Young International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources 
and the Environment (1989); Oran R Young International Governance: Protecting the 
Environment in a Stateless Society (1994); Oran R Young ‘The effectiveness of international 
institutions: Hard cases and critical variables’ in James N Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel 
(eds) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (1992) at 160. 
112 Kelly, Op cit note 110 at 305. 
113 That is, mechanisms which allow for the evaluation of compliance and the taking of action 
in the event of non-compliance. 
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strength of the commitment can affect compliance. For example, whether 
there was signature or ratification.114  
 
Enmeshment theory proposes that compliance is further enhanced when 
states view international rules as being legitimate. This is where rules are 
perceived as being fair,115 and where all parties are satisfied that they have 
been able to play a genuine role in the law-making process. International law-
making should be transparent about what is trying to be achieved and 
accommodative of the needs and the capacities of different participating 
members. There should be fruitful communication and mutual compromise. 
Thus, not only is the substance of the rules important for compliance, but the 
process of norm-creation is equally so. Thus, the negotiation phase is an 
integral aspect of securing future compliance. Scholars have emphasised the 
contribution of participatory negotiation to eventual compliance.116 It is said 
to affect enmeshment and the motivation of states to invest in the rules. 
However, the reality is that, in practice, the stronger states (politically and 
economically) tend to be more assertive in negotiations and thus better able 
to shape the legal processes according to their preferences. This means that, 
at the implementation stage, those states will have less costs to endure, 
because the commitments are likely to bear a close resemblance to their 
articulated interests and to their calculated capacity to implement. 
Conversely, weaker states are less able to influence decision-making and thus 
arising costs of compliance may influence their willingness to abide by 





114 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) arts 11 to 17 and 19 to 23.  See also 
Wade Cole ‘Human rights as myth and ceremony? Re-evaluating the effectiveness of human 
rights treaties, 1981–2007’ (2012) 227 (4) American Journal of Sociology’. 
115 Thomas M. Franck has written about the importance of the fairness of international law, 
for example in The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) and Fairness In International 
Law and Institutions (1995). 
116 Simmons Op cit note 101 at 89. 
117 Börzel et al Op cit note 108.  
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The Nature of the Institutional Arrangements 
The theory also suggests that the  likelihood of compliance is amplified by the 
existence of strong institutions that can make rules, interpret them, monitor 
compliance, resolve disputes and enforce compliance. In order to fulfil this 
broad mandate, it is imperative for institutions to have strong compliance 
mechanisms of a political and/or economic nature.  
 
2.4.2.  The Managerial Approach to Compliance with International 
Obligations  
This approach to compliance argues that non-compliance is largely 
involuntary and that it is due to the absence of the preconditions that enable 
states to comply with their commitments. This could be due to insufficient 
state capacity or to unrealistic timetables within which compliance is to be 
achieved. These are pertinent issues to explain the compliance challenges of 
less-developed countries, such as SADC states, in particular. Chayes and 
Chayes note that, compliance requires ‘scientific and technical judgment, 
bureaucratic capability, and fiscal resources. Although there are surely 
differences among developing countries, the characteristic situation is a 
severe dearth of the requisite scientific, technical, bureaucratic, and financial 
wherewithal to build effective domestic enforcement systems’.118 Thus, the 
suggestion of the managerial theory is that compliance is to be secured by 
bolstering a state’s capacity, for example, by providing it with access to 
information, training, or adequate financial resources. According to the 
theory, barring such interventions, rule-consistent behaviour may simply not 
be possible for some states. According to this school, the function of 
international agreements is not only to specify obligations and to punish lack 
of conformity. It is also to facilitate the attainment of implementation capacity 
for those states that require it.119  
 
118 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes ‘On compliance’ (1993) 47 (2)International 
Organization at 194. 
119 P M Haas R O Keohane & M A Levy. Institutions for the Earth: Sources of International 
Environmental Protection (1993). 
119 John G Ikenberry ‘The end of liberal international order (2018) 95(1) International Affairs 
Simmons Op cit note 101.  
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2.4.3. Embedded Liberalism and Compliance with Multilateralism 
Liberal internationalism envisions international order as emanating from the 
cooperation of states for their mutual benefit.120  This is seen as best achieved 
through liberalism that is facilitated by institutions. This is described as 
‘multilateralism.’ Some view multilateralism as a form of coordination that 
requires harmonised conduct of states and protectionism as a threat to 
multilateralism.121 However, Ruggie understands this differently. He argues 
that protectionism is not a deviation from liberalisation but that it is ‘an 
integral feature of it.’122 He calls this philosophy embedded liberalism.  
 
Embedded liberalism challenges assumptions about the function and 
workings of the international trade regime.123 It proposes that the 
international trade regime, while advocating for non-discrimination and non-
protectionism, equally leaves room for governmental intervention in an 
economy, should such a necessity arise. So, there is liberalism, but embedded 
into this, is also scope for limited and modest intervention in support of 
domestic stability. This is why the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
which was the first multilateral trade liberalisation instrument, contained 
several ‘safeguards, exemptions, exceptions and restrictions to protect various 
social objectives’.124 This was so long as there was no unjustified or arbitrary 
discrimination involved.125 Even the mechanisms of surveillance and dispute 
 
120 Ikenberry Ibid. 
121 For example, a Wall Street Journal article entitled  ‘Surge in protectionism worries and 
perplexes leaders of many lands‘ 14 April 1978, as cited in Melvyn B Krauss, The New 
Protectionism: The Welfare State in International Trade (1978) at xix–xx. 
122 J G Ruggie International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism and the 
postwar economic order (1982), 36 (2) International Organization  at 410. 
123 Andrew T F Lang Reconstructing embedded liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and 
constructivist approaches to the study of the international trade regime‘  (2006) 9 (1) Journal 
of International Economic Law. 
124 Ruggie Op cit note 122 at 386. See also Blonigen B A  & T J Prusa ‘Dumping and 
antidumping duties’ in Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert (eds) Handbook of Commercial Policy 
vol 1 part B (2016). 
125 Robert Howse ‘From politics to technocracy—and back again: The fate of the multilateral 
trading regime’ (2002) 96 (1) The American Journal of International Law at 97.  
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resolution were meant to resolve disputes considering this balance between 
liberalism and stability.126 
 
Therefore, Ruggie’s conclusion is that it is misguided to characterise the 
international trade regime as being a strictly legal one with lots of cheating 
taking place. Instead, he argues that it was the very intention of the regime to 
accommodate both liberalisation and the ability of states to respond to socially 
disruptive domestic adjustment costs. He argues that multilateralism 
‘expresses aspirations, not specific commitments and detailed blueprints for 
action’.127 In other words, in his view, it is not possible to always have strict 
adherence (compliance) to multilateralism.  
 
Of particular interest to this thesis is that Ruggie argues that  ‘both the 
substantive policy agenda as well as the rhetoric of multilateralism have 
shifted over time, as policy makers have learned from past mistakes or simply 
seek to defuse political criticism’128 This suggests that it is timely for 
developing countries to capitalise on this shifting of the focus and principles 
of the international trading system in such a way as to make or force the 
system to finally begin to accommodate their interests as well. Ruggie further 
alleges that ‘the compromise of embedded liberalism has never been fully 
extended to the developing countries’.129 He argues that, instead, these 
countries have been disproportionately subject to the strict, unbending 
orthodox measures of the international trade system and that the kind of 
liberalisation that has followed from this has not benefitted them. Embedded 
liberalism is not a fait accompli. It is dependent on constant renegotiation if 
trade liberalisation is going to be sustainable in the long term. States need to 
constantly reinvent embedded liberalism and evolve new ways to successfully 
 
126 Jeffrey L Dunoff ‘How should international economic disputes be resolved‘ (2001) S Tex L 
Rev at 1219 (2001). He writes that writes that WTO dispute resolution is not about securing 
compliance, but that it’s about honouring these compromises between compliance and 
flexibility, calling it the compromise of embedded legalism. 
127 John Gerard Ruggie ‘Third try at world order? America and multilateralism after the Cold 
War’ ( 1994) 109P (4) Political Science Quarterly  at 557. 
128 Ruggie Op cit note 122 at  558.  
129 Ruggie Op cit note 122 at 413-414. 
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balance the need for domestic protection with their commitment to free 
trade.130 This thesis considers whether the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
reflects these objectives of liberalisation and flexibility, especially considering 
the needs and interests of developing countries, not only in terms of the 
contents of the agreement, but also the processes involved. The table below 
summarises the assumptions and expectations of the theories that have been 
introduced as being pertinent to this study. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Theories 
Theory Assumption Expectation 
I. International trade theories: they share a common assumption that trade influences development. 
They, however, differ on how trade should be regulated to achieve positive development outcomes. They 
all recognise the role of protectionism, but adopt differing views on its role in trade policy. 
Mercantilism Trade is a zero-sum game. There are 
winners and losers in trading. Each 
state should strive to be a winner 
Trade protectionism is the key 
to economic and political 
domination 
Classic theory of 
international trade 
Every nation has unique advantages 
and should be free to exploit those in a 
free market setting. Trade restrictions 
are harmful and should only be used, 
non-discriminately, in limited 
circumstances. 
The free exchange of goods 
leads to the development of all 
nations. There are no winners 
and losers because every state 
has something to gain from its 
unique advantages. 
Heterodox economics Markets are imperfect, therefore, trade 
openness, per se, cannot guarantee 
development 
Appropriate policy interventions 
can  contain the adverse effects 
of free trade which hurt 
development prospects 
II. Law and Development Law is crucial for development Well-designed laws, which are 
complied with and soundly 
implemented will support 
development 
III. Compliance Theories: they share a common assumption that compliance challenges impede the 
effectiveness of treaties which could, otherwise, support development. They differ in their 
characterisation of what causes compliance challenges and how the challenges should be mitigated. 
Enmeshment theory States will comply with treaties that 
have clear and firm norms and a 
supportive institutional structure 
Where these conditions are 
present, treaties will become 
self-enforcing and their goal of 
contributing to development will 
be actualised 
Managerial approach Non-compliance with treaties is due to 
a lack of capacity on the part of states 
With capacity assistance states 
will be enabled to comply with 
treaty norms which support 
development 
Embedded liberalism Liberalism enhances treaty compliance Recognising flexibility in the 
assumption of treaty obligations 
will ensure greater compliance 
and thus treaties will be 
effective in their development-
enhancing mandate 
 
130 Lang Op cit note 123 at 88–89, 97. 
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2.5. Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the concept of development and has argued the 
perspective of development that informs the analysis in this research. This 
thesis asks: how can trade facilitation support development? Considering the 
theories that have been introduced in this chapter on the relationship between 
trade and development, the picture that seems to emerge is that trade can be 
beneficial for development. However, there are instances where governments 
may have legitimate policy reasons for electing to restrict trade in order to 
protect other vital interests.131 Heterodox economics has been found to be the 
most instructive theory for examining the trade and development analysis in 
relation to developing countries, such as the SADC states. It counsels that 
the context and the timing of freeing trade are important considerations which 
can impact the results thereof. The insights of heterodox economics will be 
used to interrogate the trade and development nexus in the following chapter. 
 
The second research question is: do compliance challenges explain the 
ineffectiveness of trade facilitation treaties in SADC? This chapter has 
discussed how enmeshment theory and the managerial approach seem to be 
particularly relevant to the context of SADC countries, given their attributes 
such as institutional weaknesses and capacity constraints. These theoretical 
insights will be used in chapters 4 and 7 to interrogate whether their 
observations apply to SADC trade facilitation agreements. Embedded 
liberalism argues that a balance is necessary between multilateralism and 
social purpose. Chapter 7 discusses the evolution of the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement and addresses it incorporates respect for both elements in this 
balance and, therefore, whether there is a likelihood of it securing treaty 
compliance and, subsequently, effectiveness.  
 
Finally, the law and development theory argues that law is a potentially 
valuable tool for implementing reforms that can lead to development. 
 
131 It has been argued that there is good protectionism and bad protectionism. Good 
protectionism is temporary and targeted and it is part of a holistic industrial policy: Erik 
Reinert How Rich Countries Got Rich and Why Poor Country Stay Poor (2007) appendix IV. 
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Following this theoretical insight states have conducted legal reforms in order 
to implement changes that will, they hope, have a positive influence on their 
development trajectory. Chapter 6 will discuss how SADC governments have 
attempted to use laws to implement trade facilitation strategies. The argument 
is that law, on its own, is not enough, and that other factors, such as the 
quality of compliance and institutions are also important determinants of the 




























Chapter 3 - Trade Facilitation and its Relationship to Development 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers the question of how trade facilitation can support 
development. Chapter 2 introduced theories on the relationship between 
international trade and development.132 Mercantilism was shown to favour 
the restriction of trade as a means of ensuring development, even at the 
expense of one’s trading partners. Conversely, the classical theory of 
international trade133 posits that it is free trade, and not protectionism, which 
correlates positively with development. Thus, that free trade is good for all 
states; the freer the better. This thesis has elected to follow the insights of 
heterodox economics to answer the question on the relationship between 
trade and development.134 This is because of its appropriateness to developing 
country perspectives in particular. This school proposes that trade is good, 
but it equally cautions that nations must open their trade strategically, regard 
being had to their own unique circumstances. This is because, it argues, trade 
is not inherently positively correlated to development. Thus, trade can have 
anti-developmental outcomes if not undertaken tactically. 
 
This chapter begins with an exposition of the concept of trade facilitation. It 
explains that trade facilitation contributes to trade openness by addressing 
the removal of cross-border barriers to trade. This is followed by an argument 
that this openness can contribute to development by, for instance, improving 
the competitiveness of domestic producers and their ability to participate in 
value chain production. It is also argued that there can arise negative anti-
developmental consequences from facilitating trade. These cannot be ignored. 
They should be seriously considered by developing nations, such as the SADC 
states. These states should, therefore, carefully consider how they can 
 
132 Section 2.3.1 above. 
133 Smith’s Theory of Absolute Advantage, Ricardo’s Theory of Comparative Advantage, and 
the Heckscher and Ohlin Factor Proportions Theory. Section 2.3.1.2 above. 
134 Chapter 2 argued that the rationale for trade facilitation is the same as that for trade 
liberalisation, i.e., both seek to use trade as a tool to contribute positively to development. 
See Capaldo Op cit note 74. 
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strategically open up their trade under trade facilitation instruments so that 
desirable developmental effects are attained and negative ones are contained. 
 
3.2. The Evolution of Trade Facilitation 
The facilitation of trade can be achieved unilaterally through domestic 
reforms, or through bilateral, regional, or multilateral efforts. The first 
attempts at facilitating trade emerged under bilateral subject-specific 
cooperation agreements or bilateral customs treaties. For example, the 
Liechtenstein-Austria-Hungary customs treaty of 1852 and the 1923 
Switzerland-Liechtenstein customs union agreement, which created a 
common regime for goods and required the harmonisation of laws pertaining 
to customs. These arrangements, however, had limited provisions on trade 
facilitation.  
 
[they were] typically limited to a narrowly defined area of customs reforms 
(often linked to fees and charges aspects as well as basic transparency 
disciplines). Later agreements expanded their coverage to include areas 
such as simplification of trade documents and border agency cooperation. 
The scope expanded further in subsequent treaties, which incorporated 
measures like risk management, advance rulings, appeal rights, authorized 
operators, express shipments, single window, temporary admission or 
procedures for the rapid release of goods.135 
 
The 1960s saw the advent and growth of regional trade agreements (RTAs).136 
Initially these RTAs focused only on trade liberalisation. However, in the 
1970s RTAs began to contain a smattering of provisions that indirectly related 
to trade facilitation (for example, measures on sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures and technical barriers to trade). From the 1980s there began to be 
more focused trade facilitation provisions in RTAs, although still not very 
 
135 Nora Neufeld. ‘Trade facilitation under the regional trade agreement umbrella: Origins and 
evolution’ in Rohini Acharya (ed) World Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreements and 
the Multilateral Trade System, ((2016) at 114. 
136 Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagaria (eds) New Dimensions in Regional Integration (1993). 
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comprehensive nor binding.137 Multilateral concern with barriers to trade 
facilitation began in earnest with the advent of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It addressed these types of barriers in its Articles V, 
VIII and X.138 Article V protects the freedom of transit by prohibiting 
unnecessary delays, restrictions and charges related to transit trade. Article 
VIII regulates the fees and formalities that are connected with importation and 
exportation. It is meant to ensure that such fees and charges are reasonable 
and that they do not serve as an indirect restriction of trade. Article X 
concerns the publication and administration of trade regulations. It requires 
that all laws, decisions and international agreements relating to trade shall 
be promptly published so that all interested parties can become acquainted 
with them. Subsequent agreements that addressed specific trade facilitation 
impediments were the agreements on Rules of Origin, Pre-shipment 
Inspection, Customs Valuation, Import Licensing, Technical Barriers to 
Trade, and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Inspections.139  
 
 
137 A study on the prevalence of trade facilitation provisions in regional trade agreements 
shows that the proportion of trade facilitation provisions in RTAs grew over the years from 
14% of RTAs in the 1970s, to 50% of RTAs in the 1980s, 92% of treaties in the 1990s, until 
the high of 95% of RTAs concluded between the year 2000 and mid 2013. Nora Neufeld Trade 
Facilitation Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements Traits and Trends(2014) at 7, available 
at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/90709/1/776567853.pdf, accessed 1 
December 2019. 
138 Articles VII and IX can also be argued to have some relation to trade facilitation. Article 
VII deals with valuation for customs purposes. It speaks to harmonisation, which is key for 
trade facilitation. Article IX governs marks of origin. Amongst others, it recognises that 
requirements relating to marks of origin may cause difficulties and inconvenience to traders. 
It requires that such requirements be kept at a minimum level which is necessary for 
consumer protection, and, further, that traders should not be unduly penalised for failing to 
affix marks unless, for example, some form of deception was intended.  
139 Chapter 4 discusses the GATT framework and these other agreements in more detail. 
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3.3. The Definition of Trade Facilitation 
It is a well-established principle of international law that every state is 
sovereign. 140 This means that, generally, every state is free to do as it likes 
within its territory.141 This includes the freedom to control the movement of 
people and of goods in to and out of its territory.142 This is why states 
designate specific points along their territories, viz. borders, 143 where such 
movements can occur and why they have an array of laws governing such 
movements.144 There are various officials who are involved in the regulation 
of cross-border movements. Immigration officials control the movement of 
persons across borders. Officials from Customs control the movement of 
goods. Agriculture and Forestry departments may also be represented at 
borders because the cross-border movements of goods may present a threat 
to the plant life in the importing country or may violate laws to protect 
endangered species in the country of export. Officials from the health sector 
 
140 Oppenheim describes sovereignty as a ‘supreme authority, an authority which is 
independent of any other earthly authority.’ L Oppenheim, quoted in the seminal work edited 
by Hersch Lauterpacht, namely, International Law: A Treatise vol I, 8 ed (1955) 118–119. 
Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974) 
pronounces that every state has sovereignty over all its economic activities. This signifies that 
states can control all of their internal and external economic activities. In 1986, at the Seoul 
Conference of the International Law Association, members recognised that art 2(1) is a 
recognised principle of international law as seen in the International Law Association’s Report 
of the 62 Conference: Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public 
International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order (1986) at 6 para 5.1.  
141 Barring certain internationally banned actions, for example: genocide (Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); discrimination (International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), and the 
convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) and financing terrorism 
(International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) etc. 
142 Hans van Houtte The Law of International Trade 2ed (2002) at 10–11. This was emphasised 
at the 2017 G20 Summit where the leaders affirmed ‘the sovereign right of states to manage 
and control their borders and in this regard to establish policies in their own national 
interests and national security’. See also G20 Leaders´ Declaration: Shaping an Interconnected 
World7–July 2017 at 14. 
143 A border has been defined  by Sipho Khumalo as ‘a built-up facility that enables/facilitates 
the movement of desirable persons and goods whilst it prevents/blocks the movement of 
unwanted persons and goods through the use of monitoring devices and control facilities’ in 
‘Unlocking South African cross-border transport challenges: A case study of Beitbridge 
Border Post’ in Proceedings of the 33rd Southern African Transport Conference at 835. Another 
definition says it includes ‘a set of things that facilitate (roads, bridges, ferries), prevent 
(fences, military installations), monitor (cameras, motion detectors) and control (border 
crossing facilities) movement across the boundary’. William Anderson & Jean-Paul Rodrigue, 
Transborder and Crossborder Transportation (2013), available at  
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5en/conc5en/ch5c1en.html, accessed on 1 
December 2019. 
144 For example, customs laws, immigration laws, etc. 
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ensure that traded goods do not pose a threat to the health of persons and/or 
of animals. There are also members of the security sector who are at borders 
to monitor, prevent and respond to security threats or breaches. Lastly, 
department of transport officials verify the authorisations of vehicles and of 
drivers. These are the officials that interact with traders, be they importers or 
exporters, or their agents. Trade facilitation concerns the implementation, by 
these officials, of measures that will allow goods to be processed across 
borders in a quicker, cheaper and more secure manner. 
 
A World Bank report found that,  
 
[I]n Denmark, an exporter needs three documents … and two signatures… 
to complete all requirements for shipping cargo abroad. It takes on average 
five days from the time he starts preparing documents to the time the cargo 
is ready to sail. In contrast, it takes 11 documents, 17 visits to various 
offices, 29 signatures and 67 days on average for an exporter in Burundi 
to have his goods moved from the factory to the ship.145 
 
These discrepancies are due to the extent to which trade is facilitated in the 
respective countries. There are certain practices which can increase delays, 
add costs and compromise the security of trade. This is potentially to the 
detriment, not only of traders, but also of consumers, governments and the 
economy as a whole. The concept of trade facilitation concerns addressing 
these barriers in the hopes that development gains can flow from trade. Trade 
facilitation is about making cross border trade faster, cheaper and more 
secure.146 It aims to balance the interests of government with those of the 
private sector. On the one hand, government desires to gain revenue from the 
collection of duties and other charges related to trade.147 It also wants to 
protect national interests, such as public health and security. On the other 
hand, traders desire to have efficient, transparent, and cost-effective border 
 
145 Simeon Djankov, Caroline Freund & Cong S Pham Trading on Time, (2006)  at 9. 
146 Vinod Rege, Negotiating at the World Trade Organization: Lessons from the Commonwealth, 
No.2, Commonwealth Secretariat (2011). 
147 Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation. Can Trade Facilitation Drive Manufacturing FDI? 
(2017) 6, available at  
http://www.tradefacilitation.org/uploads/6/4/3/2/64320759/icc-trade-facilitation-2017-
global-alliance-fdi-report.pdf,  accessed  on 6 July 2019. 
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procedures so that they can conduct their trade with minimal interruptions 
and maintain a competitive edge in their exports. Trade facilitation does not 
mean that there is zero control at borders. It simply means that ‘any 
disruption of trade [is kept] to a minimum, without losing the capacity to 
intervene if required’.148  
 
The relationship between trade facilitation and development is controversial. 
There are different interests that are involved in trade facilitation. These 
interests include: importers, exporters, consumers and governments. Trade 
facilitation can be used to serve one or more of these interests in a manner 
that either serves the general developmental interests of the country or that 
undermines it. Trade facilitation can serve to merely make trading more 
efficient - in the sense of allowing goods to enter and to leave a country with 
fewer hindrances. However, this may have no effect on the country’s 
development. For trade facilitation to have developmental effects, the 
efficiency must be linked with broader policy reforms that seek to amplify the 
competitiveness of domestic production. The next section discusses typical 
trade facilitation measures. It argues that these can, collectively, contribute 
to development. However, it similarly cautions that there can be negative anti-
developmental ramifications that can flow from applying such measures. 
Therefore, the chapter argument is that trade facilitation has to be 
undertaken in a carefully considered manner if it is to positively and 
concretely contribute to the development of the SADC states. 
 
3.4. Measures to Facilitate Trade 
When Smith and Ricardo argued for trade to be liberalised the types of 
barriers that they most had in mind were, for example, tariffs, discriminatory 
domestic taxation and regulations, quantitative restrictions, or the use of 
subsidies to give an unfair competitive advantage to exported goods. These 
are barriers to liberalised trade. However, it soon transpired that barriers to 
 
148 Marina van Twisk South African Revenue Services (SARS) Presentation on Customs and 
Trade Facilitation, World Customs Organization (WCO) – Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) 
Regional Workshop on Trade Facilitation, 15 September 2015.  
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the physical movement of goods across borders can be just as detrimental to 
trade as these traditional policies. Therefore, the argument was extended that, 
in seeking to improve their development, countries should not only focus on 
liberalising trade, but also on facilitating it. The question is, what kind of 
regulatory barriers hamper the cross-border movement of goods and what are 
the measures that are recommended to address them?  
 
Some typical border impediments are the following: 
 
§ Poor policy and legal framework governing cross-border trade; 
§ Inadequate border infrastructure; 
§ Bureaucratic obstacles; 
§ High costs of trade; 
§ Inadequacies in staffing; and 
§ Lack of cooperation and coordination of border authorities. 
 
Poor Policy and Legal Framework Governing Cross-Border Trade 
In order for goods to be quickly, easily and cost-effectively movable across 
borders there needs to be policies and laws that establish efficient procedures. 
There are several ways in which policy and legal frameworks can inhibit 
efficient trading. First, where laws and policies are outdated and have not 
been modified to keep pace with global trends in trade,149 or with international 
best practices (such as the standards set by the World Customs Organization 
(WCO)). Secondly, where they institutionalise cumbersome procedures. 
Thirdly, where there are diverse scores of applicable regulations. This can 
make the law difficult to ascertain and, consequently, to comply with. 
Inadequate frameworks are also those that fail to penalise illicit trade so that 
trading can take place in a more secure manner. Finally, policies and laws 
 
149 The other extreme (rules that change too frequently) is also not desirable because it 
undermines predictability. Rules and processes should change for legitimate reasons as 
necessary (for example, in order to implement best practice). The principle goal of trade 
regulation should be predictability and the avoidance of uncertainties. Business functions 
best in a transparent and predictable environment. Moreover, many firms do not have the 
resources (financial, time, labour, etc.) to constantly check for legislative and policy 
amendments for compliance-sake. 
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can hamper facilitated trade where they are inappropriate because they have 
not been informed by engagements with stakeholders. Traders are the 
principle stakeholders in trade facilitation. Therefore, it is imperative for 
governments to take their needs into consideration in the formulation of 
trading rules. The failure to do so can lead to the promulgation of rules that 
are not appropriate to experienced issues.150  
 
Inadequate Border Infrastructure 
The absence of critical trade-related hard infrastructure can compromise 
competitiveness and trade and undermine regional integration efforts. For 
example, the use of technology to automate border processes, strengthens 
“reliability, predictability, safety and competitiveness.”151 However, 
automation requires access to information and communication technology 
(ICT). This in turn depends on factors such as stable and cost-efficient energy 
and telecommunications services. Yet, African countries have the lowest 
global internet diffusion rates and unreliable energy supplies. These render 
them largely unable to make full use of ICT to mechanise border processes.152 
Low technology use can also exacerbate incidents of arbitrariness, fraud and 
corruption because ‘paper-based procedures allow for easy manipulation or 
arbitrary decision-making by customs officials’.153 When border procedures 
are done manually,154 progress can be slow and this can incentivise fraud and 
corruption as people try to bypass the sluggish systems and procedures. It 
has been proposed that investing in infrastructural development can “act as 
a catalyst for development, by bringing down the time, and thereby the costs, 
of cross-border trade and transport, which in turn would foster trade, the 
creation of decent jobs, inclusive green growth and lead to an integrated 
 
150 Kostecki  Op cit note 4 at 9. 
151 World Bank Doing Business Report : Equal Opportunities for All 14th ed (2017) at 83. 
152 Charles Abuka Infrastructure, Regional Integration and Growth in Africa (2005), available 
at   https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252697847_, accessed on  20 April 2019; 
Mothae Maruping ‘Challenges for regional integration In Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic 
convergence and monetary coordination’in  Jan Joost Teunissen & Age Akkerman (eds) Africa 
in the World Economy: The National, Regional and International Challenges (2005) at124. 
153 Kostecki  Op cit note 4 text box 4.5 at 112. 
154 For example, where inspections cannot be done by scanning and instead require time-
consuming physical inspections. 
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continent as a pathway to sustainable development.”155  
 
Bureaucratic Obstacles  
The conduct of trade involves documentary compliance as well as border 
compliance.156 Documentary compliance refers to the requirement for traders 
to provide information (by way of documents) as a condition for the 
authorisation to move goods across borders.157 Border compliance refers to 
adherence to the procedures that are applicable at national borders. These 
procedures may include: 
 
§ Obtaining licenses to import or to export  
§ Paying charges that are applicable to cross border trade158 
§ Compliance with any quantitative restrictions that may be applicable159 
§ Compliance with documentary and physical inspections 
 
Despite the legitimacy of the above requirements and procedures, nonetheless 
they can contribute to border delays. This can occur, for example, when 
documents cannot be submitted electronically for the relevant authorities to 
verify the information and process the documents. Or where there are 
excessive documentary requirements or long and complex border procedures. 
Impediments to trade should ideally be kept at a minimum if the gains from 
trade are to be realised.  
 
155 Christian Kingombe ‘How can transport infrastructure promote trade and sustainable 
development on the African continent? (2017) 6 (2)   Bridges Africa,, available from 
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/how-can-transport-infrastructure-
promote-trade-and-sustainable, accessed 8 May 2020. 
156 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Doing Business: Training for 
Reform 16 ed (2019), available at 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-
Reports/English/DB2019-report_web-version.pdf, accessed 7 October 2019. 
157 Some of the important documents for documentary compliance can include: the 
commercial invoice (used by customs officials to calculate the customs duties that are payable 
for the trade), a certificate of origin (as proof of where the goods were produced) and a packing 
list (which itemises all of the contents of every package in a shipment).  
158 For example, customs duties, excise duties, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, 
environmental levies, etc. 
159 Van Houtte Op cit note 142 at 110.  See also R Schaffer, B Earle & A Filiberto Op cit  note 
2 at  322. They define that a quota ’may be expressed with reference to the quantity of goods, 
or to their value, or “as a percentage share of the domestic market for that product’. 
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High Costs of Trade 
Governments seek to collect revenue from trade.160 This revenue can be in the 
form of fees which are charged for the rendering of services related to trade, 
for example, for licensing traders, processing documents, conducting 
inspections, or for storing goods pending the fulfilment, by the trader, of any 
conditions.161 Governments also collect revenue from the imposition of 
penalties for non-compliance with trading rules. Fees can become a barrier to 
trade when they are not commensurate to the costs of the services that are 
rendered or where there are a multitude of fees, causing the costs to add up 
and become prohibitive. Negative ramifications can also arise where trade fees 
are too high or where the processes for their payment are too cumbersome. 
Similarly, where the rates of penalties are unreasonable and are not 
commensurate to the offences this also increases the cost of trading and can 
become an impediment to trade. High fees and penalties can correlate to 
bribery and corruption. This is because border users may become tempted to 
bribe officials in order to escape the fees and penalties.  
 
Inadequacies in Border Staffing 
The quantity and the quality of staff operating at a border can affect the 
efficiency of the processes thereat. In terms of the former, border processes 
are slow when there is an inadequate number of personnel serving clients. In 
terms of the latter, if staff do not have the skills that are necessary for them 
to quickly discharge their duties this will negatively affect their service 
delivery. Lack of training prevents officials from acquiring knowledge of new 
technologies or techniques for more expeditiously executing their tasks.162 
Unfortunately, for many developing countries there are limited resources for 
 
160 Jean-Christophe Maur Trade Facilitation, Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for 
Development: A Handbook (2011) at 331. 
161 Developing countries have been found to charge a multitude of fees, such as:  customs 
surcharges, tax on foreign exchange transactions, stamp taxes, import license fee, consular 
invoice fees, statistical taxes, tax on transport facilities, taxes and charges on sensitive 
product categories, additional charges, fees related to customs procedures and community 
levies. Rege Op cit 146 at185-191. 
162 It has been suggested that ‘traders apply new technologies in the international trade 
environment at a faster pace than customs, which is slow to adjust and innovate’. Kostecki 
Op cit note 4  at 111–112. 
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imparting and developing the skills that are needed by officials. 
 
Lack of Cooperation and Coordination between Border Officials 
There is an internal aspect and an external aspect to border cooperation and 
coordination. The internal aspect refers to how the border officials of one 
government work together. The external aspect refers to how the officials of 
two neighbouring states work together. The quality of the inter-relationships, 
and the extent of the cooperation between border officials affects the ability of 
a border to function efficiently. Issues such as turf wars, the duplication of 
processes, differing requirements and processes and lack of system inter-
connectivity sabotage trading efficiency.  
 
The concept of trade facilitation addresses impediments such as those 
outlined above. As an extension of the international trade theory, trade 
facilitation proposes the dismantling of barriers so that there can be greater 
trade flows which, in turn, are expected to lead to greater levels of 
development. Typical trade facilitation measures include the following:163 
§ Consultations with traders. Prior engagement with traders is viewed 
as the first step towards informing border users about any impending 
legal changes so that they can begin to prepare for compliance 
therewith. This includes their being constantly kept apprised of any 
amendments to requirements 
§ The transparency and accessibility of all information affecting trade, 
for example, the required documentation, trade procedures, the 
applicable fees, etc. 
§ Reasonable documentary requirements. This includes the 
simplification and harmonisation of required documentation 
§ Reasonable and efficient procedural arrangements, including the 
streamlining of border controls 
 
163 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed a 
set of trade facilitation indicators that explain the content of trade facilitation, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/trade/facilitation/indicators.htm#About-TFI, accessed 8 May 2020. 
 55 
§ The use of technology, for example, to electronically exchange data and 
to automate border processes 
§ Internal and external cooperation and coordination to create one 
seamless trade process as well as to maximise the efficiency of the use 
of resources, for example by conducting joint investigations or training  
§ Reasonable disciplines on fees, charges and penalties applicable in 
trading 
§ The installation of trade dispute resolution mechanisms. This 
comprises clear complaints or grievance procedures and an efficient 
appeals procedure. 
 
3.5.  Perspectives and Controversies on the Relationship between Trade 
Facilitation and Development  
Much like with trade liberalisation, trade facilitation is similarly controversial. 
Heterodox economics acknowledges that there can be positive developmental 
outcomes from trade facilitation. It can be argued that facilitating trade can 
be beneficial for traders, consumers, governments as well as for the wider 
economy as a whole.164 We can take the different interests one by one and 
contemplate how they can be assisted by the facilitation of trade. For one, 
traders can be adversely affected in significant ways where trade is not 
facilitated. First, trade delays increase their business costs. These additional 
costs make their final products more expensive and therefore compromises 
their competitive advantage in exporting. In addition, some goods may have 
to cross several borders before they reach their final destination (transit 
trade). If there are delays at every border this compounds the costs and 
 
164 Antoni Estevadeordal Why Trade Facilitation Matters Now More than Ever: Policy Brief 
(2017). Tomasz Iwanow & Colin Kirkpatrick in  ‘Trade facilitation and manufacturing exports: 
Is Africa different’ (2009)  37 (6) World Development argue that trade facilitation improves 
investment and manufacturing exports. Alberto Portugal-Perez & John S Wilson Export 
Performance and Trade Facilitation Reform: Hard and Soft Infrastructure (2011) show a 
correlation between trade facilitation and manufacturing export performance. Maria Persson 
in Trade Facilitation and the Extensive Margin (2010) questions whether trade facilitation only 
leads to expanded trade flows in the traditional exports or whether it can actually lead to 
export diversification. She concludes that the latter is the case. Bagai, Shweta; Newfarmer, 
Richard & Wilson, John S ‘Trade facilitation: Using WTO disciplines to promote development’ 
(2004) 15 The World Bank Group International Trade Department Trade Note. 
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uncertainties for traders. Exporters can lose their contracts and be liable for 
compensation if their goods are delayed and they become unable to deliver 
their products timeously in order to meet the strict time demands in 
international supply contracts.165 This failure may have ramifications even 
beyond the immediate sales contract. It can lead to the seller not getting 
another contract from the buyer, or from firms that are associated with the 
buyer as a result of impairments to their reputation as a reliable supplier.  
Trade delays can also lead to the spoilage of perishable goods, which is a cost 
to the traders. Where traders are thus detrimentally affected, this can lead to 
them going out of business. This will undermine the sustainable development 
goals (SDGs) that relate to the reduction of poverty and hunger (goals 1 and 
2). 
 
Border costs and delays also hamper the ability of traders to participate in 
inter-regional, intra-regional, and global value chain production.166 Value 
chain production has been made possible by falling transport costs, greater 
interconnectedness (due to developments in information and communication 
technologies), increasing openness in global markets, competition by 
countries in offering low-wages for labour-intensive manufacturing and the 
international mobility of managerial and technical skills.167 Such production 
requires that borders are efficient so that intermediate inputs can be quickly 
imported, processed and re-exported.168 Traders cannot participate in value 
 
165 If border delays cause goods to arrive to the customer late, this may amount to a 
fundamental breach of contract. The 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) obligates a seller to physically deliver the goods to the buyer at a place and time 
that has been agreed to by the parties (art 30). Failing which the buyer can pursue remedies 
(arts 74–77). For an exploration of the impact of trade facilitation barriers on exports see, for 
example, Jordaan, Andree C ‘The impact of trade facilitation factors on South Africa’s exports 
to a selection of African countries’ (2014) 31 (4) Development Southern Africa. 
166 Defined as ‘where firms specialize in a particular set of activities in one country to produce 
parts and components for other countries.’ Antonio Andreoni ‘A generalised linkage approach 
to local production systems development in the era of global value chains, with special 
reference to Africa, in Ravi  Kanbur,  Akbar Noman & Joseph Stiglitz  (eds) The Quality of 
Growth in Africa (2019) at 3; and Richard Baldwin Trade and Industrialisation after 
Globalisation’s 2nd Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain are Different and 
why it Matters (2011) at 6. 
167 World Trade Organization Global Value Chain Development Report: Technological 
Innovation, Supply Chain Trade, and Workers in a Globalized World (2019) at 10. 
168 Brian Rankin Staples ‘Trade facilitation: Improving the invisible infrastructure Op cit note 
76 at139. 
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chain production if there is uncertainty about their delivery times as a result 
of inefficiencies in border-crossing procedures.169 Traders in some developing 
countries (such as China, Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil and Turkey) have 
managed to take advantage of this opportunity. However, many African 
traders are struggling to get plugged into these chains, in part as a result of 
obstacles related to low rates of trade facilitation on the continent. This 
hampers, in particular, the attainment of SDGs 8 and 9 which relate to 
economic growth and industrialisation.170  
 
The consequences of inefficient borders can be particularly disastrous for 
small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs). The larger the firm, the larger 
its scale of production and, thus, the better able it is to absorb the costs of 
border delays. Larger firms also typically have a larger labour force and can 
therefore, potentially, have employees who are specifically devoted to 
researching about the barriers at various border crossings through which 
they conduct their trade so that they can adequately prepare for such well 
ahead of time. They also tend to have representation at government briefing 
sessions and to have personal contacts with relevant officials. This makes 
them better able to effectively lobby government to address their specific 
challenges. This is not so with smaller enterprises whose members are more 
dispersed and lack economic and political clout. They may eventually be 
driven out of business due to trade costs and delays.171 This has implications 
on employment and poverty.  
 
Consumers are another faction that stands to lose out where trade is not 
facilitated. This is because trade delays can affect the domestic supply of 
goods and, therefore, also the domestic prices of goods. Furthermore, where 
 
169 African Entrepreneurs Council (AEC) interview with Janvier Litse, Director- NEPAD 
Regional Integration and Trade, African Development Bank, 29 October 2013 available at 
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/aec-2013-interview-with-janvier-litse-director-
nepad-regional-integration-and-trade-afdb-12438/accessed on 12 July 2018. 
170 Neil Foster-McGregor, Florian Kaulich & Robert Stehrer show that Africa’s participation in 
global value chains is increasing, but that it remains lower than the rate of participation by 
other developing regions in Global Value Chains in Africa (2015) at 9. 
171 Kostecki Op cit note 4  at 48–49. 
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the costs of trade rise for traders, these costs will often be passed on to the 
consumers. This negatively impacts their quality of life and impinges on the 
realisation of the SDGs that concern reducing poverty and hunger and 
achieving good health and well-being. 
 
Government can also benefit from trade facilitation in direct and indirect 
ways. If trade is facilitated, and this results in increased trade flows and 
business profits, then the government can receive more revenue from taxes. 
These taxes could be applied to stimulate the economy and to provide critical 
public needs, such as water, energy, housing, education, healthcare, 
sanitation etc.172 Indirectly, government can gain from the fact that trade 
facilitation seeks to enhance lawfulness. Where trading is costly and 
cumbersome this can result in high incidents of illegal practices, such as 
bribery and corruption,173 the commission of forgeries and the conduct of 
illicit trade.174 The Anti-Corruption Resource Centre lists factors that make 
borders particularly high risk for illicit practices. The features tend to match 
the typical conditions at developing country borders. These are:  
 
poor external oversight; the level of autonomy and discretionary authority 
border officials enjoy; high tariffs and complex regulatory frameworks that 
provide traders with incentives to bribe; the pressure of organised crime 
networks; the inadequate salary and working conditions of border officials; 
and the specific organisational features of border protection agencies.175 
 
172 These all have a relationship to SDGs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9. 
173 This is defined as ‘paying bribes to corrupt government bureaucrats to get "favors" such 
as permits, investment licenses, tax assessments, and police protection’ See  Ali Al-Sadig ‘The 
effects of corruption on FDI inflows  (2000) 29 Cato Journal at  267. Transparency 
International defines it as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain; available at  
https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption, accessed on 12 February 2020. 
174 For example, under-declaration (usually of highly taxed goods such as alcohol and 
cigarettes), smuggling (usually of banned goods such as arms or cultural artefacts), trading 
in counterfeit goods or in products that breach intellectual property rights, or health and 
safety standards, drug trafficking, money laundering, and transhipping (where products are 
re-labelled to conceal their country of origin). 
175 Marie Chêne, Corruption at borders, Anti-corruption resource centre (2018) available at 
https://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-at-borders, accessed 13 October 2020. A 2007 
USAID study on corruption along the northern corridor in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, 
Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo found that approximately 28% of all shipments 
were subject to bribery. The greater the consignment value; the higher the value of the bribe. 
USAID, Assessment Study on Corruption At the Northern Corridor Transit Point 




These illicit activities cause losses to the government. First, they result in less 
revenue being collected from trade. Secondly, the challenges do not bode well 
for a country’s business climate as a whole and can impede a government’s 
ability to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).   
 
The forgoing grounds are the reasons why it is argued that trade facilitation 
can be a critical strategy to secure benefits for traders, consumers and 
governments, and that these benefits are all linked to one aspect or another 
of development. However, there are equally compelling opposing arguments 
that facilitating trade may have no impact at all on development, or worse, 
that it may be anti-developmental and may not be particularly beneficial for 
developing countries, in particular. Many proponents of trade facilitation 
argue that there is very little to be gained from further trade liberalisation and 
that, consequently, policy emphasis must now shift to trade facilitation.176 
However, this has been rejected as not being entirely accurate. There is an 
argument that there are still many traditional restrictions on international 
trade, for example tariff barriers on developing countries’ textiles and 
agricultural products. The WTO Statistical Review notes that, between 2015 
and 2016, WTO members applied 154 new trade-restrictive measures.177 
These were in the form of new or increased customs duties and the 
introduction of quantitative restrictions.178 This shows that, despite nations 
having professed commitment to trade liberalisation for decades, barriers still 
remain. The implementation of trade facilitation measures, in the face of 
 
176 Mary Amiti & John Romalis  argue that on average, tariffs on goods from non-least 
developed countries into the United States and the European Union are below 3%. They, 
therefore, conclude that there would only be market access gains of 2.28% if there was to be 
a further 40% reduction in tariffs. Amiti, M., Romalis, J. Will the Doha Round Lead to 
Preference Erosion?. IMF Econ Rev 54, 338–384 (2007). 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.imfsp.9450009 accessed on 7 November 2019. Kim 
Anderson, Will J Martin &  Dominique van der Mensbrugghe Distortions to World Trade : 
Impacts on Agricultural Markets and Farm Incomes (2005) available at  
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/8642, accessed on  accessed on 24 
November 2019 estimate that world exports would only increase by about 10% if there was 
complete global trade liberalisation. See also Djankov, Freund & Pham Op cit 145 at 22.  
177 The report says that this was a significant increase compared with the previous year, and 
that it was the highest since 2011. 
178 Paul Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld International Economics: Theory and Policy 7 ed (2006) 
at 66. 
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continuing barriers to liberalised trade, may not have much of an impact on 
trade flows, and thus on possible development prospects.  
 
Chapter 2 argued that trade liberalisation does not always correlate to 
increased trade flows and improved development.179 The same can be said of 
trade facilitation. We can begin with the relationship between trade facilitation 
and trade flows. There are many factors that can impact trade flows. Events 
such as economic recessions in major trading partners and exchange rate 
volatility can affect the demand for imports, regardless of how efficient and 
cost-effective borders are designed to be. With respect to the relationship 
between trade facilitation and development, even where the former does lead 
to increased trade flows, it is not a given that this will automatically lead to 
improved economic conditions. An illustrative example is the experience of 
the European Community (EC). The EC was created as a customs union by 
the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (also called 
the Treaty of Rome).180 In 1986, members signed the Single European Act 
(SEA).181 Among other goals it focused on targeting inefficient border 
procedures and harmonising standards in the community. The European 
Commission had high expectations of the benefits of the trade facilitation that 
was initiated by the Single European Act. However, by 2003 it was estimated 
that the gains to the European economies from these reforms stood at 
approximately only 1.8 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This shows 
that the gains from facilitating trade may not be as much as they are 
sometimes hyped up to be.182  
 
It has been argued that trade facilitation could lead to expanded trade flows 
and, consequently, to more government revenue, which revenue could be 
 
179 Section 2.3.1.3 above. 
180 It was signed on 25 March 1957 and entered into force on 1 January1958. 
181 It entered into force on 1 July 1987. 
182  However, despite the meagre results of the SEA, the European Commission concluded 
that it was ‘a mild disappointment but hardly a failure’. They pointed to improvements in 
competition, innovation, price and quality benefits for consumers. They concluded that those 
made up for the more modest gains in GDP, see  Krugman & Obstfeld Op cit note 178 at 212. 
This shows that the implementation of trade facilitation reforms can have positive knock-on 
effects that are not necessarily reflected in substantially quantitative impacts.  
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applied to stimulate the economy and to provide public goods. However, this 
is not a reliably certain correlation. The ability of trade flows to impact 
government revenue depends on many factors, for example, the Dollar value 
of the exports. This means that, even if trade flows are high, if the value of the 
flows is low then this will not have much impact on government revenue. 
Further, because facilitating trade means cutting trade costs, often facilitating 
trade will have the effect of compromising government revenue, rather than 
enhancing it.183 This means that government budgets can be even more 
stretched after implementing trade facilitation measures than before. This can 
have anti-developmental outcomes because it will mean that the government 
will have to make budget cuts, even to socially important programmes, such 
as the provision of public healthcare and education, etc. 
 
The statistics that are used to back up the claim that trade facilitation can 
increase global revenue from trade have also come under critique. Statistics 
have been quoted that facilitating trade can potentially increase global 
revenue from trade by $1 trillion and create more than eighteen million jobs 
in the lesser developed economies.184 However, these predictions have been 
questioned.185 The arguments mainly relate to the reliability of the methods 
that have been used to arrive at the figures. It is argued that there is evidence 
of erroneous assumptions, the use of small sample studies that inaccurately 
scale-up the findings to make generalisations and reliance on outdated 
statistics (for example, on Gross Domestic Product and commodities growth). 
Furthermore, that trade facilitation indicators do not lend themselves well to 
establishing concrete correlations with other variables, such as employment. 
Thus, it is proposed that, conversely, trade facilitation can actually cause a 
loss of revenue and employment, particularly in developing countries.  
 
 
183 This issue is further elaborated upon in section 3.4.3. 
184 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) available at https://iccwbo.org/media-
wall/news-speeches/business-gives-last-push-to-seal-bali-deal-and-salvage-doha-
round/,  accessed on 2 December 2017. 
185 Jeronim Capaldo ‘The uncertain gains from trade facilitation’  (2013) 1 (13-02) Global 
Development and Environment Institute Policy Brief  at 1.    
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Trade facilitation has been touted as being potentially beneficial to a country’s 
ability to attract investment (especially into manufacturing). This is expected 
to lead to improved employment rates, thus higher incomes and standards of 
living. However, these effects too are not a given. Investors are attracted to a 
country by many factors that are related to the general investment climate 
and ease of doing business. Facilitated trade is just one of the many factors 
that they consider; it is not decisive on its own. The Global Alliance for Trade 
Facilitation conducted a study on this very issue. They begin from an 
assumption that attracting investment into the manufacturing sector 
(especially for export) is a good development strategy that will lead to 
increased employment and development. They then seek to determine 
whether addressing the ease and costs of cross-border trading has any 
positive link to attracting foreign direct investment into manufacturing.  They 
find that ‘investment into manufacturing is driven by a number of factors—
from proximity to markets and cost of labor, to tax incentives and the overall 
market size—and trade facilitation reform alone cannot attract FDI’.186 
 
These two sides of the ‘trade facilitation and development argument’ lead us 
to the realisation that trade facilitation cannot guarantee development. 
Facilitating trade can merely increase efficiency and not necessarily increase 
development. Thus, it is imperative that governments configure their trade 
facilitation policies in a manner that best serves their development policies. 
Trade facilitation should be mainstreamed into governments’ development 
policies and strategies in a manner that strikes a balance between openness 
and protectiveness in order to contain any possible negative consequences of 
openness. For one, nations will have to be prepared for an influx of imports. 
These could decimate unproductive competing industries. In addition, their 
own export industries should be able to produce goods that can successfully 
be marketed and sold in other countries. Otherwise, there will be no benefit 
of having facilitated trade. This is important to understand because the 
producers in the SADC region struggle to achieve productivity and 
 
186 Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation Op cit note 147 at 10. This is not to say that trade 
facilitation is unimportant but that it is not singularly important. 
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competitiveness. If border barriers are reduced in such environments, then 
this could be a potential threat to their viability.  
 
Many developing countries and Least Developed Countries lack ‘the 
educational, industrial, financial, and political capabilities’ to initiate 
industrialisation projects.187 Thus, their ability to benefit from trade 
facilitation could be jeopardised. This is why trade facilitation has to go hand 
in hand with other reforms.188 Otherwise it can have a negative effect on poor 
countries, ultimately exacerbating trade and current account deficits. 
Therefore, yes, governments should address these issues, but in a strategic 
and well-thought out manner, taking into account their own peculiar 
circumstances and readiness for such reforms.  
 
Finally, the cautions of heterodox economics help us to notice other glaring 
reasons why trade facilitation measures may not be entirely appropriate for 
lesser-developed countries (such as the SADC countries) as compared to more 
developed nations. There are three broad reasons why trade facilitation can 
be particularly onerous for developing countries and potentially destructive to 
their economic prospects. These are: 
 
§ The cost implications of implementing trade facilitation measures 
§ The difficulties of catching up from behind the curve 
§ The risks of harmonisation. 
 
The Cost Implications of Implementing Trade Facilitation Measures 
It is difficult for developing countries, in particular, to implement trade 
facilitating measures because many of the measures have huge cost 
implications that they cannot easily afford. The OECD estimates the costs at 
between $5 to $25 million for implementation and approximately $3.5 million 
in annual operating costs.189 Many developing countries are grappling with 
 
187 Yong-Shik Lee et al Op cit note 86 at 24. 
188 Staples Op cit note 168 at 144. 
189 OECD_Trade_Facilitation_Indicators_updated, available at Trade Facilitation  
https://www1.oecd.org/tad/facilitation/ -flyer_May_2013.pdf, accessed on 1 May 2017.  
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severe socio-economic challenges, such as poverty and unemployment, and 
are unable to deliver social services, such as healthcare, education and social 
welfare. They can, therefore, scarcely afford the costs of trade facilitation 
reforms and would likely have to divert money from social programmes in 
order to implement them. It is true that there is some technical and financial 
assistance that may be available for these costs. The OECD estimates that 
donor support for trade facilitation was $477 million in 2012 and that the 
largest beneficiary of this money was Africa, which received $290 million out 
of the total support.190 However, donor support is never free and unlimited. It 
comes with stipulations attached. The donor will make demands on the 
recipient, sometimes to the detriment of the latter. Furthermore, resorting to 
assistance perpetuates the dominance-dependency relationship between rich 
nations and poor nations, which the latter is trying to shed. 
 
A major cost implication of trade facilitation is the acquisition of technology. 
Most of the technology that is required to facilitate trade is owned by western 
corporations and organisations. It is very expensive for developing countries 
to acquire it. Compounding this is the fact that technology becomes obsolete 
after a while, thus developing country governments will need to continually 
upgrade and maintain systems at a huge cost. They can scarcely find funds 
for such recurrent costs in their already over-stretched budgets. At times they 
even lack the supporting infrastructure, (e.g. reliable energy and ICT services) 
that will allow them to make full use of the technologies.  
 
Another cost of facilitating trade is that of improving staffing. This element 
requires implementing strategies to ensure that there is an adequate number 
of staff to deliver services (hiring) and providing training to upgrade 
knowledge and skills. Both of these involve recurrent expenditure. For 
example, with respect to training, staff will have to continually refresh their 
 
Why Trade Facilitation Matters in Today’s Global Economy, available at 
https://Www1.Oecd.Org/Tad/Facilitation/OECD_Trade_Facilitation_Indicators_Updated-
Flyer_May_2013.Pdf., accessed on  11 May 2017. 
190 The report adds that donors have also allocated specific funds directed at trade-related 
infrastructure amounting to $11.5 billion for transport and storage and $617 million for the 
improvement of communications in 2011OECD ibid. 
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training as new practices and technologies emerge. This is so that they can 
continually have the relevant skills. Donors cannot support recurring costs 
forever. They are becoming aid weary and, moreover, they have their own 
domestic challenges to address. For instance, the United States and the 
United Kingdom have been traditional donors. However, recently their ability 
or willingness to proffer support has been diminishing. 
 
A final example of how exorbitant costs can arise in facilitating trade can be 
seen with respect to the interventions that address excessive documentary 
and procedural requirements. Trade facilitation mandates that the 
documents that are required for trading should be reduced and simplified. 
Procedural requirements should be streamlined191 and time-saving 
interventions must be introduced in order to expedite processes. These 
include strategies such as:  
 
§ post-clearance audits192  
§ risk management strategies193  
§ advance rulings194 and 
§ the creation of modalities for the appeal and review of administrative 
decisions. 
 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) argues that 
such measures will lead to increased trader compliance, a more efficient 
bureaucracy, more security, less corruption and the attraction of investment. 
Furthermore, that traders will benefit from operating in an environment that 
is more transparent and predictable and has speedier processing and lower 
 
191 For example, by the installation of single windows or according select firms authorised 
economic operator status which gives them access to expedited procedures. 
192 To identify where blockages exist in order to rectify them. 
193 To determine the appropriate thoroughness of the screening or requirements that should 
be imposed on different traders or shipments. 
194 These are prior rulings by customs administration given to traders regarding the 
classification, origin, method of valuation etc of goods. They inform traders of the treatment 
that their goods will receive at the time of importation. This assures that goods will arrive at 
a border in a compliant state, because the trader will have known beforehand what the 
assessment thereof would be. 
 66 
costs. Ultimately, they will have improved competitiveness, which will have a 
favourable impact on their export potential.195 However, the costs of making 
these amendments to documentary and procedural requirements can be vast. 
These costs include: 
 
§ conducting a diagnostic assessment of the border deficiencies in order 
to identify where the inefficiencies lie and to determine the interventions 
that will be necessary to address them 
§ establishing new procedures (for example, for appeal and review, pre 
and post clearance audits, and single windows etc.) 
§ acquiring risk assessment techniques and databases 
§ reforming laws and institutions  
§ hiring and/or training staff to implement the new requirements 
§ improving infrastructure and purchasing equipment. 
 
Developed countries do not struggle with the same budgetary constraints as 
poorer nations do.196 Developing countries would need money every step of 
the process to tackle these documentary and procedural reforms. It is argued 
that they would struggle to afford such investments and they would likely 
need to have assistance. 
 
The Difficulties of Catching Up From Behind the Curve 
Besides the issue of affording the reforms, it is also easier for developed 
countries to implement trade facilitation measures that are imposed in treaty 
commitments. This is because their practices already largely conform to the 
ideal standards. Their manner of operations mirror the recommendations of 
 
195 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Trade Facilitation Implementation 
Guide, available at http://tfig.unece.org/details.html, accessed 8 August 2019). 
196 Russell Hillberry & Carlos Zurita-Castro analysed the relationship between the level of 
GDP per capita and the number of category A commitments that were notified under the TFA. 
They found  “a positive relationship between the number of type A commitments and logged 
per capita income” and conclude that “higher income countries are likely to have greater 
capacities to implement trade facilitation measures.” A Cross-country Assessment of 
Commitment Behavior in the Trade Facilitation Agreement, December 2019, at 11, available 
at https://www.russellhillberry.net/uploads/6/4/1/0/64104535/tfa_dec2.pdf, accessed 19 
March, 2020. 
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organisations such as the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the United 
Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT). 
Conversely, the practices of developing countries are so far behind the 
international standards that the learning and adjustment curve will be a steep 
one for them. They would, therefore, need more time to incrementally improve 
their practices in order to reach the ideal standard. This is a fact that any 
organisation or treaty concerning trade facilitation must be aware of and cater 
for.  
 
Three examples highlight the difficulties that developing nations face in 
attempting to catch up to the international standards. First, in order to 
counter the impediment of lack of information on the part of traders, trade 
facilitation requires that information be made available to traders in an 
accessible way. The often-touted ways are by publication on the internet or 
at enquiry points. The implementation of these interventions can be 
financially onerous for poorer governments. Therefore, there should be an 
allowance for them to use alternative methods that are more accomplishable 
for them, as long as they similarly satisfy the goal of keeping traders informed 
on all issues pertaining to their trade.  
 
Another example can be seen with the requirement for consultations with 
traders. These are mandated so that traders’ inputs can be taken on board 
when formulating reforms, to secure buy-in on their part and to prepare 
them for any measures that the government will implement in the future 
which may affect their manner of operating. This obligation also has to be 
measured when being implemented by developing countries because of the 
administrative burdens that can arise from its execution. It should be up to 
individual states which mechanisms they employ to satisfy the general 
objectives of the measure. Finally, trade facilitation reforms require the 
continual review of trade requirements and the making of improvements as 
necessary. Such projects can cause a significant administrative burden on 
poorer countries. These examples show that, despite the desirability of trade 
facilitation measures, developing countries may need longer transition 
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periods to get their practices aligned with the standards. In the meantime, 
they should be allowed the flexibility to continue with their current practices, 
as long as they too contribute to addressing inefficiencies, while gradually 
growing into greater and greater conformity over time. 
 
The Risks of Harmonisation 
Another reason why trade facilitation reforms may be inappropriate for 
developing countries is because the notion of trade facilitation encourages the 
harmonisation of practices, standards, and requirements. Harmonisation 
between asymmetrical countries cannot work because of the wide difference 
in their economic muscles and therefore in their implementation capacities. 
Thus, there will be a need to afford flexibility to poorer states. This involves 
taking into account the peculiar realities of each country. Where there are 
compelling and legitimate reasons for deviations in practices, then that should 
be allowed. For example, the characteristics of traders is one factor that 
impacts on the clearance processes that are adopted by a country’s border 
agencies and, consequently, on the delays or otherwise at the border. In the 
case of developed countries, the majority of traders are large, formal firms 
which trade in bulk. Their shipments can be processed much quicker. 
However, in developing countries, the majority of traders are small firms and 
individuals, who import numerous small shipments. Processing these types 
of trade takes longer and may require different clearance strategies. Rege puts 
it thus 
 
the procedures and practices adopted by customs and other government 
departments in relation to imported and exported goods, have to be tailored 
to the trading environment, prevalence of corruption and other constraints 
confronting the authorities in applying them. The methods used and rigour 
with which rules are applied would be greatly different.197 
 
Thus, harmonisation in vastly diverse contexts is a complicated undertaking. 
We can also take the example of physical inspections to show why 
harmonising practices can fail to meet the peculiar challenges or needs of 
 
197Rege Op cit note 146 at 171. 
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developing countries. Physical inspections are conducted at ports for various 
reasons.198 Most importantly they are used in order to detect criminal 
activities during trading. Developing countries face far more illicit trade than 
developed countries do. Examples of this are rampant under-declaration and 
smuggling.199 The fact that customs duties tend to be high in developing 
countries (on average) incentivises traders to resort to these types of fraud in 
order to evade declaring and paying the required fees. This challenge 
influences the behaviour of border agents in developing countries who, 
consequently, become stricter about conducting thorough inspections. 
Conversely, developed countries do not experience similar magnitudes of 
these challenges and therefore the need for inspections is less. This can make 
it undesirable for developed and developing countries to adhere to the same 
practises because the motivations for the practices that they adopt are not 
the same. 
 
Another example relates to the issue of reducing trade costs. Trade 
facilitation requires nations to adopt measures that will make trading 
cheaper. Governments are required to implement disciplines on fees, charges 
and penalties that ensure commensuration between costs and the services 
rendered. However, measures that are applied to reduce trade costs may not 
necessarily be in the best interests of poorer countries because they depend 
heavily on trade fees as a vital source of their revenue. Trade liberalisation 
efforts have already reduced their revenue; therefore, the remaining trade fees 
are important from a budgetary perspective. In contrast, the share of trade 
costs as a percentage of a typical developed country’s revenue is relatively 
minute. They have alternative sources of revenue and can afford to forego 
 
198 At times it can be to verify information that will inform revenue-related decisions, such as 
the rates of fees to be charged. Other times they are conducted to determine the safety of 
imported goods (SPS or TBT measures). 
199 This is because the rates of tariffs in developing countries tend to be higher than those 
applicable in developed countries. Therefore, traders have more incentive to resort to under-
declaring or smuggling goods in order to evade these high fees. 
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revenue from trade.200 This is another area where harmonising a practice can 
be very risky for the poorer state. 
 
3.6. Chapter Conclusion 
Chapter 2 defined development as a multifaceted concept that includes not 
only improvements in economic indicators but also in the social, political, 
cultural, environmental and other conditions, for the betterment of the lives 
of all people. This chapter has debated the relationship between trade 
facilitation and development. Trade facilitation has been explained as 
concerning the easing of trade impediments which manifest as time delays 
and increased costs in cross border trading. The classical theory of 
international trade advocates that freeing trade will bring about development. 
This chapter has argued that yes, this can be the case. It has shown that, by 
facilitating trade, traders can benefit from increased profits from increased 
trade flows, consumers can gain cheaper access to greater quantities of goods 
and that governments can earn more tax revenue, which can be applied to 
provide social services for the improvement of the lives of their people.  
 
However, this chapter has also argued that simply facilitating trade will not 
automatically be sufficient to impact development in a meaningful way. This 
is why, as Ismail writes, African leaders ‘adopted an Action Plan for Boosting 
Intra-African Trade (BIAT) that includes seven clusters including trade policy, 
trade facilitation, productive capacity, trade-related infrastructure, trade 
finance, trade information and factor markets’.201 Therefore, trade facilitation 
has to be part of a broader development strategy that encompasses other 
important interventions that can complement openness, such as  
 
200 The World Bank Organization reports on trade taxes as a percentage of total government 
revenue. Its statistics show that the average trade taxes as a percentage of revenue for a high 
income country is0.9% (2013), for a middle income country it’s 4.8% and for Least Developed 
Countries it’s 9.9%. The average for Sub-Saharan Africa is 11%. Therefore, there is an inverse 
relationship between development levels and trade tax dependency. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.INTT.RV.ZS, accessed 13 October 2020. 
201 Faizel Ismail Transformative Industrialization and Trade in the Context of the CFTA: 
Opportunities and Challenges (2017) at. 89. See also Mbekeani, Kennedy K ‘Infrastructure, 
trade expansion and regional integration: Global experience and lessons for Africa’ (2007) 119 
(AERC suppl) Journal of African Economies, at 88–113 and Mills, Greg ‘Africa and regional 
integration: What works and why’ (2004) 11 (2) South African Journal of International Affairs. 
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infrastructural development. In fact, there are those who argue that 
infrastructure problems largely explain the relatively low levels of African 
trade and that opening borders will not greatly assist a country that does not 
have sound infrastructure.202 This chapter has similarly argued that we 
cannot ignore the potential negative consequences of facilitating trade, for 
example, the decimation of uncompetitive domestic industries and 
exacerbated trade deficits. 
 
This thesis is arguing that participating in trade facilitation agreements has 
not resulted in significant positive changes to facilitated trade on the ground 
in the Southern African Development Community. The next chapter discusses 
the regional and multilateral agreements that SADC countries have entered 
into in their bid to address cost and time delays in their trade. It argues that 
compliance deficits may help to explain why the agreements have largely been 
ineffective in addressing the barriers. Chapter five highlights the prevalent 
barriers while chapter six takes a closer look at the situation by way of a case 
study of one SADC state – the Kingdom of Lesotho. It uses the law and 
development theory to argue that weaknesses in regulatory design, 
compliance and implementation also contribute to the ineffectiveness of 
regional and multilateral instruments. Chapter seven then debates whether 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement has unique features which will assist it to 








202 Benno Ndulu, Lolette Kritzinger-van Niekerk &  Ritva Reinikka ‘Infrastructure, regional 
integration and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Jan Joost Teunissen & Age Akkerman (eds) 
Africa in the World Economy : National, Regional and International Challenges  (2005). 
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Chapter 4- The Regional and Multilateral Framework for Trade Facilitation in 
the Southern African Development Community 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The discussion thus far has supported a case for reducing trade barriers, 
arguing that this may lead to increased trade flows, which could be beneficial 
to development. It has been argued that trade barriers do not only emanate 
from restrictive trade policies but also from inefficient cross-border processes. 
Chapter 3 explored the factors that can increase time delays and transactional 
costs at borders. It explained that redressing such barriers can be achieved 
by measures that are taken unilaterally by individual states, bilaterally 
between neighbouring states or under the auspices of regional or 
international agreements. The introductory chapter of this work outlined one 
of the research questions as being: what have been the challenges to 
compliance with regional and multilateral treaties, which have rendered these 
frameworks ineffective for facilitating trade in the Southern African 
Development Community? This thesis applies theoretical insights on 
compliance to interrogate this question. These theories were introduced in 
chapter 2. Compliance was defined as referring to when states adhere to the 
substantive and procedural provisions and to the spirit of a treaty.203 
Compliance differs from implementation. Implementation relates to the 
measures that states employ in order to domesticate their international 
obligations.204 
 
This chapter applies theories on compliance to the regional and multilateral 
frameworks for facilitating trade in Southern Africa. The two theories that are 
applied in this regard are the enmeshment theory and the managerial 
approach to compliance. The former proposes that the nature of commitments 
(whether treaty provisions are precise, obligatory and interpretable or whether 
 
203 Harold K Jacobson &  Edith Brown Weiss  Op cit note 103. 
204 Beth Simmons defines it as the adoption of domestic rules or regulations that are meant 
to facilitate, but do not in themselves constitute, compliance with international agreements’ 
Op cit note 101 at 77-78. 
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they are vague, ambiguous and broad)205 and the nature of institutional 
arrangements (whether there are strong institutions supporting 
implementation)206 are important determinants of whether or not there will be 
treaty compliance. The latter theory posits that non-compliance is an 
involuntary occurrence, usually induced by the lack of capacity to comply. 
This chapter studies each treaty in turn and discusses the extent to which 
these theories explain non-compliance, by the SADC states, with their 
frameworks. The argument is that, if there is non-compliance with 
instruments, then there will not be transformation to the state of trade 
facilitation in the region. However, it is recognised that compliance alone is 
not the singular factor that is inhibiting the effectiveness of the legal 
frameworks. It is argued that it is one of the prominent factors. 
Implementation is another factor that will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6 
of this work. 
 
4.2. The Regional Framework for Trade Facilitation in the Southern African 
Development Community 
From independence, the vision of African leaders across the continent has 
been the pursuit of unity via regional integration. Maruping explains that 
countries pursue integration in order to ‘foster competition, subsidiarity, 
access to wider market (via trade), larger and diversified investment and 
production, socio-economic and political stability and bargaining power’.207 
Therefore, there are political as well as economic reasons that motivate 
countries to seek greater coordination.208 Regional integration is allowed as 
 
205 Kelly Op cit note 110 at 305. 
206 For example, by interpreting rules, monitoring compliance, resolving disputes, etc. 
207 Maruping Op cit note 152 at 131. See also Balassa, Bela The Theory of Economic Integration 
(2011), Byiers, B & Vanheukelom, J, What Drives Regional Economic Integration? Lessons 
from the Maputo Development Corridor and the North-South Corridor (2014) European Centre 
for Development Policy Management, Machlup, Fritz A History of Thought on Economic 
Integration (1977) and Sakyi, Daniel &  Eric Evans Osei Opoku Regionalism and Economic 
Integration in Africa: A Conceptual and Theoretical Perspective (2014), African  Capacity 
Building Foundation, Addis Ababa. 
208 Wolff-Christian Peters also agrees that there are these two rationales for regional 
integration: an economic one and a political one. In The Quest for an African Economic 
Community: Regional Integration and its Role in Achieving African Unity: The Case of SADC 
(2010). Peter Robson adds that the economic, political and social considerations cannot easily 
be disentangled from each other, see his  Economic Integration in Africa (2011) at 11. 
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an exception to Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
by its article XXIV. The rationale was that regionalism was expected to 
supplement and to accelerate multilateralism.209 The regional integration 
agreements that the SADC countries have entered into, which aim at 
facilitating their trade are: 
 
§ The Southern African Development Community Protocol on Trade 
§ The Southern African Customs Union Agreement 
§ The Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
§ The African Continental Free Trade Agreement. 
 
This section discusses each treaty in turn. It describes the legal and 
institutional arrangements therein. It debates the extent to which each 
framework supports members’ compliance with trade facilitation disciplines. 
 
4.2.1 The Southern African Development Community Protocol on Trade 
The first instrument to address trade facilitation barriers in the SADC region 
was the Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community 
Region (SADC Trade Protocol). It was signed on August 1, 1996210 and 
currently has twelve members.211 The preamble to the protocol refers to some 
goals that are related to trade facilitation. These are: strengthening customs 
cooperation and combatting illegal trade. The preamble of a treaty outlines its 
principle purposes. Therefore, including trade facilitation objectives in the 
preamble of the protocol makes it a central mandate; not merely incidental. 
The substantive provisions of the protocol refer to trade facilitation in Part 3, 
which is titled ‘Customs Procedures’. The section refers us to annexes II, III 
and IV to the protocol. All of these annexes relate to one aspect or another of 
trade facilitation. It would seem favourable that different issues are covered 
in stand-alone annexes, because it would give opportunity for each annex to 
devote sufficient attention to each individual facet of trade facilitation. 
 
209 Jagdish Bhagwati ‘Regionalism versus multilateralism (1992) 15 (5) The World Economy. 
210 It entered into force on January 25, 2000. 
211 Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, eSwatini, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
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Annex II concerns customs cooperation. The preamble acknowledges that 
differing customs laws and procedures hinder intra-SADC trade. Thus, the 
annex has three goals: simplification, harmonisation and cooperation. 
Chapter 3 referred to this as soft infrastructure. In terms of simplification, 
members are bound to simplify their customs laws and procedures. Their laws 
should also reflect internationally accepted principles.212 In terms of 
harmonisation, members are bound to:  
 
§ Harmonise their customs laws and procedures 
§ Use common customs and statistical nomenclature that is consistent 
with the Harmonised System (HS)  
§ Publicise trade statistics in conformity with the HS system213  
§ Harmonise their valuation laws and practices in accordance with the 
World Trade Organization’s disciplines on customs valuation214  
§ Develop a single customs document for trade215  
§ Adopt common customs systems.216  
 
There are three components to the cooperation obligation. The first is related 
to security. Because the proliferation of customs offences sabotages legitimate 
trade, members agree to cooperate to investigate and to fight such offences.217 
Secondly, because of the importance of the quality of the human resources at 
border posts, members agree to cooperate in training customs officials by 
developing joint training programmes. Finally, parties to the protocol are 
required, by article 8, to cooperate by enhancing communication. 
 
 
212 Article 5(1). Reference is made to standards and guidelines that are set by organisations 
such as the World Customs Organization (WCO), The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UN-EC), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Civil 
Aviation Association (ICAO), the International Standards Organization (ISO), the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA). 
213 Article 3. 
214 Article 4. 
215 Article 5(3). 
216 Article 6(5). 
217 In article 7 of the annex. 
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Annex III to the protocol concerns the simplification and harmonisation of 
trade documentation and procedures. The preamble recognises the negative 
effect of arduous trade documentation and procedural requirements. It 
advocates that members should simplify these, based on internationally 
recognised standards.218 Members pledge to reduce the costs of trade 
documentation and procedures219 and to standardise trade documents and 
information.220 International standards are to be used as a basis for 
formulating trade documents and data processing techniques are to be used 
to process trade data. Furthermore, parties to the protocol are to initiate trade 
facilitation programmes.221  
 
Finally, annex IV concerns transit trade. It is important that goods that are in 
transit are not subjected to as equally stringent requirements as those goods 
that have arrived at their final destination (imports). Thus, article 2 of this 
annex provides for the freedom of transit for goods that are destined for other 
community countries or for international markets. This freedom is defined as 
meaning that members should not levy duties on transit traffic,222 or 
restrict/prohibit or control transit trade,223 or permit practices that 
discriminate against such trade or the persons engaged in such trade.224 
Transiting goods are also to be exempted from customs examinations.225 In 
an effort to harmonise practice, article 7 requires that all parties adopt the 
standard form usage of SADC transit documents.226 In terms of physical 
infrastructure, members agree to ensure the construction of warehouses for 
the temporary storage of transit goods227 as well as clearing offices.228  
 
 
218 Article 2 on the objectives of the annex. 
219 Article 3. 
220 Article 4. 
221 Article 5. 
222 Save for administrative or service charges. Article 2(2). 
223 Article 2(4). 
224 Article 2(3). 
225 Article 8(1) (b). Except that, where customs officials suspect any irregularity, they may 
subject the goods to examination under Article 8(2). 
226 This is to be approved by the Committee of Ministers responsible for trade matters (CMT). 
227 Article 11(1). 
228 Article 11(2). 
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These three annexes are quite extensive in terms of the policies and the 
practices that they capture. There is a fairly comprehensive coverage of trade 
facilitation measures. The substantive provisions of the annexes identify 
relevant trade facilitation impediments and institute correlating relevant 
interventions. However, there are two glaring omissions that may compromise 
the optimality of the protocol. First, it is silent on some key issues, such as 
on the reduction of direct costs related to trade.229 Trade facilitation requires 
that not only are processes expedited, but also that the transactional costs of 
trade are reduced. Furthermore, there is no mention of dispute resolution 
mechanisms between traders and officials. Chapter 3 discussed how 
important it is that traders have recourse to appeal and review procedures 
where they have grievances about the application of rules or the quality of 
services, etc. If a treaty neglects to deal with critical aspects of the problem 
that it is aiming to solve, this will hinder its ability to be effective.  
 
How does this treaty contribute to the ability, or otherwise, of members to 
comply with its provisions? First, it does so by couching provisions in precise 
and obligatory terms. By and large the annexes provide for concrete measures 
that are to be installed. They use the words ‘undertake to’ or ‘shall’ to refer to 
the incumbency of compliance. The enmeshment theory of compliance argues 
that this obligatory phrasing bodes well for securing compliance by states. 
However, it falls short in terms of the strength of the institutional 
arrangements that it installs. African regional institutions have been criticised 
as tending to be weak and, thus, ineffective in guiding member states towards 
compliance.230 The enmeshment theory explains that the strength of a treaty’s 
institutional arrangements can correspond to the probability of members’ 
compliance. The annexes to the trade protocol create a Committee of Ministers 
(CMT) that adopts implementing regulations.231 It also appoints a Sub-
 
229 For example, service costs. 
230 Ashimizo Afadameh-Adeyemi &  Evance Kalula ‘SADC at 30: Re-examining the legal and 
institutional anatomy of the Southern African Development Community in  Bösl, Anton, Willie 
Breytenbach, Trudi Hartzenberg, Colin McCarthy & Klaus Schade (eds)  Monitoring Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook (2011) at 20. 
231 For instance, in art 12 in annex I. 
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Committee on Customs Co-operation.232 The Sub-committee undertakes 
studies and makes recommendations on the covered areas. However, these 
bodies are not given much power to monitor or to enforce the compliance of 
members. Without these capacities the otherwise stellar legal obligations may 
go un-implemented because of the lack of follow-through. 
 
The managerial approach to compliance cautions that states may be unable 
to comply with a treaty due to shortfalls in their capacity. The SADC trade 
protocol requires the implementation of heavily resource-dependent reforms 
(for example the institution of training programmes, infrastructural 
development, etc.). However, it does not provide the means for these to be 
afforded by the member states (for example, provisions on technical 
assistance). Neither are the institutions that are created given any resources 
to assist members who might experience compliance challenges. This 
becomes a bar to compliance with the commitments because the members 
are all poor developing and least developed countries who have limited 
resources to implement the costly measures. These are some of the 
weaknesses of the framework that may explain why this protocol has not 
greatly assisted in the resolution of trade facilitation challenges in the region. 
 
 
4.2.2 The Southern African Customs Union Agreement 
Some members of the Southern African Development Community are also 
members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).233 The SACU 
agreement234 facilitates trade because it calls for the application of common 
tariffs on goods from non-members and for common trade regulations. 
However, despite trade facilitation being listed in the objectives of the 
 
232 Article 11 of annex I, and art 6 of annex IV. 
233 These are: Botswana, Lesotho, eSwatini, Namibia and South Africa. 
234 Of October 21, 2002. The predecessor agreements were the Customs Agreement between 
the government of the Union of South African and the Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland, 
and Bechuanaland Protectorate (of 30 July, 1910) and the Customs Union Agreement 
between the Governments of The Republic of South Africa, The Republic of Botswana, The 
Kingdom of Lesotho and The Kingdom of Swaziland (of 11 December, 1969). The Republic of 
Namibia acceded to it on 6 July 1990). All of the agreements are available at 
http://www.sacu.int/list.php?type=Agreements.  
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treaty,235 the agreement only has two substantive provisions that are 
specifically related to facilitating trade. These are articles 23 and 24.  
 
Article 23(2) provides that members shall take measures that are necessary 
to ensure the simplification and harmonisation of trade documentation and 
procedures. However, there are no specific details about what exactly should 
be done in respect of this obligation. The same article also mentions that 
members’ customs authorities “shall cooperate,” but again without details of 
cooperating on what and how. The enmeshment theory argues that such 
imprecision of commitments hampers treaty effectiveness.  
 
Article 24 of the agreement is on the freedom of transit. This provision is 
limited in that the freedom is defined as applying only between the territories 
of the member states. The SADC Trade Protocol guarantees freedom of transit 
even when the destination country is a third country. Therefore, this 
agreement is very shallow in terms of the obligations that it imposes on 
members. Its provisions lack sufficient coverage and specificity. This may, 
therefore, hamper its ability to achieve compliance and, therefore, 
effectiveness. 
 
Article 7 of the agreement establishes an extensive network of institutions of 
the customs union. There is an organ that is responsible for making rules,236 
those that enforce rules237 and one that interprets rules and resolves 
disputes.238 However, even though these institutions are given these 
responsibilities, they are not given political or economic tools to enforce them. 
This compromises their effectiveness to enforce member compliance. A final 
concern regarding the agreement is that there is no assistance that is given 
to parties to implement treaty obligations. This is despite the managerial 
approach to compliance insisting that capacity constraints should be 
 
235 Article 2 of the SACU treaty. 
236 The Summit was created in art 7A. It is responsible for the strategic direction of the 
organisation and adopts its rules. 
237 The Council of Ministers (art 8), Customs Union Commission (art 9) and the Secretariat 
(art10) are all involved in some aspect of enforcing rules. 
238 The ad hoc tribunal that is established in art 13 of the agreement. 
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addressed in treaty provisions so as to enhance the ability of parties to comply 
with the framework. 
 
4.2.3 The Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
The tripartite free trade area is composed of the members of three African 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs): the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). The idea for this free 
trade area originated with the Kampala Communique of the Tripartite Summit 
of October 22, 2008.239 Therein the Heads of States and Governments of the 
three RECs agreed to the establishment of a free trade area amongst 
themselves as a stepping-stone to the eventual establishment of a customs 
union. The resultant agreement was signed in Egypt on June 10, 2015. The 
Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA) has been signed by 22 out of the 28 
member states but it has not yet entered into force due to an insufficient 
number of ratifications.240 
 
The goals of the TFTA are contained in its article 5. Customs cooperation and 
trade facilitation are mentioned in article 5(c). These goals are fleshed out in 
more detail in articles 13, 14 and 15 respectively, as well as in annexes IV, V 
and VII to the agreement. The annexes are mirror images of annexes II, III, 
and IV to the SADC Protocol on Trade. Therefore, the same comments that 
were made about the protocol, regarding the nature of the commitments, the 
institutional arrangements, as well as capacitation, equally apply here.241 
Nevertheless, the mere fact that this agreement was concluded evidences that 
the SADC members have been keen to address trade facilitation barriers even 
 
239 http://meac.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Tripartite-Summit-Final-Communique-
Kampala-20081022-1.pdf, accessed on 27 May 2020 . 
240 Eight countries have ratified it so far. These are: Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Kenya, 
Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda and South Africa. Another seven countries (Comoros, eSwatini, 
Malawi, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe countries are in advanced stages of the 
ratification process: https://www.comesa.int/implementation-of-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-
now-in-sight/ accessed on 23 May 2020. 
241 See the discussion in section 3.2.1. above. 
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beyond their immediate region. The challenge remains to address the 
compliance challenges that may impede the TFTA from achieving its goals. 
 
4.2.4 The African Continental Free Trade Agreement 
The negotiations for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) were 
launched in South Africa on June 15, 2015.242 The agreement was signed on 
March 21, 2018 at an African Union (AU) Summit that was held in Kigali, 
Rwanda. This launched phase I of the agreement.243 The agreement entered 
into force on May 30, 2019. It is currently the largest (in terms of scope and 
membership – 32 members) and the most ambitious African project for 
regional integration that has ever been achieved. Trade facilitation is 
mentioned in the specific objectives of the AfCFTA. It is stated that parties 
shall ‘cooperate on customs matters and the implementation of trade 
facilitation measures’.244 Reservations are not allowed to be made to the 
agreement245 and a member may not withdraw from it within the first five 
years of its establishment.246 This is indicative of the level of commitment that 
is expected of the members. The enmeshment theory argues that the strength 
of commitments can affect compliance with an agreement.247  
 
The African Continental Free Trade Agreement has a Protocol on Trade in 
Goods. Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the protocol are relevant to trade facilitation. 
They refer to annexes 3, 4 and 5 (respectively) to the agreement.248 Annex 3 
is on customs cooperation and mutual administrative assistance.249 It 
 
242 African Union Assembly Decision, Assembly/AU/Dec. 569 (XXV). 
243 Phase I encompasses: trade in goods (including customs cooperation, trade facilitation, 
and transit trade), trade in services and a dispute settlement mechanism. Phase II of the 
agreement will cover investment, intellectual property rights, and competition policy (Article 
7 of the AfCFTA- rendezvous clause).  
244 Article 4(e). 
245 Article 26. 
246 Article 28. 
247 For example, was there just signature, or ratification? Are reservations allowed? How easy 
is it to withdraw, etc.? 
248 The status of the protocols and annexes to the agreement is discussed in art 8 of the main 
agreement. It explains that they are part and parcel of the agreement and the undertakings 
of members, and that they form part of the single undertaking and will enter into force 
simultaneously with the entry into force of the main agreement. 
249 Annex II of the SADC Protocol on Trade, and Annex IV of the Tripartite Free Trade 
Agreement. 
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contains significant repetition of the provisions of the correlating annexes to 
the SADC Trade Protocol and the Tri-partite Free Trade Agreement.250 For 
example, the AfCFTA keeps the same disciplines as these previous agreements 
with respect to the harmonisation of customs tariff nomenclatures and 
statistical nomenclatures,251 the harmonisation of valuation laws and 
practices,252 the prevention, investigation and suppression of customs 
offences,253 and communication on customs information.254 However, there 
are some key differences in the new agreement that may give it advantages 
over the previous ones. First, the language used in the previous regimes 
regarding computerisation (TFTA language) or automation (AfCFTA language) 
is not obligatory. Members are ‘encouraged to’,255 or ‘should’,256 or ‘whenever 
practicable’,257 or members shall  ‘consider’258 etc. This is a weaker legal 
regime because it is largely devoid of legal consequences. In contrast, the 
AfCFTA provisions on this issue are more binding. For example, it is provided 
that members ‘undertake to establish, use and continually upgrade’ their 
processing systems. According to the enmeshment theory, the obligatory 
nature of treaty provisions is important for enhancing compliance. Therefore, 
this feature may assist the AfCFTA to be more successful in securing the 
compliance of members, as compared to the previous agreements. 
 
Secondly, the regime on customs cooperation is more extensive than that 
which obtains in the previous regional agreements. For example, with regard 
to the advance exchange of information,259 confidentiality during customs 
 
250 Annex II to the SADC Trade Protocol, and annex IV to the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement. 
251 Article 3. 
252 Article 4. 
253 Article 7 of the AfCFTA’s annex and article 8 of the TFTA’s annex, although the TFTA 
provisions are a little bit more detailed on the type of information that may be requested. 
254 Article 12 of the AfCFTA’s annex and article 9 of the TFTA’s annex.  
255 Article 6(1) on the use of data processing techniques to support customs operations. 
256 Article 6(3) on customs authorities reviewing existing manual procedure with a view to 
modernising. 
257 Article 6(4) that computer applications should be based on internationally accepted 
standards. 
258 Article 6(5) on the development and adoption of customs application systems in common 
with other members. 
259 Article 7 requires the exchange of information in advance of arrival, at a border crossing, 
of persons or goods or means of transport. The previous agreements do not have a similar 
provision. 
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cooperation260 and the scope of cooperation in training.261 On a balance, the 
annex has stronger norms than those contained in the previous agreements. 
This counts in its favour in terms of favouring potential compliance. 
 
Annex 4 to the AfCFTA is on Trade Facilitation.262 In many ways it is an 
improvement on what obtained in the previous regional instruments. The 
annex is more comprehensive in that it covers a wider range of trade 
facilitation measures that members must implement.263 Furthermore, the 
majority of the measures are couched in legally binding language.264 
Therefore, even with this annex there is evidence of stronger obligations, thus 
giving greater confidence for compliance. 
 
The regime on transit trade is provided for in annex 8 to the AfCFTA. 265 It is 
almost an exact mirror image of the previous annexes. However, it has an 
interesting provision that is absent from the previous instruments. It 
mandates that parties should accord one another ‘expedited implementation 
of the provisions of the annex’. At first glance it may appear to be a strong 
commitment. However, the provision is troublesome because, as the 
enmeshment theory explains, states cannot comply with obligations which 
are vague and difficult to interpret. This is the case with this phrasing because 
the ambits of the commitment are not explained. It is not clear exactly what 
 
260 Article 10. 
261 Article 11. 
262 The corresponding annexes are annex III to the SADC Trade Protocol and annex V to the 
Tripartite Free Trade Agreement. 
263 Publication, the establishment of enquiry points, advance rulings, pre-arrival processing, 
electronic payment, separation of release from final determination of customs duties, taxes, 
fees and charges, risk management, post-clearance audit, establishment and publication of 
average release times, trade facilitation measures for authorised operators, expedited 
shipments, perishable goods, use of international standards, use of information technology, 
single window, freedom of transit, documentation, fees, charges and penalties, review and 
appeal, use of customs brokers, pre-shipment inspection, and border agency co-operation. 
264 In two other instances, the language is binding but it also allows members to prioritise 
implementation in light of their existing policies, or subject to listed exceptions. However, in 
six instances, the measures are couched in non-binding terms by use of language such as 
‘shall, to the extent possible/practical;, or that members are ‘encouraged to’, or that they 
shall ‘endeavour to’. 
265 Annex IV to the SADC Trade Protocol and annex VII to the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement. 
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timeframes are expected from the members. Thus, it will not be helpful in 
guaranteeing action from the member states.  
 
The enmeshment theory postulates that a robust institutional framework is 
necessary to support compliance. It was argued that the Trade Protocol and 
the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement have weak institutional arrangements. 
Those of the AfCFTA have been fortified to provide for a more sound 
institutional structure. There are decision-making bodies in the form of the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments266 and the Council of 
Ministers.267 There is also a body that is responsible for implementing 
programmes and monitoring and reviewing the functioning of the 
agreement.268 There is also a dispute settlement mechanism which is 
established in article 20 of the agreement. It makes reference to the AfCFTA’s 
Protocol on Rules and Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes. It 
institutionalises arrangements that harken to those of the World Trade 
Organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). It establishes a 
dispute settlement body (DSB)269 which is responsible for, inter alia, 
establishing panels and an appellate body to preside over disputes by 
members and to make recommendations which will be adopted by the DSB. 
This more comprehensive structure and diverse responsibilities may assist in 
empowering the institutions to secure member compliance. 
 
The managerial approach to compliance recognises that capacity constraints 
must be overcome in order for members to be able to comply with treaties.270 
To its credit, the AfCFTA recognises that members are at varying levels of 
development and seeks to mitigate this inequality which can impact on their 
ability to comply with the regime. This is reflected in Article 30 of the Protocol 
 
266 Article 10 of the AfCFTA. It is responsible for the strategic direction of the free trade area 
and provides interpretations of the provisions of the AfCFTA. 
267 Article 11 of the AfCFTA. It is tasked with ensuring the enforcement of the agreement. 
State parties must implement any decision of the Council of Ministers. 
268 That is the Committee of Senior Trade Officials, which is established in art 12 of the 
agreement. 
269 In art 5 of the Protocol. 
270 Chayes & Chayes Op cit note 118.  
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on Trade in Goods which provides for special and differential treatment 
(S&DT). This is in the form of flexibilities that are given to certain states; 
mindful of their diminished capability to implement obligations. The 
dispensations are in the form of ‘special consideration and additional 
transition periods’ for implementation. This is given on a case by case basis. 
This latitude can greatly improve prospects of compliance. 
 
4.3. The Multilateral Framework for Trade Facilitation in the Southern 
African Development Community 
There are several international organisations that promote the global 
facilitation of trade. These include the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD),271 the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD),272 the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC),273 the International Trade Centre (ITC),274 and the United Nations 
Organization (UNO), amongst others.275 However, the two most prominent 
 
271 UNCTAD created a no-cost customs modernisation software system called the Automated 
System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) which is used in over 90 countries including in many 
SADC states, available at http://new.asycuda.org/, accessed  on 13 August 2018. 
272 The OECD developed the trade facilitation indicators (TFIs). They identify areas for action 
for trade facilitation, and address how countries may assess the potential impact of reforms. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/trade/facilitation/indicators.htm, accessed on 28 October 
2017.  
273 The ICC is part of the Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation. This is a partnership of public 
and private entities that aims to identify and to implement reforms that will facilitate trade 
in developing and Least Developed Countries. https://www.tradefacilitation.org, accessed 10 
October 2017. 
274 The ITC runs a trade facilitation programme that assists primarily small and medium 
enterprises to improve their competitiveness. http://www.intracen.org/itc/trade-facilitation-
programme, accessed 10 October 2017. 
275 The United Nations adopted the Almaty Programme of Action (APoA) in 2003 in Almaty 
Kazakhstan at the First International Ministerial Conference of Landlocked and Transit 
Developing Countries. The aim was to address the trade facilitation needs and challenges of 
land locked developing countries (LLDCs). The programme covers transit policy, 
infrastructural development and international support for implementation. In November 
2014, the Second United Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries was held 
in Vienna. The Vienna Programme of Action for the Landlocked Developing Countries for the 
Decade 2014 to 2024 (VPoA) A/CONF.225/L.1 is the successor programme to the APoA. It 
concentrates on building partnerships between LLDCs and transit countries, (for instance in 
infrastructure development, technical and administrative support, customs and logistics 
connectivity, the harmonisation, simplification and standardisation of rules and 
documentation, and the implementation of relevant international, regional and bilateral 
agreements). See also UN-OHRLLS Africa Regional Report on Improving Transit Cooperation, 
Trade and Trade Facilitation for the Benefit of the Landlocked Developing Countries (2015) 1–
2, available  at 
http://unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/Elle%20Wang%20Uploads/LLDCs%20Publication.pdf, 
accessed on 23 December 2017. 
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organisations are the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The SADC countries are members of both of these 
organisations. They have, therefore, assumed international commitments to 
facilitate trade. This next section discusses the instruments that have been 
created by these two institutions. It assesses their abilities to enhance 
compliance by the SADC states, so that they may facilitate their trade as a 
strategy towards the achievement of greater development gains.  
 
4.3.1. The Instruments of the World Customs Organization 
The World Customs Organization276 is an intergovernmental organisation that 
was created to advise its members on customs matters. It aims to assist 
governments to improve the efficiency of their customs administrations so 
that global trade can expand.277 The WCO has membership of 183 customs 
administrations.278 It promotes customs cooperation, proposes strategies to 
harmonise customs operations, prepares conventions, publicises information 
on customs regulations and procedures and advises governments on customs 
issues.  The WCO is responsible for many important trade facilitating 
conventions. The SADC states are members of the following five instruments: 
 
§ The Customs Convention on the A.T.A Carnet for the Temporary 
Admission of Goods  
§ The International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for 
the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences 
§ The Convention on Temporary Admission  
 
276 http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/what-is-the-wco.aspx, accessed 24 November, 
2018. 
277 It was created by virtue of the 1952 Customs Cooperation Convention. This was signed in 
Brussels on 15 December, 1950 and it entered into force on November 4, 1952. The 
organisation was initially called the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) but was 
subsequently renamed the World Customs Organization in 1994, due to its growing global 
membership. 
278 WCO Secretary General, Position as Regards Ratifications and Accessions DATE 
SG0205E1a, available at http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/about-
us/legal-instruments/conventions-and-agreements/conventions/sg0205e1.pdf?la=en. 
Membership is governed by Articles XVI and XVIII of the Customs Cooperation Convention. 
The former article deals with original membership while the latter one deals with accessions. 
Save for Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea every African state is a member of the WCO. 
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§ The International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System 
§ The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization 
of Customs Procedures 
 
The Customs Convention on the ATA Carnet for the Temporary Admission of 
Goods  
This is also known as the A.T.A Convention. It entered into force on July 30, 
1963 and currently has 63 members.279 Eleven members are African states; 
three of which are SADC states.280 The A.T.A carnet is a document that is 
used when goods are temporarily admitted into a territory, but where the 
goods will not remain in that country (for example, where they are imported 
as samples, or for display at exhibitions, etc.). It excludes goods that will 
undergo any further processing or repair while in the country. By virtue of the 
convention, contracting parties accept A.T.A carnets in the place of their 
national customs documents. The carnet can be valid for up to one year and 
in multiple territories, thus giving an importer access to many markets. It 
gives security to the government of the state into which the goods are being 
imported because they have a guarantee that, should the conditions of the 
carnet be breached, then the customs duties and taxes will become payable. 
The system facilitates international trade because, when customs formalities 
are not applied to goods that are only temporarily being imported, this saves 
traders time and costs. It also facilitates trade by encouraging harmonisation 
because the annex to the agreement provides a model carnet. 
 
The International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the 
Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences 
This convention is also known as the Nairobi Convention. It was concluded 
on June 9, 1977. It entered into force on May 21, 1980. It currently has 52 
 
279 World Customs Organization General Secretariat, Position as Regards Ratifications and 
Accessions Brussels, PG0233E1. February 22, 2018. 
280 South Africa (1975), Mauritius (1982) and Lesotho (1983). 
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members.281 Seventeen members are African states; seven being from the 
SADC region.282 The convention recognises that customs offences are 
detrimental to the economic, social and fiscal interests of states and to 
legitimate trade.283 It, therefore, mandates members to take joint action 
against such offences. This is to be achieved by customs administrations 
affording each other mutual assistance in the prevention, investigation and 
repression of customs offences. The improvement of cooperation between 
customs officials is an essential pillar of trade facilitation. Furthermore, 
because customs offences undermine the legitimacy of trade, any instrument 
that concerns making trade safer and more secure also serves the mandate 
of trade facilitation. 
 
However, the convention lacks a strong institutional pillar to ensure 
compliance from enforcement. Article 12 of the agreement creates a Council 
and a Permanent Technical Committee. These organs are not given much 
power. The Committee gives opinions on interpretations and makes proposals 
of amendments to the Council. The Council, in turn, tables the proposals 
before the Contracting Parties. Neither of the organs can take or enforce any 
decisions. This undermines the quality of the institutional arrangements. 
This, as enmeshment theorises, weakens compliance prospects. 
 
The convention’s annexes are well-designed to cover numerous areas of 
cooperation. These are: 
 
§ Annex 1 - Assistance by a Customs administration on its own initiative  
§ Annex II - Assistance, on request, in the assessment of import or export 
duties and taxes  
§ Annex III - Assistance, on request, relating to controls  
§ Annex IV - Assistance, on request, relating to surveillance  
 
281 World Customs Organization General Secretariat Position as Regards Signatures, 
Ratifications and Accessions. Brussels (8 August 2012) EG0019E1a. 
282 Malawi (1978), Mauritius (1985), the Seychelles (2012), the Republic of South Africa 
(1993), eSwatini (2000), Zambia (1984) and Zimbabwe (1982). 
283 In the preamble to the convention.  
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§ Annex V - Enquiries and notifications, on request, on behalf of another 
Contracting Party 
§ Annex VI - Appearance by Customs officials before a court or tribunal 
abroad  
§ Annex VII - Presence of Customs officials of one Contracting Party in 
the territory of another Contracting Party 
§ Annex VIII - Participation in investigations abroad. 
 
However, the ability of a customs administration to participate in these kinds 
of exchanges and areas of assistance would require significant resources of a 
human and financial nature. The SADC countries do not have such resources 
to spare, and none are offered under the auspices of the agreement. Therefore, 
even though the framework contains a well-designed scheme for nations to 
collaborate, it will likely remain largely ineffective in the SADC states because 
it does not address their capacity constraints for compliance. 
 
The Convention on Temporary Admission  
This agreement is also called the Istanbul Convention.284 It has sixty-nine 
contracting parties. Eleven of them are African countries; three of which are 
SADC states.285 It was created in reaction to the proliferation of international 
conventions governing the temporary admission of goods into territories. It is 
an amalgamation of thirteen international instruments on temporary 
admission that existed as of 1990. The fear was that this proliferation would 
continue with more and more new instruments added, each governing the 
admission of a separate category of goods, thus leading to a complicated and 
convoluted regulatory framework. The convention contains thirteen annexes. 
Each annex is made specific to a particular good. It provides for temporary 
 
284 Of 26 June 1990. It entered into force on 27 November 1993. 
285 Mauritius (1995), the Republic of South Africa (2004) and Zimbabwe (1992). 
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admission as well as the period for re-exportation.286 According to Article 2 of 
the convention, temporary admission is to be granted without the payment of 
any import duties or other taxes and free from any import restrictions or 
prohibitions. States can accept temporary admission documents in lieu of the 
presentation of a customs document and the furnishing of security. As has 
been mentioned (above), not imposing costs and procedures on goods that 
enter temporarily facilitates the import and export of such goods.  
 
However, despite its well-intentioned trade facilitation mandate, some of the 
requirements in the agreement require costly reforms, yet there is no provision 
of assistance towards these costs. For example, article 15 requires the 
reduction of formalities. It provides that contracting parties should reduce the 
customs formalities that are required in connection with the temporary 
admission of goods and that all related regulations governing such formalities 
shall be promptly published. The conduct of regulatory reform can be a taxing 
exercise because it has to begin with the collation of applicable regulations, 
followed by the identification of dispensable formalities and then a regulatory 
reform process. All of these require time, labour, skills and finances, which 
the SADC countries may not have, given their levels of under-development. 
Another example is article 22 which anticipates the use of electronic data 
processing techniques for implementing the provisions of the convention. 
Poorer countries struggle to acquire such technology and thus may remain 
non-compliant with the commitment. 
 
 
286 Annex A governs temporary admission papers for A.T.A carnets and C.P.D carnets. Annex 
B contains nine sub-annexes on different goods (Annex B.1 is the Annex Concerning Goods 
for Display or Use  At Exhibitions, Fairs, Meetings Or Similar Events, Annex B.2 is the Annex 
Concerning Professional Equipment, Annex B.3 is the Annex Concerning Containers, Pallets, 
Packings, Samples and other Goods Imported in Connection With a Commercial Operation,  
Annex B.4 is the Annex Concerning Goods Imported  in Connection With a Manufacturing 
Operation, Annex B.5 is the Annex Concerning Goods Imported for Educational,  Scientific 
or Cultural Purposes, Annex B.6 is the Annex Concerning Travellers' Personal Effects  and 
Goods Imported for Sports Purposes, Annex B.7 is the Annex Concerning Tourist Publicity 
Material, Annex B.8 is the Annex Concerning Goods Imported  as Frontier Traffic, and Annex 
B.9. is the Annex Concerning Goods Imported for Humanitarian Purposes. Annex C governs 
the temporary admission of means of transport. Annex D concerns animals, while Annex E 
is primarily related to goods which are not mentioned in such other annexes. 
 91 
The International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System 
This instrument entered into force on January 1, 1988. It replaced the former 
Convention on Nomenclature for the Classification of Goods in Customs 
Tariffs (and the protocol of amendment thereto).287 The new convention has 
one hundred and fifty-four parties. Forty-four parties are African states,288 
with fourteen being SADC members.289 Its key objectives are to facilitate the 
collection and use of international trade statistics and to harmonise the 
classification of goods and of trade documentation. The latter objectives are 
meant to reduce the expense, confusion and time wastage that ensue from 
the lack of coordination. Harmonisation is a fundamental pillar of trade 
facilitation. The agreement defines the Harmonised Commodity Description 
and Coding System (or HS system) as ‘nomenclature comprising the headings 
and subheadings and their related numerical codes, the Section, Chapter and 
Subheading Notes and the General Rules for the interpretation of the 
Harmonized System’. Article 3 of the convention provides that members must 
ensure that their customs tariff and statistical nomenclatures are in 
conformity with the Harmonized System. 
 
The convention contains two measures in support of compliance. First, 
flexibility is provided for developing nations, such as the SADC states. Article 
4 of the convention allows them to temporarily delay the application of some, 
or all, of the subheadings of the system if they are unable to apply them 
immediately upon entry into force of the agreement. Furthermore, article 5 
imposes an obligation on developed countries to extend technical assistance 
to developing countries in order to enable them to fully apply the convention. 
 
287 The former convention had been signed in Brussels on December 15, 1950 and entered 
into force on September 11, 1959. However, by the 1980s it was thought to be outdated and 
to not be keeping in touch with the needs of member states and advancements in the conduct 
of international trade. Hence its replacement with the current convention. 
288 World Customs Organization General Secretariat Position as Regards Signatures, 
Ratifications and Accessions Brussels (6 July 2016) NG0231E1a. 
289 Angola (2013), Botswana (88), the Democratic republic of the Congo (1998), Lesotho 
(1988), Madagascar (1988), Malawi (1989), Mauritius (1988), Mozambique (2014), Namibia 
(2006), the republic of South Africa (1988), eSwatini (1988), Tanzania (2008), Zambia (1988) 
and Zimbabwe (1988). 
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This encompasses, for example, assistance with training personnel and 
converting their existing nomenclatures to the HS system.  Therefore, there 
are clear ambits on the scope of the assistance that may be sought and an 
understanding that there should be engagement and agreement on the terms 
of the assistance. However, the limitation of this arrangement is that there is 
no guarantee that a party will get exactly what it has requested, nor on its 
own acceptable terms and conditions. Thus, this can be a barrier to 
developing countries using such opportunities to adequately address their 
capacity challenges in a manner that they find most apposite to their 
circumstances. 
 
The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of 
Customs Procedures 
The first version of this convention was the Kyoto Convention.290 On June 26, 
1999 it was amended by the current convention, which is referred to as the 
Revised Kyoto Convention.291 It has one hundred and twelve state parties. Of 
these, thirty-two are African states; twelve of which are members of SADC.292 
The convention aims to simplify and to harmonise the customs procedures of 
its member states. This is because inconsistencies in these practices can 
hinder the flow of international trade. The convention aims to strike a balance 
between facilitating trade while maintaining adequate customs control. It 
contains a multitude of measures to facilitate trade. For example:  
 
§ Members must designate and publicise where their customs offices 
shall be and the opening hours, paying particular attention to the needs 
of traders293  
 
290 Of the 18 May, 1973. It entered into force on September 25, 1974. 
291 Which entered into force on February 3, 2006. World Customs Organization General 
Secretariat Position as Regards Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions. Brussels (11 August 
2017) PG0277E1a.  
292 Angola (2017), Botswana (2006), the Democratic Republic of Congo (signature 2000, 
pending ratification), Lesotho (2000), Malawi (2013), Mauritius (2008), Mozambique (2012), 
Namibia (2006), the Republic of South Africa (2004), eSwatini (2012), Zambia (2006) and 
Zimbabwe (2003). 
293 Standard 3.1 of the General Annex. 
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§ All the applicable customs formalities, duties and taxes294 and laws 
related to customs must be published295 
§ States must impose reasonable information requirements296 and apply 
reasonable clearance procedures and practices297  
§ States must balance traders’ need for expediency with the public 
interest of legitimate customs control298  
§ There must be cooperation and collaboration between customs 
officials299  
§ Professionalism is required of staff300  
§ Traders must be furnished with reasons and an opportunity to appeal 
adverse decisions taken against them.301  
 
In conclusion on the World Customs Organization, its instruments are well 
designed in terms of having a wide coverage of trade facilitation measures, for 
example, the simplification of procedures and requirements, cooperation 
between administrations, publication and appeal and review procedures. As 
the next chapter will show, these are real experienced hindrances to facilitated 
trade in SADC. One problem, however, is that the rules are dispersed across 
several agreements, rather than being contained in one instrument. This 
means that not all members are subject to the same disciplines. This 
introduces a coordination problem. Furthermore, this may make ascertaining 
applicable rules difficult.  
 
The managerial approach to compliance recognises the importance of support 
for capacity-building. This issue is somewhat addressed in the WCO’s 
instruments. For example, the SADC states are able to benefit from 
flexibilities in some of the agreements.  However, the problem is that not all 
 
294 Standards 4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.15, 4.16 and 5.1 of the General Annex. 
295 Standard 9.1 of the General Annex. 
296 Standards 3.12, 3.13, 3.15, and 3.16 of the General Annex. 
297 Standard 3.31 of the General Annex. 
298 Standards 3.33, 4.21, and 6.1 - 6.3 of the General Annex. 
299 Standards 3.3, 3.4, 3.35 and 6.7 of the General Annex.  
300 Standard 3.39 of the General Annex. 
301 Standards 9.8 and 10.1 of the General Annex. 
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of the agreements provide for flexibilities. Secondly, although there is mention 
of possible technical assistance from developed member states, the ambits of 
this are narrow and there is no guarantee that assistance will ultimately be 
provided. Therefore, the measures that are required by the instruments may 
not be successfully complied with by the SADC states because of these 
shortcomings. 
 
Finally, the enmeshment theory endorses strong institutional capacity to 
support compliance. The WCO has institutions that advise and support 
members to implement programmes. This is important for developing 
countries, such as the SADC states, because where they lack capacity (in 
terms of knowledge and skills) they can approach the organisation for 
assistance in this regard. However, a key weakness, from a compliance 
standpoint, is that the organisation does not have the power to enforce 
obligations under any of its instruments. This is because its constituent 
document302 does not give it authority to do so. Furthermore, it cannot resolve 
disputes between members that are related to its agreements. It can only 
‘make recommendations, in a conciliatory capacity, for the settlement of 
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Conventions’.  
Members are left to resolve disputes through negotiations between 
themselves. Enmeshment theory suggests that the failure to have a dispute 




302 Convention Establishing a Customs Cooperation Council. Signed in Brussels on 15 
December 1950, entered into force on 4 November 1952. 
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4.3.2. The Instruments of the World Trade Organization 
There are currently one hundred and sixty-four members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).303 Of these, forty-two are African nations;304 thirteen of 
which are SADC member states.305 There were primarily seven WTO 
agreements that addressed trade facilitation issues before the WTO Trade 
Facilitation Agreement came about. These are: 
 
§ The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
§ The Agreement on Rules of Origin 
§ The Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection 
§ The Customs Valuation Agreement 
§ Import Licensing Agreement 
§ Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
§ Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Inspections. 
 
As has been done with the regional frameworks for trade facilitation and the 
instruments of the World Customs Organization, this section will apply the 








303 Articles XI and XII of the Marrakesh Agreement govern membership of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The former describes the original members of the WTO as those nations 
which were contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) upon 
the entry into force of the Marrakesh Agreement. Article XII is on accessions. It provides that 
any ‘state or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its 
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements’ may accede to the agreement. 
304 All African States are members of the WTO except for the following which merely have 
Observers Status: Algeria, the Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, São 
Tomé and Principe, the Seychelles and Sudan.  
305 Angola (1996), Botswana (1995), The Democratic Republic of the Congo (1997), Lesotho 
(1995), Malawi (1995), Mauritius (1995), Mozambique (1995), Namibia (1995), the Seychelles 
(2015), the Republic of South Africa (1995), eSwatini (1995), Tanzania (1995), Zambia (1995), 
and Zimbabwe (1995). 
306 The Trade Facilitation Agreement is the subject of chapter 7. 
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The GATT addresses trade facilitation in articles V, VIII and X.307 Article V 
provides for the freedom of transit. It prohibits the subjection of transit traffic 
to unnecessary delays or restrictions and exempts it from customs duties, 
transit duties or other charges, (except those that are related to transportation 
or administrative and other costs of services rendered). It requires that all 
charges and regulations related to transit traffic be reasonable. 
 
Article VIII regulates the fees and formalities that are connected with 
importation and exportation. It requires that all fees and charges (apart from 
import and export duties and taxes, which are governed by Article III) shall be 
limited to the cost of services rendered and shall not serve as an indirect 
protection of domestic products, or as a taxation for fiscal purposes. Members 
are to work towards reducing the number of fees and charges, as well as the 
complexity of formalities and documentation requirements. Further, it 
prohibits the levying of harsh penalties for minor incidences of lack of 
conformity with regulations or requirements.  
 
Finally, Article X concerns the publication and administration of trade 
regulations. It imposes an obligation of transparency. It requires members to 
promptly publish all of their laws, judicial and administrative decisions and 
international trade agreements so that other governments and traders can 
become acquainted with them. Furthermore, any amendments to their duties, 
requirements, restrictions or prohibitions etc. (in particular where trade is 
made more burdensome) are not to be enforced before being officially 
published. It requires timeous publication so that all stakeholders who might 
be affected by the changes may have sufficient time and opportunity to 
 
307 Articles VII and IX can also be argued to have some relation to trade facilitation. Article 
VII deals with valuation for customs purposes. It speaks to harmonisation, which is key for 
trade facilitation. Article IX governs marks of origin. Amongst others, it recognises that 
requirements relating to marks of origin may cause difficulties and inconvenience to traders. 
It requires that such requirements be kept at a minimum level which is necessary for 
consumer protection. Further, that traders should not be unduly penalised for failing to affix 
marks unless, for example, some form of deception was intended. 
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acquaint themselves with the changes and ready their compliance. Members 
are also required to establish independent judicial, arbitral or administrative 
processes to review actions that are related to customs matters.  This includes 
installing appellate procedures.  
 
The GATT was a good first step that was taken by members to reduce barriers 
to trade facilitation. However, the agreement lacks sufficient coverage of the 
many different trade facilitation impediments that may arise in trading. 
Secondly, the measures that are covered, lack depth in terms of 
comprehensively prescribing required actions. Therefore, the quality of the 
norms is weak. The agreement also fails the ethos of the managerial approach 
in that it does not sufficiently address the economic imbalances between 
members which may render developing members less capable of 
implementing commitments as compared to more developed members. 
 
Post-GATT Subject- Specific Trade Facilitation Agreements 
With the advent of the World Trade Organization in 1995 there came six 
agreements that each focused on a particular aspect of trade facilitation. This 
next section will discuss the essence of the agreements and summarise the 
key takeaways on compliance aspects thereof. 
 
The Agreement on Rules of Origin  
Rules of origin are used to determine the country of origin of traded goods.308 
The preamble to the Agreement on Rules of Origin highlights the need to 
“facilitate (own emphasis) the flow of international trade,” and to ensure that 
the application of rules of origin do not cause unnecessary barriers to trade. 
There is a work programme to harmonise rules of origin so that all members 
apply the rules in the same way. Harmonisation is important to trade 
facilitation. 
 
308 The World Trade Organization defines rules of origin as “the criteria used to define where 
a product was made and are important for implementing other trade policy measures, 
including trade preferences (preferential rules of origin), quotas, anti-dumping measures and 
countervailing duties (non-preferential rules of origin).” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_e.htm accessed 14 September 2018. 
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The Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspections 
Article 1 of the agreement defines pre-shipment inspections as assessments 
for verifying the quality, quantity, price and/or the customs classification of 
goods.309 Despite their utility, inspections have the potential for increasing 
expenses, delays and uncertainties in trading. The agreement, therefore, 
requires that transparent regulations and processes be put in place so that 
traders will know what to expect of the assessments and be prepared for 
them.310 Delays to trade are to be avoided by only conducting inspections 
when strictly necessary.311 Finally, effective dispute resolution processes are 
to be created so that there can be compensation if the rules are not 
respected.312  
 
The Customs Valuation Agreement  
This agreement was created to implement Article VII of the GATT, which deals 
with customs valuation. It facilitates trade because it seeks to harmonise 
trade procedures313 and safeguard transparency in the regulation of trade,314 
while protecting the legitimate interests of customs control.315 Article 20 (3) of 
the agreement addresses the capacity challenges of members by providing for 
special and differential treatment (S&DT) for the less developed member 
states. They can delay the application of some of the provisions of the 
agreement for a period. It also accords them eligibility to gain technical 
assistance from the more developed members of the organisation, for example, 
for the training of their personnel, the preparation of implementation 
 
309 See also Autar Krishen Koul, Guide to the WTO and GATT: Economics, Law and Politics, 
(2018) at 489 – 496 and Talat Kaya & Tolga Tuncer, the Legal Status of Pre-shipment 
Inspection Before and After: The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, Global Trade and Customs 
Journal, Volume 12, Issue 4 (2017) at 149 – 157. 
310 Article 2 (5). 
311 Article 2 (15). 
312 Articles 2(21) and Article 4. 
313 Articles 1 to 9 contain rules for valuing goods. 
314 Article 12 requires the publication of all laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings of general application related to the agreement. 
315 Article 17 empowers customs officials to take action to verify, to their satisfaction, ‘the 
truth or accuracy of any statement, document or declaration presented for customs valuation 
purposes’. 
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measures, as well as information and advice on the application of the 
agreement.316 
 
The Import Licensing Agreement 
This agreement governs the administrative procedures for the issuance of 
import licenses.317 The preamble recognises that international trade can be 
“impeded by the inappropriate use of import licensing procedures.” Therefore, 
its provisions seek to encourage transparency,318 predictability, 
simplification,319 fairness and equity320 in licensing procedures. It also 
recognises the need to speedily resolve disputes, so that trade can quickly 
resume.  
 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
This agreement governs the use of technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures in international trade. The application of 
such measures (despite the legitimacy of their objectives) can impede trade 
flows. The application of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
can facilitate trade because it requires TBT measures to not be applied in a 
manner that will obstruct trade.321 This could be, for example, by the 
implementation of procedures that are slow, information requirements that 
are burdensome322 and fees that are not equivalent to the costs of the service 
that is provided.323 The agreement promotes harmonisation in that states 
must use international standards where these exist.324 They are also 
 
316 This is phrased in a similar fashion to art 5 of the International Convention on the 
Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System in that it requires a request to be 
made by the developing member, followed by engagement between the donor and recipient 
until mutually agreed terms are reached.  
317 Article 1 of the Import Licensing Agreement. 
318 For example, it requires that rules on import licensing should be published. 
319 For example, arts 1.5 and 1.6 require that application forms and procedures should be as 
simple as possible. 
320 For example, art 1.3 requires that rules should be neutral and fairly administered. Article 
1.7 provides that no application should be rejected on the grounds of a minor error in the 
documentation and art 1.8 that no import should be rejected because of minor variations 
between it and the information in the licence used to import it.  
321 Articles 2.2 and 5.1.2. 
322 Article 5.2.3. 
323 Article 5.2.5. 
324 Articles 2.4 and 5.4 
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encouraged to accept the regulations and standards of other members as 
equivalent to their own, despite any minor differences that might exist 
between them.325 It requires transparency in that regulations and standards 
must be published timeously before their entry into force326 and inquiry points 
should be established where anyone can get information on the applicable 
measures and relevant documents.327 Finally, the agreement obliges members 
to implement mechanisms for the review of complaints and the taking of 
corrective action. Articles 11 and 12 concern S&DT and technical assistance 
for developing members. The regimes for these are similar to those seen in the 
Customs Valuation Agreement. 
 
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  
The cross-border movement of goods can lead to the spread of pests and 
diseases that could harm the plants, animals or humans in the countries of 
import. However, measures to halt such spread could adversely affect the 
international movement of goods. Therefore, the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures seeks to regulate the taking of such measures, 
in the interests of balancing the opposing interests. Articles 3 and 4 of the 
agreement concern harmonisation, which is the backbone of trade facilitation. 
Article 7 is on transparency. It requires members to provide information on 
changes to their SPS measures. Articles 9 and 10 relate to the granting of 
technical assistance and of special and differential treatment to developing 
countries. The contents are similar to those in the Customs Valuation and 
Import Licensing agreements. 
 
Therefore, in conclusion on the WTO regime predating the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement, it can be seen that there are different pros and cons. Positive 
aspects are that there is a wide expanse of measures that target multiple 
possible trade facilitation impediments. Furthermore, although the legal 
regime is dispersed among several agreements, unlike with the WCO, the 
 
325 Articles 2.7 and 6.1. 
326 Articles 2.11 and 5.8. 
327 Article 10. 
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WTO’s regime is uniform in that all members must agree to all of the covered 
agreements. Furthermore, the commitments are couched in legally binding 
terms. This lends more seriousness to them, and, as per enmeshment theory, 
this may assist with securing member compliance. In terms of the dictates of 
the managerial approach (that capacity be accorded to enable compliance) the 
WTO regime provides for the special and differential treatment of lesser-
developed members. This is by way of flexibilities that are related to the timing 
of implementation. There is also some scope, albeit limited, for technical 
assistance for members. Lastly, as recommended by the enmeshment theory 
on compliance, the WTO has strong institutions which are tasked with 
ensuring the implementation of its agreements. There is more security to the 
regime because there is ambit for disputes to be brought before the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) for non-compliance.328 However, the special and 
differential treatment and the technical assistance provisions are generally 
weak in all of the agreements, for reasons that have been explained in the 
discussion above. 
 
4.4. Chapter Conclusion 
The discussion in the previous chapters argued that there may be a 
correlation between inefficient and costly trade regulations and procedures 
and the lack of development in Southern Africa. However, it has equally been 
suggested that the slow growth and the low levels of development are also 
related to structural factors, such as the inability of members to industrialise. 
Furthermore, that poor quality infrastructure (hard and soft) compounds the 
structural deficiencies. Therefore, trade facilitation alone will not enhance the 
capacity to export and, thus, improve welfare and prosperity. Nevertheless, 
trade facilitation reforms remain an important component of an overall 
economic policy to strengthen industrial and export capacity.  
 
This chapter has discussed how Southern African countries have entered into 
regional and multilateral treaties as part of their reform efforts. This thesis 
 
328 Section 7.3 discusses the pros and cons of the dispute settlement regime in greater detail. 
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primarily concentrates on the World Trade Organizations’ Trade Facilitation 
Agreement. Yet it is important to understand that the treaty did not arrive to 
find a vacuum in the regulation of trade facilitation. Therefore, it is important 
to examine the pre-dating arrangements and to consider why, seemingly, they 
have had little impact on trade facilitation in the SADC region and to surmise 
whether the TFA has any advantages that may assist it to fare better than 
they have. This chapter has argued that compliance deficiencies may partly 
explain the disconnect between the legal frameworks and what has been 
experienced practically on the ground. It used the enmeshment theory and 
the managerial approach to compliance to analyse the agreements.  
 
It has been discovered that the regional and multilateral frameworks are 
generally sound, in terms of their substantive provisions. They have 
established disciplines that target critical threats to trade facilitation, such as 
lack of coordination, skills shortages, inefficient bureaucracy, the lack of 
expediting technologies etc. Apart from the extensive regulatory regimes, there 
are also institutional arrangements that are created in support of the 
frameworks. Some of the conventions include flexibilities and some ambits for 
technical assistance for developing countries. Furthermore, there is 
complementarity between the regional and the multilateral arrangements.329  
 
However, some weaknesses have also been unearthed. These include the 
presence of vague or non-binding treaty language, the installation of 
 
329 The regional rules replicate international best practice. For instance, the African Directors 
General of Customs held their 5th Ordinary Session in Cotonou, Benin in September 2013. 
In that session they recommended that the Continental Free Trade Area text should include 
the provisions of the Revised Kyoto Convention ‘such that any Party that would have 
agreed/signed the texts will be bound to implement the elements of the Convention’ (UNECA, 
Trade Facilitation from an African Perspective (2013) at 38). This shows the desire to have 
conformity with WCO provisions as harmonising disciplines in the African arrangement. 
Further, many regional agreements mandate that members use the harmonised system. This 
also shows deference to multilateral principles. As another example, the preamble to the 
AfCTA, specifically mentions that members seek to build on their commitments in multilateral 
frameworks, such as the Marrakesh Agreement. So, again, we see the desire to harmonise 
what is happening regionally with what is happening globally. The GATT, GATS and WTO 
Agreement are also part of key definitions in the AfCFTA. The obligations in the AfCFTA are 
so concrete that reservations are not allowed to be made to the agreement.  This may be 
because members wanted to replicate the WTO’s principle of accepting the regime as a single 
package. 
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institutions which are not endowed with political and economic power to 
enforce rules and limited flexibilities and scope for technical assistance for 
poorer members to assist their capacity to comply.  
 
Non-compliance is one explanation of why instruments may be ineffective. 
The other side of the coin is implementation deficiencies. The following 
chapter provides an overview of the state of trade facilitation in the Southern 
African Development Community. It considers whether implementation 
difficulties may also explain why the agreements have not been impactful. 
Chapter 6 contains a deeper examination of this by way of a case study of one 
SADC state – the Kingdom of Lesotho. Chapter 7 considers whether, and how, 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement may address the compliance and 
implementation challenges that are being argued as being hinderances to 


















Chapter 5 -  Trade Facilitation and Implementation Challenges in the 
Southern African Development Community 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 of this work interrogated the concept of trade facilitation. This 
included a description of the various impediments to facilitating trade. The 
previous chapter discussed the regional and multilateral agreements that the 
SADC countries have entered into with the intention of addressing these 
barriers. This thesis argues that the challenges continue unabated, regardless 
of these arrangements. The previous chapter argued that compliance 
challenges might partly explain why the instruments have not been markedly 
fruitful. This chapter argues that implementation challenges might also be 
part of the explanation. Therefore, it seeks to unearth the implementation 
challenges that the SADC countries face, which may have compromised the 
success of the instruments to positively affect trade and development. 
 
The chapter begins with an overview of the state of trade facilitation in the 
SADC region. This is to support the contention that is being advanced that 
barriers to trade facilitation are still widespread despite the instruments that 
were discussed in chapter 4 that were designed to alleviate them. It then 
discusses, one by one, the most prominent obstacles. These are: poor 
regulatory environments, high trade transaction costs, poor infrastructure, 
excessive documentary and procedural requirements and human resource 
deficiencies. This analysis will reference reports and filed complaints by 
traders. Thereafter, the chapter considers the general implementation 
challenges that make it difficult for members to abide by their treaty 
commitments. The conclusion that is reached is that implementation 
challenges are indeed an important contributing factor to the lack of progress 






5.2. Overview of the State of Trade Facilitation in the Southern African 
Development Community 
Although the rate of intra-SADC trade has been improving over the years330 it 
still remains comparatively low in terms of its total value, as well as the total 
percentage value of the states’ overall trade. This is common for African 
countries.331 However, it is not common for countries in other regions of the 
world. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
notes that the proportion of intra-continental exports stood at more than two 
thirds in Europe, half in Asia and less than one fifth in Africa.332 One of the 
reasons for the low rates of African trade is the long delays and high costs at 
borders. The fact that the majority of the countries are landlocked333 means 
that goods have to cross several borders in order to reach ports or export 
destinations.334 This further compounds delays and costs. 
 
The World Bank found that the Sub-Saharan Africa region is the poorest 
performer in terms of three of the four indicators that are used to judge the 
time and costs of trade. 335  It has the longest time to export (in terms of both 
 
330 For example, SADC reports that, since the launch of the Free Trade Area (in August 2008), 
trade between members grew from an initial $13.2 billion in 2000, to approximately $34 
billion in 2009. http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/ 
accessed 10 October 2019. 
331 UCTAD reports that “Intra-African trade, defined as the average of intra-African exports 
and imports, was around 2% during the period 2015–2017.” https://unctad.org/press-
material/facts-figures-0, accessed 12 October 2019. 
332 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Trade structure by partner, 
Handbook of Statistics: International Merchandise Trade (2017) #2 Fact Sheet  at 1. For 
example, the value of intra-SADC exports in 2009 was $16 billion. This represented only 
12.2% of the share of total exports. Kennedy K Mbekeani Understanding the Barriers to 
Regional Trade Integration in Africa (2013) at 14.  
333 Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania are coastal states, whereas 
Botswana, the DRC, eSwatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe are all land-locked. 
They, therefore, lack direct access to the seas, which is vital for access to foreign markets. 
334 For instance, goods to and from the DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi have to be 
transported to and from the Mozambican port of Beira.  
335 World Bank Doing Business: Reforming to Create Jobs 15 ed (2018). 
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border compliance and documentary compliance) as well as the highest costs 
of border compliance for export.336  
 
Table 2: Comparison of the Time and Cost of Trade per Region337 



















East Asia & the 
Pacific 
55.9 387.5 68.2 112.1 
Europe & Central 
Asia 
28.0 191.4 27.9 113.8 
Latin America & the 
Caribbean 
62.5 526.5 53.3 110.4 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
62.6 464.4 74.3 243.6 
OECD High Income 12.7 149.9 2.4 35.4 
South Asia 59.4 369.8 77.0 179.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 100.1 592.1 87.8 215.1 
 
The World Bank has also ranked countries in terms of their trade logistics. 338 
The SADC countries do not fare well in these rankings either. Angola appears 
at number 162 out of 163 economies. The others are not far behind.339 This 
is also indicative of trade not being facilitated in the region.  
 
 
336 The same is confirmed in the World Bank’s Time Release Study for eSwatini,  (2012). It 
reports that it can take up to 1 hour 20 minutes to process exports and 1 hour 50 minutes 
to process imports at some of eSwatini’s borders. The reasons for the time delays were 
elaborated in a speech by Zodwa Mabuza (CEO of the Federation of eSwatini Employers and 
Chamber of Commerce) at the launch of the Swaziland-World Bank Time Release Study (24 
January 2012). Quoted in the WTO’s Trade Policy Review for eSwatini WT/TPR/S/324 (2012)  
at 380. 
337 World Bank Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations: Trading across Borders 
(2020), available at -http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-
borders, accessed on 27 March 2020. Two columns (Trading Across Borders- Distance to 
Frontiers, and Rank) have been omitted from the original table in this reproduction. 
338 World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI) Scores and Rankings (2018), available  at 
https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global, accessed 14 January 2019. 
339 South Africa has the best ranking, at 36. It is followed by Malawi (100), Zambia (114), the 
DRC (123), Lesotho (142), and Zimbabwe (155).  
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The Southern African Development Community, as an organisation, has 
recognised that trade facilitation is a serious issue for the region. It reports 
that ‘stakeholders and businesses in the private sector have identified 
difficulties at borders as a major impediment to trade throughout the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) region’.340 Most of the 
borders are traditional two-way border posts. This does not bode well for the 
speed of processing goods for import and for export.341  
 
The SADC countries experience common trade facilitation challenges. The 
principle challenges appear to be the following:  
 
§ Poor regulatory environments 
§ High fees and other charges 
§ Poor infrastructure (including low mechanisation and technology) 
§ Excessive trade documentation and procedural requirements 
§ Deficiencies in human resources (including poor cooperation and 
coordination of officials and agencies). 
 
The next section analyses these challenges. In doing so it makes use of 
complaints that have been collected by the South African Institute for 
International Affairs (SAIIA) from firms that conduct trade in the region. These 
are used as case studies to highlight the nature of the challenges.  
 
5.3. Poor Regulatory Environments 
Trade facilitation requires that the trade regulatory environment be up to 
date, transparent and create favourable conditions for trading. ‘Being up to 
date’ means that it should reflect the current best practices. ‘Transparency’ 
requires that states publicise the policies, laws and procedures that are 
applicable to trading. This will assist to ameliorate the costs of searching for 
 
340 South African Development Community Towards a Common Future (nd), available at  
http://www.sadc.int/themes/economic-development/trade/customs-trade-facilitation/, 
accessed on 17 February 2019. 
341 The Road Transport Agency State of Cross-Border Operations Report (2018) March at 31, 
accessed 17 February 2019.    
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information. Publication should be done on easily accessible platforms that 
are non-discriminatory (i.e., that do not  favour one type of trader (large, 
formal, etc.) over others (small, informal etc.). ‘Favourable conditions’ 
includes, for example, operating in environments where there are simplified 
regulations. This will reduce the costs of deducing requirements and add 
greater clarity so that there is less scope for corruption. Consultation with 
traders is important for the creation of a favourable regulatory environment. 
This is because it enables the government to gain and to consider traders’ 
inputs before implementing or modifying rules. However, these aspects are 
not always  reflected in trade in SADC.  
 
There are two primary ways to meet the publication requirement. One is by 
the installation of trade portals. The other is by the establishment of enquiry 
points. The World Bank gives a basic definition of a trade portal as being “the 
primary site where one can obtain all the information on regulatory 
requirements needed to undertake international trade.”342 Only seven of the 
SADC states have trade portals. These are: Botswana,343 Lesotho,344 
Malawi,345 Namibia,346 Tanzania,347 Zambia,348 and Zimbabwe.349 Enquiry 
points are a portal for receiving answers to enquiries submitted by 
governments, traders and any other interested parties on issues such as 
applicable laws, procedures, restrictions, rates of duties /charges/ fees/ 
penalties, etc. An enquiry point should also provide relevant forms and 
 
342 World Bank, International Trade Department Developing a Trade Information Portal,  
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Pubs/TIP-
Complete-Version.pdf, accessed on 24 August 2019. 
343 Botswana Trade Portal Facilitating Cross-Border Trade to Foster Economic Growth in 
Botswana,  available at  https://botswanatradeportal.org.bw/index.php?r=site/index, 
accessed on 7 September 2019.  
344 Lesotho Trade Portal  The Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Order 1970, available at  
https://www.lesothotradeportal.org.ls/index.php?r=site/display&id=48, accessed on 7 
September 2019. 
345Malawi Trade Portal Welcome to the Malawi Trade Portal , available from 
https://malawitradeportal.gov.mw/, accessed on  7 September 2019. 
346 http://ncci.org.na/page/trade-information-portal, accessed 25 August 2019. 
347 Tanzania National Trade Portal  A Transparent Trade and Business Environment, available 
at https://trade.business.go.tz/, accessed on 7 September 2019 
348  https://www.zambiatradeportal.gov.zm, accessed 20 June 2020. 
349 The National Trade Development and Promotion Organisation of Zimbabwe Think 
Zimbabwe, available at  http://www.tradezimbabwe.com/, accessed on 7 September 2019.  
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documents. Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia do not 
have enquiry points. They have all requested technical assistance for 
instituting them.350  
 
The failure of the SADC states to publish trade information by instituting 
trade portals and enquiry points has dire consequences on traders. It 
contributes to a non-transparent and unpredictable trading environment. It 
prevents traders from being well-apprised of what will be required of them 
when their goods arrive at borders. They are, therefore, often ill-prepared and 
non-compliant. They waste time trying to rectify defects and they may even 
become liable for penalties as a result of the unintended non-compliance. 
Often they are pressed to resort to corruption in order to get officials to turn 
a blind eye to their non-conformity. Some traders have resorted to informal 
trade because they struggle to obtain information on the formal formalities, 
or due to the arduousness of conformity.351  
 
Buyonge and Kireeva352 have found that African traders are not regularly 
engaged by regulatory authorities when trade policies are being devised or 
amended.353 This is the case also in SADC. This has led to the implementation 
of regulations that do not adequately take traders’ needs and interests into 
account. For instance, some regulations institute inconvenient operating 
hours for borders. DD Williamson (a company incorporated in eSwatini) has 
reported that, at times, their imports from South Africa have remained at the 
border overnight due to border closure. This not only disrupts their 
production, but it has also soured their relationships with some trucking 
companies which now refuse to deliver to them because of the losses that they 
incur as a result of the standing time at the border due to border closure.354 
 
350 In their Category C notifications to the WTO. 
351 Sally Peberdy, Hurdles to Trade? South Africa’s Immigration Policy and Informal Sector 
Cross-border Traders in the SADC (2002) at 37. 
352 C  Buyonge & I Kireeva, Trade facilitation in Africa: Challenges and Possible Solutions  
(2008) 2 (1) l. 
353 Buyonge & Kireeva  ibid at T44–48. 
354 SAIIA SADC Business Barriers DD Williamson (2012), available at  
https://saiia.org.za/saiia-toolkit/dd-williamson/, accessed on 1 June 2018. 
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A firm called Mohammed Enterprises Tanzania Ltd (MeTL) (which imports and 
exports from/to the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and 
Zambia) has similarly complained about the lack of engagement by the 
Tanzanian government when implementing or abrogating laws.355 Vodacom 
(South Africa) also decries the fact that tariff and customs legislation 
seemingly change overnight without any warning.356 When firms become 
frustrated by the trade regulatory environment this may disincentivise them 
to continue operating, or to make further investments into their business. 
This will have a negative impact on the country’s trade, economic growth and 
development prospects.  
 
5.4.  High Trade Transaction Costs 
Trade Facilitation is not only about making trade faster, it is also about 
making it more cost-effective.357 This is particularly important if traders are 
to maintain an international competitive advantage with respect to the pricing 
of their goods. Despite this, there are a multitude of fees and other charges 
that are levied at SADC borders.358 These include: 
 
§ Consular fees 
§ Transit fees 
§ Security penalties 
§ Value Added Tax (VAT). 
 
In Zimbabwe alone traders can find that they need to pay: carbon pollution 
tax (the amount depends on the engine capacity of the vehicle), toll fee, road 
 
355 SAIIA SADC Business Barriers Mohammed Enterprises Tanzania (2012),  available at  
http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-business-case-studies/mohammed-enterprises-tanzania, 
accessed on 5 June 2018. 
356 SAIIA SADC Business Barriers Vodacom (South Africa) (2012) available at  
https://saiia.org.za/saiia-toolkit/vodacom-south-africa/, accessed on 1 June 2018.  
357 See section 2.4.4. above. 
358 The World Bank Doing Business Report reflects that Africa has the highest cost of trade 
compared to all other regions. Op cit note 337. UNCTAD has also reported that “Sub-Saharan 
Africa has the highest cost to export compared with all other regions and the highest cost to 
import with the exceptions of Latin America and the Caribbean based on border compliance, 
and South Asia, based on documentary compliance.” Op cit note 331. 
 
 111 
access fee (the amount is based on the vehicle’s size), border post fee, exit 
pass, compulsory third party insurance, overload fees, road transit fees and 
a fuel levy.359 Tristan Export (a South African firm that exports throughout 
the SADC region) reports that the South African Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry requires exporters to have obtained an export permit 
to export fish into the Republic. The cost is R200 per permit, per species, per 
consignment. This results in very high trading costs.360 There is a direct 
correlation between high costs of trade and rising informal trade. 361  When 
trade costs are high (either due to exorbitant rates or to multifarious 
charges),362  this can incentivise informal and illicit trade (for example, 
practices such as such as smuggling, under-invoicing, etc.). Governments 
lose out on collecting vital revenue when such practices occur. Therefore, 
reducing trade costs in SADC should help to reduce informality, thus allowing 
more revenue to be collected by state agencies. Revenue that can be applied 
to develop the nations. 
 
Apart from high direct fees, there are other less direct ways that the costs of 
trade add up in SADC. Logistics companies in the region report that just 3 
per cent  of their costs are due to direct border charges and fees — 60 per 
cent of their high and uncompetitive logistics costs are due to standing costs 
 
359 https://www.aa.co.za/zimbabwe-cross-border-information and 
https://www.zinara.co.zw, accessed 27 August 2018. 
360 SAIIA SADC Business Barriers Tristan Export, available at https://saiia.org.za/saiia-
toolkit/tristan-export/, accessed on 1 June 2018. 
361 Caroline Lesser & Evdokia Moisé-Leeman Informal Cross-Border Trade and Trade 
Facilitation Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa - (2009) at 17. 
362 Alaska is a firm from the Democratic Republic of Congo. It has claimed that the costs of 
customs clearing procedures constantly change every two or three months. The uncertainty, 
due to the fluctuations, is costly to them because it means that they have to keep researching 
the current applicable charges. SADC Business Barriers: Alaska, available at 
https://saiia.org.za/saiia-toolkit/alaska/, accessed on 1 June 2018. Another DRC company 
(Ets ALBARTOS) complains about the multiplicity of trade fees that have to be paid and over-
taxation by dishonest customs agents. It says that ‘companies are obliged to use consultants 
to avoid being ripped off by customs officials’. See  SAIIA https://saiia.org.za/saiia-toolkit/ets-
albartos/, accessed 1 June 2018. 
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(border delays).363 Standing time is not only costly because of the fuel costs 
of an idle vehicle (especially where refrigeration has to be kept on) but also 
because vehicles are depreciating assets and therefore they need to make as 
many deliveries as possible so that they can earn money. Anytime that they 
remain idle is a loss to the owners. Therefore, addressing these direct and 
indirect trade costs should have favourable consequences on the 
competitiveness of businesses, which will improve their viability, which, in 
turn, will be to the benefit of the economy as a whole (for example, tax and 
employment impacts).  
 
5.5. Poor Infrastructure, Including Low Mechanisation and Technology 
Chapter 3 discussed the negative implications of infrastructural deficiencies 
on economic development. The SADC states suffer from poor quality 
infrastructure across their economies as a whole. Infrastructure deficits at 
the border, in particular, can hinder expediency in trade processing. Trade 
facilitation requires the use of technology to automate trading processes. This 
includes, for example, the use of electronic data interchange systems and the 
implementation of electronic single windows.364 The 2017 World Bank Doing 
Business Report argues that ‘automation improves reliability, predictability, 
safety and competitiveness of operations’.365 Many SADC states struggle to 
acquire and to update their use of modern technologies. Therefore, they fail 
to mechanise and to automate trade processes.  
 
363 Anna Ngarachu, Christopher Wood, Heinrich Krogman et alBorder Economies Linkages to 
the Development of Trade Corridors and Regional Value Chains in SADC (2018) at 9. 
Fleetwatch, Truck Operating Benchmarks (2016) available at https://fleetwatch.co.za/truck-
operating-benchmarks-2015/, accessed on 24 June 2020. Gamberoni, Elisa, Lanz, Rainer & 
Piermartini, Roberta,  Timeliness and Contract Enforceability in Intermediate Goods Trade 
World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division (2010) World Trade 
Organization, Geneva. 
364 The Southern African Development Community defines a single window as ‘a facility that 
allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized information and 
documents with a single entry point to fulfil all import, export and transit-related regulatory 
requirements. If information is electronic, then individual data elements should only be 
submitted once. It is essentially a political / organizational / procedural concept – it is not a 
technology system!’ SADC Draft SADC Guidelines for Coordinated Border Management (2011)  
at 17. See also United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business 
(UN/CEFACT) Recommendation and Guidelines on Establishing a Single Window to Enhance 
the Efficient Exchange of Information between Trade and Government  33 of 2005. 
365 World Bank Doing Business Report : Equal Opportunities for All 14 ed (2017) at 83. 
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As an example, DHL has complained about issues related to information and 
communications technology (ICT) infrastructure in some SADC countries. It 
claims that, although South Africa rolled out an e-filing system in order to 
speed up border crossings, the infrastructure required to render the system 
functional is not present at the borders. Furthermore, that the 
implementation of the e-filing system at the Beitbridge Border between South 
Africa and Zimbabwe was sabotaged by the lack of bandwidth capacity at the 
border, as well as by the lack of adequate equipment to run the e-filing 
system. These shortcomings have led to backlogs in customs processing.366 
Border officials have then become forced to rely on cumbersome manual 
processes.367  Where processes are done manually this takes time and may 
add to the likelihood of human error or manipulation. 
 
5.6. Excessive Trade Documentation and Procedural Requirements 
In SADC, bureaucratic obstacles that manifest as excessive trade 
documentation and procedural requirements threaten the facilitation of trade. 
With respect to the former (documentation requirements) not only do traders 
have to submit customs declaration forms, but governments can also require 
a multitude of other supplementary documentation such as:  
 
§ Import/Export permits 
§ Certificate of origin 
§ Commercial invoice 
§ Packing list 
§ Transit documents 
§ Cross-border road transport permits 
§ Certificate of fitness and roadworthiness certificates for vehicles.  
 
 
366 South African Institute  of International Affairs (SAIIA) SADC Business Barriers: DHL, 
available at http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-business-case-studies/dhl, accessed on 5 June 
2018. 
367 A report of the SADC Sub-Committee on Customs Co-operation notes that that the use of 
information technology in goods clearance in Southern Africa is largely restricted to main 
urban border posts. 2006 report, at 10. 
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Although these documents may serve important purposes (for instance, to 
assist in the correct calculation of revenue due (e.g. the commercial invoice), 
or to contribute to the protection of public health/ policy/ security (e.g., the 
road worthiness certificate), etc.) securing these documents can prove to be 
time-consuming and costly for traders.368  When documentary requirements 
increase, so too do compliance costs, delays, and incentives for corruption to 
avoid the excessive requirements. One example of exorbitant requirements is 
that of Zimbabwe introducing surtaxes in 2012. This necessitated that traders 
apply for import licenses369 and undergo conformity assessments. License 
applications could only be made on two days of the week (Wednesdays and 
Thursdays) and it could take up to two weeks for a trader to obtain the license. 
Analysts found that the policy led to a decline in imports and an increase in 
smuggling.370 These are adverse to trade and economic improvements. 
 
Convoluted border procedures are also regularly experienced in trade in 
SADC.371 The biggest culprit for causing these delays is inspections. They 
often take time when they are done manually and are not conducted based 
on a risk assessment. Furthermore, coordination failures can result in 
multiple inspections being conducted by different border agencies. For 
example, traders in Tanzania complain about numerous stops for inspections, 
for instance at weighbridges and police checkpoints.372 Another example 
 
368 The Bakhresa Group of companies (incorporated in Tanzania) complains about the 
multiplicity of agencies that are involved in seeking authorisation to import or to export. They 
give the example that, in order to import grain, they are required to secure approval from nine 
different agencies, and for exports they need at least four different approvals. These lengthy 
procedural requirements take time and are too onerous. https://saiia.org.za/saiia-
toolkit/bakhresa-group/. 
369 Schedule to the Control of Goods (Open General Import License) 1996, in Statutory 
Instrument 8 of 1996 (as amended) lists the goods for which an import license needs to be 
obtained in Zimbabwe. 
370 Elisha Tshuma South Africa and Zimbabwe trade: How does it work? (2016) S16TB17Trade 
Law Centre at 9. The report in the press that is being referred to is an article in the Zimbabwe 
Chronicle titled ‘Import restrictions fuel rampant smuggling in Beitbridge’ 9 August 2016.  
371 TradeMark Southern Africa, SADC’s Slow Customs Procedures Drives up Prices of Goods 
‘http://www.trademarksa.org/news/sadc-s-slow-customsprocedures-drive-prices-goods. The 
Rice Milling Company (Pvt.), a Malawian company, has complained about delays in processing 
goods at Malawian borders http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-business-case-studies/rice-milling, 
accessed 31 March 31 2018. 
372 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Union, African Development 
Bank, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area 
About, 2017. 
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relates to the application of rules of origin. Rules of origin have to be applied 
in SADC because it is Free Trade Area and not a customs union. The 
determination of origin can be time-consuming.373 Another aggravation for 
traders is that some countries apply requirements and procedures 
inconsistently.374  
 
When processes are complicated, this slows down the time taken to trade and 
can increase traders’ motivation to engage in corrupt practices in order to 
attempt to accelerate clearance time.375 Some delays can frustrate traders to 
the point that they may reconsider importing from or exporting to certain 
destinations. For example, Nakara CC is a small Namibian firm that exports 
90 per cent  of its leather products to South Africa. If a South African importer 
has not set up a Deferred Value Added Tax (VAT) Account with the South 
African Revenue Services (SARS), then Nakara has to pay VAT before export. 
The amount can be reclaimed, but it claims that the repayment procedures 
can take up to two months, thus negatively impacting their cash flow.376  
 
Excessive documentation and procedural requirements prolong the 
processing time of goods. These goods may be perishable and their being held 
up at borders may lead to spoilage, which is a cost to traders. Or the goods 
may be the subject of an international sales contract whereby they need to 
reach their destination within strict deadlines. The failure to do so will expose 
the trader to lawsuits for breach of contract. Delays can also affect the ability 
 
373 UNCTAD has reported that “in 23 developing countries (13 in Africa) and LDCs during 
2010–2013, 35% of the most difficult non-tariff measures applied by partner countries to 
manufacturing exports concern rules of origin and related documentation.” And that “the 
most frequent complaints registered on the non-tariff barriers reporting, monitoring and 
eliminating mechanism of the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement relate to rules of origin (11% 
of filed complaints.” Op cit note 331. 
374 Rab Processors Ltd (a Malawian agricultural company) has complained about the lack of 
consistency in the application of customs procedures. See SAIIA SADC Business Barriers Rab 
Processors Ltd, available at http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-business-case-studies/rab-
processors-ltd, accessed on 1 June 2018. 
375 This is attested to by Shenimed (a cigarette distribution company in the DRC). It reported 
that customs clearance procedures are ‘long, time consuming and very costly and that often 
the only way to expedite clearance is by the payment of a bribe.’ 
http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-business-case-studies/shenimed, accessed 4 May 2019. 
376 SAIIA SADC Business Barriers: Nakara CC, available at https://saiia.org.za/saiia-
toolkit/nakara-cc/, accessed on 5 June 2018. 
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of traders to participate in value chain production. All of these compromise 
the ease of trading. This has a knock-on effect on the economy because, if 
traders are unable to maximise their profits, this could reduce government 
tax revenue. This augurs poorly for the ability of the government to provide 
social services (such as education, healthcare and others). Reducing 
documentary and procedural requirements would be particularly helpful for 
small traders because the costs are disproportionately heavy on them.377 
Facilitating trade could assist the small, low value consignments of small 
traders to get through the borders quicker, thus incentivising them to 
formalise, and perhaps to even trade even more. 
 
5.7. Deficiencies in Human Resources Including Poor Cooperation and 
Coordination by Officials and Agencies 
Chapter 3 explained that one of the impediments to trade facilitation is poor 
human resources. This aspect relates to both the quantity and the quality378 
of staff who operate border agencies. If there is an inadequate number of staff, 
or if staff are insufficiently trained to speedily execute their duties, this will 
result in excessive delays at border crossings. Border security is also 
compromised by staffing deficiencies, for instance, if practices such as the 
smuggling goods or of narcotics etc. cannot be detected because of an 
overwhelmed work force. The former can negatively affect government 
revenue, whereas the latter compromises public health, welfare and security. 
 
Poorer nations tend to struggle with human resource capacity because of the 
significant costs that are involved in employing and in training personnel.  
This is the case in the SADC region, as many firms will attest. Coca-Cola 
(eSwatini) exports to more than twenty African countries. It complains that 
African customs officials are not always sufficiently knowledgeable about the 
procedures at their own borders. This is said to lead to inconsistencies in 
 
377 Lesser & Moisé-Leeman Op cit note 361 at 27. 
378 Poor quality human resources may manifest in many forms, for example, unskilled, 
unprofessional, unmotivated and untrained border officials. 
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practices, which confuses and frustrates traders.379 This is because border 
agents suffer from the lack of training opportunities. This affects the quality 
of service delivery at borders and hampers the ability to facilitate trade.  
 
The low levels of internal and external cooperation and coordination between 
border agencies is another aspect of the human resource challenge. 
Cooperation and coordination can manifest in practices such as information-
sharing, regular interaction, joint programmes and the installation of one-
stop border posts (OSBPs), etc. At a One Stop Border Post the border agencies 
of two countries are stationed together on one side of the border (i.e., at the 
entry or at the exit).380 The trader receives services from the authorities of 
both nations simultaneously.  This means that any inspections, etc. are done 
by both authorities in succession. Thus, clearance happens concomitantly 
and there is no need to queue again on the other side of the border.381 One 
example is the Chirundu OSBP that lies between Zambia and Zimbabwe.382 
Despite a few challenges generally the implementation of the One Stop Border 
Post has led to faster clearing times. As a result more OSBPs are being 





379 SAIIA SADC Business Barriers  Coca-Cola Swaziland (CONCO LTD), available at 
https://saiia.org.za/saiia-toolkit/coca-cola-swaziland-conco-ltd/, accessed on 1 June 2018.  
380 Road Transport Agency, The Annual State of Cross-Border Operations Report (March 2018) 
gives guidance on four core elements for the successful implementation of OSBPs at 49–50. 
381 Greater customs efficiency by streamlining the customs clearance of two administrations 
into one smooth process can result in cost saving to the two governments (by sharing staff, 
information, and resources, for example, joint offices or warehouses etc.); increased trade 
flows and revenue (due to lower trade costs for traders); reduction in consumer prices (due 
to traders passing off their savings on trade costs to consumers); job creation and economic 
growth (as a result of increased trade and economic activity) and the fostering of good 
relations between neighbouring countries. Habiba Ben Barka, Border Posts, Checkpoints, and 
Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions (2012) at 12, available at 
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/border-posts-checkpoints-and-intra-african-
trade-challenges-and-solutions-12377/, accessed on 11 July 2019. See also the Draft SADC 
Guidelines for Coordinated Border Management Op cit note 364 at 21 and UN-OHRLLS Op cit 
note 275. 
382 Barney Curtis, The Chirundu Border Post: Detailed Monitoring of Transit Times, Sub-
Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) S (2009) at xiv and 18;  Ngarachu, Wood, 
Heinrich Krogman et al Op cit note 363 at 21–22. 
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§ Lebombo (South Africa) and Ressano Garcia (Mozambique)383  
§ Kazungula (Zambia) and Kasumbalesa (the Democratic Republic of 
Congo)384  
§ Mamuno (Botswana) and Trans Kalahari (Namibia)385  
§ Forbes (Zimbabwe) and Machipanda (Mozambique)386 
§ Tunduma (Tanzania) and Nakonde (Zambia).387 
 
However, the general status in SADC is that border agencies often work in an 
uncoordinated manner, both internally and externally.388 This can be caused 
by systems and processes not being integrated, or by the lack of 
harmonisation or the mutual recognition of forms, processes, etc. The SADC 
Sub-Committee on Customs Cooperation notes that, although there are 
several bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) regarding cooperation 
on customs matters ‘there remain few exchanges of information, joint 
investigations and or other such actions’.389 This has been attested to by 
different organisations. For example, the World Trade Organization’s Trade 
Policy Review for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)390 discovered 
that some regulations, documentary and procedural requirements are not yet 
 
383 There has been the construction of supporting physical infrastructure, such as a 
commercial freight clearance facility away from the border, a freight by-pass road and 
separate passenger clearance facilities. The legal framework is still to be signed by the two 
governments.  
384 Some critical infrastructure is being constructed, for instance, an access road, parking 
and office facilities on the Zambian side. 
385 The legal framework is being constructed as a precursor to the launch of the project. 
386 This has been proposed. 
387 It is in the process of being transformed into a OSBP. The Road Transport Agency Op cit 
note 380 at 25. 
388 ‘Internally’ refers to coordination amongst the various border agencies of one a state. 
‘Externally’ relates to the relationship between the border agencies of neighbouring states. 
389 Southern African Development Community Strategic Plan 2012-2017 at 11. This is echoed 
in the European Union’s Capacity Building Diagnostic Study, Annex C, at 10. 
390 World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review Body Trade Policy Review for the Southern 
African Customs Union, (2015) at 19. 
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harmonised391 and that states have different customs systems.392 The report 
concludes that this impedes the coordination of trade processing and trade 
facilitation because the systems do not speak to each other.393 The Road 
Transport Agency confirms that variable Information Communication 
Technology (ICT) and customs data systems limit and delay the exchange of 
information and that this delays cross border trade.394  
 
Traders in the region have also attested to these problems. An importer of 
frozen food in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Madel Food) reports that, in 
their experience, border agents in the DRC operate their own inspections even 
if other border agents already conducted inspections, thus causing 
duplication of inspection and resultant time delays.395 Palfridge Limited t/a 
The Fridge Factory complains that the South African Revenue Services (SARS) 
and the eSwatini Revenue Authority (SRA) use different tariff codes. The result 
for traders is that they fall foul of one authority or the other when filling in 
the two sets of contradictory forms. This has led to penalties being levied on 
them396 or to their imports being stopped at the borders,397 therefore adding 
to time-consuming delays and unexpected costs.398 Wesbank Transport, (a 
Namibian transport company) reports that the standardisation of customs 
documents in SACU has been helpful but that what still remains is that there 
 
391 Article 22 of the SACU agreement requires members to adopt similar legislation on 
customs duties and excise duties. Article 23 mandates customs cooperation. The members 
launched a customs modernisation programme in 2009 with the aim of facilitating trade in 
the region. Further, a Regional Customs Policy Document was adopted by the SACU Council 
of Ministers on 25 December, 2011. This document specified that trade facilitation should be 
borne in mind when implementing customs projects. 
392 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and eSwatini use UNCTAD’s Automated System for Customs 
Data (ASYCUDA) while South Africa uses the Interfront Customs and Border Management 
Solution (ICBS). 
393 WTO Trade Policy Review Body Op cit note  390 at 20. 
394 The Road Transport Agency Op cit  note 380  at  2. 
395 SAIIA SADC Business Barriers Madel Food, available at  https://saiia.org.za/saiia-
toolkit/madel-food/, accessed on 5 June 2018. 
396 They report penalties which have, at times, reached R10, 000. 
397 They report delays of up to three days at times. 
398 SAIIA SADC Business Barriers Palfridge Limited t/a The Fridge Factory, available at  
https://saiia.org.za/saiia-toolkit/the-fridge-factory/, accessed 1 June 2018. 
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should be harmonisation of customs clearance procedures in order to have 
more meaningful impact on trade delays.399 
 
5.8. Implementing Trade Facilitation Reforms in the Southern African 
Development Community 
The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) calculated that, in August 
2013, only 25 out of 42 agreements of the African Union had been ratified by 
members.400 The Kagame report on the African Union notes that the African 
Union Assembly has adopted more than 1,500 resolutions, yet very few of 
them have been implemented.401 This, it says, has resulted in an 
implementation crisis. The evidence of this implementation crisis, says 
Hartzenberg, can be seen from practices such as: delays in the ratification 
and domestication of legal instruments, missed targets (collectively) by 
members in achieving the successive steps in their linear regional integration 
path, the failure of individual members to implement provisions of agreements 
and the failure to apply any form of sanctions to deter the lack of 
implementation.402 This implementation crisis can also be observed with 
respect to trade facilitation agreements. They have been ineffective, partly due 
to implementation challenges. 403 In 2011, an audit was taken of the SADC 
countries’ implementation of regional and international conventions. Some of 
these conventions concern trade facilitation. The general trend that emerges 




399 SAIIA SADC Business Barriers Wesbank Transport, available at  https://saiia.org.za/saiia-
toolkit/wesbank-transport/, accessed on  5 June 2018.  See also SAIIA SADC Business 
Barriers  Lobatse Clay Works, available at  https://saiia.org.za/saiia-toolkit/lobatse-clay-
works/, accessed on 5 June 2018. 
400 African Capacity Building Foundation A Digest of OAU-AU Treaties, Conventions, and 
Agreements, 1963 to 2014 (2016). 
401 Paul Kagame The Imperative To Strengthen Our Union: Report on the Proposed 
Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union (2017). 
402 Trudi Hartzenberg Regional Integration in Africa (2011) at 18. See also Asante, SKB, 
Regionalism and Africa’s Development: Expectations, Reality and Challenges (1997) and Gibb, 
Richard ‘Regional integration and Africa's development trajectory: Meta-theories, 
expectations and reality’ (2009) 30 (4) Third World Quarterly at 701–721. 
403 See also See Habiba Ben Barka, Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: 
Challenges and Solutions (2012) Op cit 381. 
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Table 3: Implementation of Trade Facilitation Conventions in SADC 
 
Convention Number of Countries 
who have 
implemented 
Revised Kyoto Protocol 8 
International Convention on the Mutual Administrative 
Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression 
of Customs Offences 
5 
Convention on Temporary Admission 5 
Customs Convention on the A.T.A Carnet for the 
Temporary Admission of Goods 
4 
World Trade Organization Customs Valuation Agreement 13 
International Convention on the Harmonized System 11 
Declaration of the Customs Cooperation Council 
Concerning Integrity in Customs 
5 
 
Even though the audit was taken some years ago, the fact still remains that 
the conventions had been there for decades, and yet there was still evidence 
of low rates of implementation by SADC members. The researchers found the 
reasons for non-implementation to be: lack of hard infrastructure, lack of 
administrative capacity, lengthy delays in ratification and gazetting and lack 
of coordination by the states in implementation.404 It is argued that these 
challenges continue to persist even to this day. 
 
Y.S. Lee’s theory of law and development that was discussed in chapter 2 of 
this work provides insights on the importance of regulatory design, regulatory 
compliance and implementation if law is to have an impact on development.405 
The theory is useful for our analysis of what could possibly be causing the 
dichotomy between the legal frameworks that were explored in chapter 4 and 
the practical realities that have, so far, been discussed above in this chapter. 
Lee writes that “it is the quality of implementation that determines the 
 
404 Ranga Munyaradzi & Agnes Katsonga Phiri Audit of the Implementation of Regional SADC 
Customs Instruments and International Conventions:  Technical Report (2011). Saurombe, 
Amos ‘The role of SADC institutions in implementing SADC treaty provisions dealing with 
regional integration’ (2012) 15 (2) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal. 
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effectiveness of law.”406 Implementation can be defined as the actions that are 
taken by states (legislatively, administratively and judicially) to execute the 
objectives of a law. Lee notes some factors that can affect implementation. 
These are:  
 
§ inappropriateness of the laws. This can be brought about by legal 
transplant 
§ lack of political will to implement and 
§ capacity constraints, be they financial, technological, or administrative.  
 
The next section considers the extent to which these might explain the 
implementation challenges that are plaguing the region. 
 
Inappropriateness of Laws due to Legal Transplant  
The law and development theory argues that, for law to have a positive effect 
on development, it must resonate with the political, social, economic, cultural, 
and other conditions in the state in which it is to apply. This is why laws that 
embody developed country perspectives may be ineffective in developing 
country contexts. The legal regulatory design may not accord with the 
practical realities in the developing country and this may either diminish a 
state’s willingness to implement or be above its capabilities to implement.407 
 
The trade facilitation measures that were discussed in chapter 4 have been 
argued to largely reflect developed country perspectives.408 One reason is 
because developing members, such as the SADC countries, had little 
influence on the creation of most of the rules. This is on account of several 
reasons. First, they were not independent states at the founding of the 
organisations that came up with the rules. Most of the SADC states were still 
colonies when the General Agreement on Trade in Goods was founded on 30 
 
406 Lee Op cit note 96 at 450. 
407 Lee ibid at 448  
408 Davie Malungisa, The Informal Trade Sector in SADC Legal, Policy and Programmatic 
Support (2015) Study at 3. 
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October, 1947409 and when the World Customs Organization was founded on 
26 January, 1952.410 This means that they had no say in the organisations’ 
founding principles and rules. Neither were they independent states at the 
conclusion of some of the agreements that are related to trade facilitation. For 
example, only South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, 
and Tanzania existed as sovereign states on 30 July, 1963 when the 
Convention on the ATA Carnet was concluded.411  Namibia and Zambia 
became sovereign states only after the conclusion of some of the 
instruments412 – such as the Nairobi Convention,413 the Istanbul 
Convention,414 and the revised Convention on the Harmonized System.415 Not 
having been independent states means that they were not party to the 
negotiations on the terms of these agreements and, therefore, the provisions 
would not have included their perspectives.  
 
Secondly, poorer countries pay relatively smaller contributions in the 
organisations and are often under-represented in the executive bodies. These 
factors may diminish their power in the organisations and their say in the 
agreements. The agreements may, thus, end up largely incorporating the 
perspectives, interests and practices of developed parties. This may explain 
why the instruments that were discussed in chapter 4 have not had a 
significant impact in assisting the SADC countries to resolve their trade 
facilitation challenges. 
 
409 It was constituted of just twenty-three members: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, 
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United 
Kingdom and the United States, available at  
https://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm,  accessed on 11 
October 2019). South Africa had obtained nominal  independence from Britain on 31 May 
1910. 
410 World Customs Organization [website], available at http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-
us/what-is-the-wco/au_history.aspx, accessed on 11 October 2019). 
411 South Africa as at 31 May1910 (from Britain), the Democratic Republic of the Congo as at 
30 June 1960 (from Belgium), Madagascar as at 26 June 1960 (from France) and Tanzania 
as at 9 December1961 (from Britain). 
412 Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980 (from Britain) and Namibia on 21 March 1990 (from South 
Africa). 
413 It was concluded on 9 June 1977. 
414 It was concluded on  26 June 1990. 
415 Of 1988. 
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Lastly, some of the trade facilitation provisions in the regional and multilateral 
instruments416 contain commitments that may have been too ambitious for 
the countries to successfully apply. For example, article 6 of annex II to the 
SADC Protocol on Trade requires the computerisation of customs. Articles 9 
and 10 of annex 3 to the AfCFTA’s Goods Protocol requires the use of 
information technologies and the institution of single windows. These 
represent policies which, although common in the developed world, may be 
too arduous for poor countries, like those in SADC, to meet. Their attempts 
to benchmark their practices with those of more developed nations might be 
setting them up for failure.  
 
Political Will 
Political will is required of governments to implement commitments.  ‘Political 
leaders and senior officials are responsible for setting the tone and pace—
generating a sense of urgency and creating the necessary enabling 
frameworks.’417 However, sometimes this resolve can be lacking where the 
government considers that certain national political imperatives outweigh the 
regional or multilateral interests.418 African leaders can refuse to subjugate 
the sovereignty of their nations (and their own self-interest) to the interests of 
the region as a whole.419 This is especially so with respect to programmes 
such as trade facilitation, in particular, which can result in the reduction of 
revenue from customs payments and, thus, require fiscal adjustment. African 
countries are grappling with various socio-economic crises (ranging from 
unemployment, poverty, social unrest, etc.) which take their attention away 
from broader regional issues as they try to contain the dire situations within 
 
416 Regional instruments tend to adopt multilateral approaches as best practice. 
417 Erich Kieck & Jean-Christophe Maur ‘Regional integration and customs unions’ in Gerard 
McLinden, Enrique Fanta, David Widdowson & Tom Doyle (eds) The World Bank, Border 
Management Modernization) (2011) at 246. 
418 Jaime de Melo & Yvonne Tsikata ‘Regional integration in Africa: Challenges and prospects’ 
in Célestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin (eds)  The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics;  
Volume 2: Policies and Practices, 2015.  
419 Evengelista Mudzonga ‘Implementation challenges for the SADC FTA: Tariff and non-tariff 
barriers; in Institute for Global Dialogue Implementation Challenges for the 2008 SADC FTA 
and Beyond, (2008) at  21–22. 
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their borders. They, therefore, prefer to dedicate their limited resources to 
addressing these domestic pressures first. 
 
Lack of Organisation and Coordination 
Kieck and Maur explain that, where reforms are to be made, ‘good practice 
dictates that the policy objectives should be underpinned by clear actions and 
timeframes and a clear allocation of responsibilities and resources, with 
political and administrative buy-in to the strategic framework and with 
institutional focus and support’.420 However, instead what seems to be the 
case in the SADC countries is that the bureaucracies are disordered and 
there’s little impetus to organise around implementation. 
 
Another aspect of organisation is that of bringing all domestic structures, (the 
public sector, civil society, trade unions, industry citizens in general, etc.) on 
board so that they understand the vision and the strategies, and can help to 
contribute to the attainment of the goals. However, consultation and 
sensitisation mechanisms are lacking in the SADC states. This leads to 
national stakeholders not understanding the regional vision, nor their role in 
helping to bring it about. Ultimately this leaves governments working on their 
own, having failed to have garnered the necessary implementation support 
from stakeholders.  
 
Not only are the individual members disorganised, but the region collectively 
is disorganised. For one, there is no regional implementation plan. This has 
been one challenge to implementation.421 There is also poor organisation 
between the regional economic communities (RECs).422 Members have 
multiple memberships in the regional economic communities. This 
undermines their ability to implement all of their varied, and sometimes 
 
420 Kieck & Maur Op cit note 417 at 246. 
421 Munyaradzi & Phiri, Op cit note 404.  
422 The states in southern Africa are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
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conflicting, commitments.423 As a result, implementation can become overly 
complicated, confusing, arduous and expensive. 
 
Capacity  
Lee observes that often developing countries lack adequate financial, 
technological and administrative resources to effectively implement laws.  
 
Law reform projects, regardless of their specific content or ideological 
orientation, have not been very successful where the host state lacks the 
essential capacity to implement the law, which is necessary to meet the 
projects' objectives.424  
 
This is true of the conditions in the SADC states. The states have massive 
debt and dependency burdens, which hamper their ability to rally the 
resources that are necessary to effect their commitments. Thonke and Spliid 
agree that budgetary constrictions are real impediments to African treaty 
implementation.425 The fact that there are states which are at diverse levels 
of development, yet the regional agreements lack compensatory funds to 
address these imbalances, is one factor that fuels the discouragement to abide 
by commitments.426 The Audit of the Implementation of Regional SADC 
Customs Instruments and International Conventions revealed that ‘several 
Member States have limited financial resources and capacity to implement a 
modernization program, hence their progress depends on technical 
assistance’.427 The (then) President of the Africa Development Bank (Donald 
Kaberuka) made a statement at the World Trade Organization’s Fourth Aid for 
Trade Global Review that the failure of trade reforms in Africa appears to be 
attributable to capacity constraints. He remarked that ‘legislation and texts 
are often adequate, sometimes even better than elsewhere. It is 
 
423 Surabhi Singh & Ajay S Singh ‘Trade blocs and economic integration of Southern African 
countries:  Prospects and challenges (2015) III (4)’ International Journal of Economics, 
Commerce and Management at 10. 
424  Lee Op cit note 92 at 469. 
425 Ole Thonke & Adam Spliid ‘What to expect from regional integration in Africa’(2012) 21 (1) 
African Security Review at 63. 
426 De Melo & Tsikata Op cit note 418.  
427 Munyaradzi &  Phiri Op cit note 404 at 22. 
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implementation which does not always follow, often due to poor capacities to 
follow through’.428 
 
Financial issues do not only affect individual members’ ability to implement, 
they also affect the quality of implementation by the regional institutions.429 
Strong institutions should, ideally, not only have political capacity to enforce, 
but also economic capacity to enforce. This is a challenge for African 
institutions, which are heavily dependent on donor funding. Their lack of 
secure financial capacity restricts their ability to fulfil their mandates. The 
Kagame report cites that, in 2014, half of the budget of the African Union (AU) 
was financed by donors. Over the years this figure climbed until it was 
approximately 75 per cent of the budget that was financed by donors in 2017, 
with 97 per cent  of its programmes being donor-funded.430  
 
Despite these challenges, two successful trade facilitation projects can be 
mentioned. These help us to identify challenges to implementation and the 
approaches that worked in resolving them. The first is the Chirundu One Stop 
Border Post. It was created between Zambia and Zimbabwe to expedite 
customs processing and to relieve congestion at the border.431 Before the 
intervention, the Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA) had been taking an 
average of 17.4 hours to process one truckload of goods.432 The main 
challenges to implementing trade facilitation reforms were the incompatibility 
of the systems between the two nations, as well as broader infrastructural 
challenges, such as poor ICT and energy services.433 The following actions 
 
428 Donald Kaberuka Africa and the Global Value Chain: Time to Raise the Bar (2013),  
available at https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/africa-and-the-global-value-chain-
time-to-raise-the-bar-afdb-president-donald-kaberuka-12092/, accessed 13 December, 2019. 
429 Soumana Sako, Challenges Facing Africa’s Regional Economic Communities in Capacity 
Building (2006) African Capacity Building Foundation, Addis Ababa. 
430 Paul Kagame Op cit note 401 at 5.  
431 Chirundu was chosen as a pilot for a One Stop Border Post at a Transport Coordination 
Committee meeting of the Regional Economic Communities (REC-TCC) that was held in 
Nairobi. Chirundu was chosen over Beitbridge for the pilot because it was believed that it 
would be easier to convert it into a OSBP because of the facilities that it already had, and 
some steps that had been already been taken towards OSBP processing there. 
432 Barney Curtis Op cit note 382 at xiv and 18.  
433 Ngarachu,  Wood, Krogman et al Op cit note 363 at 21–22. 
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assisted the nations to overcome the challenges and to ensure the ultimate 
success of the project:434 
 
§ The establishment of sound legal frameworks before the 
operationalisation of the OSBP435 
§ The countries signed a bilateral agreement on August 27, 2009, 
signalling their political will 
§ Adequate OSBP facilities were built 
§ Organisationally, a lead ministry and project manager were selected 
and all border agencies were involved in the steering committee that 
planned the project 
§ Staff training was provided before and after the opening of the OSBP. 
 
The second example is the Kazungula Bridge Project.436 This has led to 
improved speed of trade processing, increased trade flows and improved 
security of cross border trade between Botswana and Zambia. In August 
2007, the two governments agreed to seek funding to construct a road, a rail 
bridge and new border facilities at their border. Construction began on 
October 12, 2014. The project cost approximately US$259.3 million. It was 
funded through the efforts of the two governments,437 the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA),438 an EU-ITF (Infrastructure Trust Fund) 
Grant,439 and the African Development Bank (ADB) from the African 
Development Fund (ADF) window.440 Before the advent of the bridge the 
transit times for goods could take as long as thirty hours, or even as long as 
one month during peak times. This was reduced to six hours after the 
 
434 One Stop Border Post Sourcebook 2ed (2016) at 13-10 to 13-11. 
435 Zimbabwean OSBP Control Act.21 of 2007 and the Zambian OSBP Control Act. 8 of 2009. 
436 Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) Briefing Memorandum on Kazungula Bridge 
Project – Botswana and Zambia (2007), available at  
https://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/Transport_Meeting/S4-Kazungula-Bridge-
Final-EN.pdf, accessed 24 June 2020.  
437 Which covered 9.2% of the costs. 
438 Which covered 57.5% of the cost. 
439  Which covered 1.8% of the project cost. 
440African Development Bank Group Kazungula Bridge: Bridging the Regional Divide (2013) 
https://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/selected-projects/kazungula-bridge-
bridging-the-regional-divide-98/, accessed on  24 June 2020.  
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completion of the bridge.441  This shows the importance of coordination, 
political will and technical assistance in the implementation of successful 
reforms. 
 
5.9. Chapter Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to show how trade facilitation impediments 
manifest in the Southern African Development Community. The key 
challenges have been found to be poor regulatory environments, high trade 
transaction costs, low levels of automation, excessive documentary and 
procedural requirements and deficiencies in human resources. That these 
challenges are still continuing bears evidence to the argument that the legal 
frameworks that were discussed in chapter 4 are not having a significant 
impact on the facilitation of trade in the region. The reports of regional and 
international organisations, as well as the complaints of traders in the region, 
have attested to the continuation of these challenges. Abuka similarly notes 
that ‘despite these notable efforts to integrate Africa’s economic space and 
improve its international competitiveness, most of the trade facilitation 
initiatives have yielded limited results’. 442 
 
This chapter has argued that implementation challenges partly explain the 
reasons for the underwhelming impact. The reasons for the implementation 
challenges are: lack of capacity, lack of political will, the inappropriateness of 
the legal frameworks and the lack of coordination of members. The following 
chapter looks at the implementation challenges of one SADC state (the 
Kingdom of Lesotho) to add on to the regional analysis that has been 
undertaken in this chapter. 
 
441 Donald Kaberuka, President of the African Development Bank, 18th African Union 
Summit, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23-30 January ‘Slow implementation of infrastructure 
projects constrains intra-African trade’ February 2012. available at 
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/slow-implementation-of-infrastructure-projects-
constrains-intra-african-trade-says-afdb-president-8808/, accessed on  4 February 2019. 
Similar construction projects have been undertaken between Zambia and Zimbabwe at 
Victoria Falls, as well as between Namibia and Zambia at Katima Mulilo. However, large 
infrastructural projects such as these are not widespread in  the SADC region because of the 
financial implications, as well as the lack of coordination between the member states. 
442 Abuka Op cit note 152 at 125. 
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Chapter 6 – An Exploration of the Challenges to the Implementation of Trade 
Facilitation Measures in the Kingdom of Lesotho 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the typical trade facilitation 
challenges that are experienced throughout the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). It did so by analysing the reports of regional 
and international organisations that have conducted studies on the 
phenomenon in the region. In addition to this, it reviewed complaints that 
have been lodged by traders regarding the obstacles to trade that they 
encounter. The chapter demonstrated that, despite the SADC states 
participating in many regional and international legal regimes that are 
designed to improve trade facilitation, time delays and high costs continue to 
hamper trade in the region. This is frustrating the states’ intentions to 
stimulate their development through improved trade and regional integration. 
The chapter argued that it is not adequate for the SADC states to merely 
commit to regional and international rules. For any reform to successfully 
take place there must be impactful domestic implementation of treaty 
commitments.  
 
The theoretical framework on law and development that was developed by Y.S. 
Lee provides the framework for the research and analysis that is undertaken 
in this chapter. The theory seeks to explain the factors that may affect 
regulatory impact. These factors are: regulatory design, regulatory compliance 
and the quality of the implementation. This chapter discusses how these 
factors may explain why there can be minimal development impact in a 
country despite the extensive trade facilitation commitments that it has 
assumed in various treaty regimes.  
 
What follows is a focused case study of one of the SADC countries – the 
Kingdom of Lesotho. The Maseru Bridge (a border post that lies between 
Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa) is the research focal point.  The 
chapter begins with a background to the research that was undertaken. This 
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gives the research justification, scope and methodology. Section 3 details 
Lesotho’s regional and international commitments for facilitating trade. 
Section 4 outlines what cross-border trading conditions are like on the ground 
and reflects on whether they point to the implementation of the commitments. 
Sections 5, 6 and 7 use the theory of law and development to analyse the 
impact of trade facilitation laws, in terms of their regulatory design, regulatory 
compliance and the quality of implementation. The chapter concludes that, in 
most cases, the failure of Lesotho to devise appropriate policies, laws and 
strategies, as well as to establish and equip implementing institutions, are 
the reasons why the treaty commitments have not significantly led to 
improved trading efficiencies. 
 
6.2. Research Justification, Scope and Methodology 
Research Justification 
The problem that was argued in chapter 1 of this work was that the 
arrangements that the SADC countries have elected to participate in have led 
to few noticeable improvements in trading on the ground.443 The research 
proposed to determine whether this is the case by, inter alia, conducting a 
focused case study. The aim is to assess the extent and the impact of trade 
facilitation reforms following the assumption of trade facilitation 
commitments by a SADC country.  
 
Only one country was chosen for a detailed study. This was due to the limited 
resources and time available to the researcher.444 Because there are so many 
stakeholders in trade facilitation, attempting to add another country would 
have taken an inordinate amount of time and resources, and would have led 
to a bulky fieldwork chapter in order to have done justice to both countries’ 
regimes. For instance, had South Africa been added, the researcher would 
have had to consult regulators and border agents of the South African 
 
443 Section 1.2. 
444 George R. Taylor explains that factors, such as cost and the amount of time one has to 
conduct research, are some of the important factors that can determine the scope of the 
research that is adopted. Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in research, 2 
ed (2005) at 6. 
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departments of: home affairs, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, police, health, 
environmental affairs and revenue services. Not to mention South African 
traders. This would have been excessive for the scope of this work and for the 
point of this exercise. Therefore the study captured data on the impediments 
to importing and exporting on the Lesotho side of the border only. 
 
Lesotho was deliberately selected because it makes a particularly interesting 
case study for two main reasons. First, because it is a Land-Locked Least 
Developed Country (LLLDC).445 The United Nations Office of the High 
Representative for the Least Developed Countries (UN-OHRLLS) explains that 
the characteristic of being land-locked is ‘trade-reducing’ and that, due to 
their location, LLLDCs are inherently more disadvantaged than their coastal 
counterparts in terms of their trade and development.446 Freedom of transit 
is very important for LLLDCs because they do not have direct access to ports. 
Trade facilitation issues can impede their freedom of transit by adding to the 
cost and time taken to move goods across numerous internal borders. 
Therefore, it is important to identify where bottlenecks exist and how policy 
and legal interventions can be made more effective.  
 
Secondly, Lesotho is one of only three enclave states in the world. This means 
that it is a sovereign state that is entirely surrounded by only one other state 
(the Republic of South Africa). One would assume that this forced 
geographical symbiosis would mean that trade flows freely between the two 
countries. Yet this study shows that, even in such cases, trade facilitation 
 
445 There are sixteen African Land-Locked Least Developed Countries (LLLDCs): Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, 
Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, South Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The United 
Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked 
Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS) Op cit note 273 at 3. 
446 UN-OHRLLS  ibid at 1. The UN-OHRLLS report The Development Economics of Land-
lockedness: Understanding the Development Costs of being Landlocked is also instructive of 
these challenges, available at http://unohrlls.org/custom-content/uploads/2013/09/The-
Development-Economics-of-Landlockedness-Understanding-the-Development-Costs-of-Being-
Landlocked.pdf, accessed on January 23 2019. Government of Mongolia in Partnership with 
the United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, the United Nations 
Development Programme the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the 
Mission of Paraguay in Geneva Trade, Trade Facilitation and Transit Transport Issues for 
Landlocked Developing Countries (2007). 
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challenges can persist and, therefore, it is important to figure out how to 
resolve them, in the interests of poor countries. 
 
Research Scope 
The study collected data on the processes and costs that are involved in 
trading across the Maseru Bridge. This is a bridge that crosses the Mohokare 
River, which is a designated boundary between the Kingdom of Lesotho 
(Maseru district) and the Republic of South Africa (Orange Free State 
province). There are five designated ‘commercial border posts’ in Lesotho.447 
Trade can only be conducted through commercial border posts. The other 
border posts can only be used for the movement of persons. Of these five, only 
Maseru Bridge and Maputsoe Bridge are open 24 hours a day, seven days a 
week.448 The Maseru Bridge was selected because it is the principle port of 
entry and exit. Thus, it receives the bulk of cross-border trade movements. 
One would anticipate, therefore, that it would be the focus of trade facilitation 
reforms in Lesotho. Granted there are limitations of focusing on only one 
border, for instance it may somewhat dilute the reliability of the study. The 
findings may be less accurate than had a broader scope been adopted. 
However, in this case these shortcomings were not judged to be fatal because 
the research findings were not intended to be definitive but predominantly 
illustrative from drawing on the insights from the interviewees. 
 
Research Methodology 
Moses and Knutzen explain that there are two different methodological 
perspectives that can be identified in the social sciences. These different 
perspectives influence individual researchers to employ different technical 
tools in conducting their research.449 The primary perspectives are naturalism 
and constructivism. The former represents a positivist or empiricist view 
which was initially favoured predominantly by pure scientists. Naturalists 
usually begin their research with an assumption, from which they coin a 
 
447 There are thirteen border posts across the country. A list of these is provided in Annex 1.  
448 The other border posts are only open between 6:00am and 10:00pm. 
449 Moses Jonothan & Knutsen, Torbjørn L. Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in 
Social and Political Research, 3ed (2019). 
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hypothesis. Data is then collected and statistically analysed in order to report 
on whether or not the hypothesis holds. 
 
The latter approach, constructivism, does not necessarily require the 
collection and reporting of a quantitative set of data. Instead, it seeks to 
discover new insights on the phenomenon that is being investigated. This view 
of research arose out of a criticism of positivism; that it is not particularly 
helpful in the context of social sciences because the real world is very complex  
and no single analytical framework is adequate to explain it. Therefore, 
constructivists use different disciplines (for example: history, politics, 
sociology, economics etc.) when they analyse phenomena, so that they can 
better understand the social and contextual influences. They believe that 
there are tensions between different interest groups in society and they argue 
that it is only in speaking with different stakeholders, that one can truly 
understand all of the perspectives to an issue. There is no one correct view. 
Constructivism is more interested in what is experienced, rather than in how 
many experiences there are of a thing (quantity). Its interest is in gaining 
insights and not, as such, in forming firm immutable conclusions. The 
insights are meant to help us to develop a deeper understanding of an issue. 
 
Depending on the methodology, different tools will be employed in conducting 
the research. Methodology refers to the lens from which the researcher views 
the research,  whereas methods refers to the tools that are used to conduct 
the research. Patricia Leavy succinctly differentiates between naturalist 
(quantitative) and constructivist (qualitative) methods. She notes that the 
former methods are used with the aim of proving or disproving existing 
theories. The tools are used for “measuring variables and testing relationships 
between variables in order to reveal patterns, correlations, or causal 
relationships.”450 On the other hand, the aim of qualitative tools is “to learn 
about social phenomenon; to unpack the meanings people ascribe to 
activities, situations, events, or artefacts; or to build a depth of understanding 
 
450 Patricia Leavy, Quantitative, Qualitative, Mixed Methods, Arts-Based, and Community-
Based Participatory Research Approaches (2017) at 9. 
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about some dimension of social life.”451 This is because constructivism 
ascribes importance to people’s subjective experiences. The report of the 
findings of qualitative research “has a flexible structure… that honors an 
inductive style, a focus on individual meaning, and the importance of 
rendering the complexity of a situation.”452 
 
The Lesotho fieldwork used a mix of methods. Some quantitative tools (such 
as questionnaires) were used to gather inputs from traders. Interviews (for 
example with regulators) were used to discover the different perspectives and 
experiences of various stakeholders. The responses are analysed within the 
theoretical framework that has been developed since chapter 2 of this work. 
The challenging development context of Lesotho suggested that the use of one 
research method would be inadequate to provide the study with an 
informative explanation for the lack of effectiveness of Lesotho’s trade 
facilitation commitments. The reasons would be very complex. Thus, a 
multidisciplinary and blended approach was utilised. Therefore, the 
discussion that will follow will not have the same rigour as a purely 
quantitative study. This chapter does not report findings or results, per se, 
but rather insights that were gained from discussing the unique perspectives 
of the various stakeholders and applying the theoretical framework thereto. 
However, some quantitative findings have been presented in Annex 9 of this 
work. 
 
The fieldwork involved a desk review of the policies and laws that govern the 
conduct of trade in Lesotho.453 These would be relevant to a determination of 
whether or not there has been appropriate domestication of treaty 
commitments. Other important documents were also consulted, such as the 
reports of regional and international organisations on the state of trade 
 
451 Ibid. 
452 John W Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Approaches, 4ed, 
(2014) at 4. 
453 A list of these is provided in annex 2. 
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facilitation in the country.454 Secondly, the fieldwork entailed site visits to the 
Maseru bridge in order to study the trade requirements and processes thereat. 
Lastly, face-to-face interviews were conducted with stakeholders.455 There 
were four categories of respondents:456 
 
§ Representatives of regulatory institutions that determine the policies 
and procedures that are applicable to cross border trade  
§ Border officials who implement the policies and procedures on the 
ground 
§ Traders (importers, exporters and clearing agents)457 
§ Others.458  
 
There were a total of 43 respondents: 12 representatives of regulating 
institutions, 11 border officials,459 14 traders and 4 others.460 Their responses 
were used to inform impressions regarding where the bottlenecks lie at border 
posts, what the causes thereof are, what interventions have been devised to 




454 For example, the World Bank’s Time Release Study Plus (TRS+) of Lesotho (2018), the World 
Bank Group (WBG) World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement: Validation 
Reform Map (May 2016), Lesotho’s Investment Climate Reform Implementation Framework 
(2016), the Lesotho Heads of Border Management: Border Management Strategy (June 2015), 
the Lesotho Revenue Authority (LRA) Activity Plan for Trade Facilitation Reforms (2015), and 
minutes of the meetings of Lesotho’s National Trade Facilitation Committee (NTFC). See also 
United States Agency for International Development Diagnostic Trade Integration Study: 
Update for Lesotho (2012). 
455 Phase 1 of this exercise was conducted from October to December 2018. A second phase 
was undertaken between January and February 2019. 
456 A full list of all respondents is provided in annex 5. 
457 An attempt was made to get a fair representation of the different types of businesses: small 
traders, large businesses, preferred traders, etc. A questionnaire was employed for this 
exercise. However, unlike a quantitative questionnaire (which contains primarily close-ended 
questions) this one contained primarily open-ended questions, to give respondents latitude 
in describing their perceptions, understandings and opinions. 
458 These were individuals who were not directly engaged in trade, such as officials from the 
bureau of statistics who could provide trade statistics and those from the Lesotho National 
Development Corporation (LNDC) who could provide information on the general ease of doing 
business in Lesotho. 
459 Two requested anonymity.  
460 Five requested anonymity. 
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6.3. Regional and International Frameworks for Trade Facilitation in 
Lesotho 
Lesotho is a member of three regional agreements that have trade facilitation 
provisions. The first is the Southern African Customs Union agreement. It 
signed the agreement on October 21, 2002 and ratified it on March 24, 2004. 
The second is the Southern African Development Community Protocol on 
Trade. It signed it on August 1, 1996 and ratified it on August 12, 1999. 
Lesotho signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement on July 2, 2018, 
and deposited its instrument of ratification on 2 November, 2020. It has not 
signed the Tri-Partite Free Trade Agreement.461 
 
Lesotho is party to three instruments of the World Customs Organization 
which aim to facilitate trade. These are the Customs Convention on the A.T.A. 
Carnet for the Temporary Admission of Goods (1963),462 the International 
Convention on the Harmonized Description and Coding System (1988)463 and 
the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of 
Customs Procedures (1999).464 Because the World Trade Organization 
operates on the basis of the concept of the “single undertaking” Lesotho is 
obliged by all of the Uruguay Round agreements that target different facets of 
non-tariff barriers. These are: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
the Import Licensing Agreement, the Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspections, 
the Agreement on Rules of Origin, the Customs Valuation Agreement as well 
as the agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and on Technical 
Barriers to Trade. Lesotho ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement on 
the January 4, 2016.465 The implications of each of these regional and 
multilateral frameworks have already been discussed in chapter 5. In 
summary, under these agreements Lesotho has committed to:  
 
461 Lesotho is also party to the 1996 SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and 
Meteorology and the 2005 SADC protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Persons (Of 
the 18 August, 2005. It is not yet entered into force. Both of these also address some aspects 
of border efficiency, but not in aspects that are directly related to the scope of this present 
research. 
462 Lesotho ratified this treaty in 1983. 
463 Lesotho ratified this treaty in 1988. 
464 Lesotho ratified this treaty in 2000. 
465 https://tfadatabase.org/members/lesotho, accessed 7 December, 2018. 
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§ publicising trade laws and other information 
§ maintaining consultations with stakeholders 
§ curbing excessive documentary and procedural requirements 
§ limiting fees associated with importing and exporting 
§ respecting the freedom of transit and  
§ ensuring the collaboration of border agencies. 
  
6.4. Trade Processes and Bottlenecks at Maseru Bridge 
Given Lesotho’s regional and international commitments, the question 
becomes: what does trading look like in the country? This section discusses 
the processes and costs at the Maseru Bridge in a bid to get an answer to this 
question. The first observation that can be made about the Maseru Bridge is 
that it is a small and congested border post. One of the major causes of the 
congestion is that there is very little physical space at the border. One 
consequence of this is that there is little room to designate certain areas for 
specific functions (for example inspections), or to have ample lanes for the free 
flow of traffic. Historically, the borders between South Africa and her 
neighbours were based on apartheid South Africa’s security interests. South 
Africa wanted to avoid external destabilisation threats. Therefore, borders 
were created to restrict movements, rather than to promote them. Such is the 
case with the Maseru Bridge. There is no space for expansion where it 
currently lies because it is flanked by a river, a railroad and built up 
commercial and residential buildings on its sides.466 
 
All trade transactions at the bridge begin with customs clearance. The Lesotho 
Revenue Authority (LRA) is the agency that is tasked with controlling the entry 
and exit of goods and collecting revenue from trade. There are three steps to 
the customs clearance process: customs payments, documentary inspection 
and physical inspections.467 Importers must first make all customs payments 
 
466 Hlouhla Lelosa, Operations Manager, Department of Traffic and Transport. Interview 2 
October 2018 
467 Tseko Ngatane, Border Manager, Lesotho Revenue Authority. Interview 12 October 2018. 
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before their goods can be conveyed to the Lesotho border. The payments 
which have to be made with respect to imports include: 
 
§ Value Added Tax (VAT) – if it had not been paid to the supplier upon 
purchase of the goods 
§ Customs duties on goods which are from extra-SACU territories 
§ Provisional payment for temporary importation. 
 
Traders can pay using cash, bank-guaranteed cheques, electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) or a speed-point. There is an inconvenience to those who pay 
by EFT because they will have to physically go to the office of the Team Leader 
who will verify receipt of their payments. There is usually a queue at that office 
because the role of the Team Leader is broad (for example, they receive 
complaints and settle disputes).468 When payment has been received, a trader 
will be issued with a document called the ‘Proceed to Border’ which allows 
them to proceed for customs clearance.  
 
Documentary inspection follows customs payment. The basic documents that 
are required for trade are the goods declaration form,469 CN1 and CN2 
forms,470 invoices and any applicable permits. In terms of the costs of this 
process, traders use clearing agents who charge M50 (USD 3.14) per page for 
processing SAD 500, and M70 (USD 4.40) a page for processing SAD 501.471 
The costs can add up when a trader has a large shipment because usually 
only three items can fit on one page of the forms. One trader reported that, 
for them, clearing agent fees (for processing on the Lesotho side of the border) 
were M15, 000 (USD 942.19) for the month of September 2018 alone. They 
 
468 Liteboho Mahase, Team Leader, Lesotho Revenue Authority. Interview 16 October 2018. 
469 The form that is used for imports and exports in Lesotho is the SACU Single Administrative 
Declaration (SAD) form that is used by all of the SACU countries, by virtue of them being in 
a common customs area. The basic form is the SAD 500. The SAD 501 is the continuation 
sheet for the SAD 500. The SAD 502 is for transit control. 
470 These evidence that the goods have been cleared by the South African Revenue Services 
(SARS). 
471 The Lesotho Loti (M) and South African Rand (R) are at par. M1 is equivalent to USD 15.92. 
As of November 4, 2020. 
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use other agents to clear on the South African side of the border. They use 
clearing agents because such agents become adept at manoeuvring the 
procedures for goods processing, through executing numerous such 
transactions on a daily basis. They have also developed a good rapport with 
the border staff. However, this efficiency comes at a significant cost for a 
trader, especially when they have to use two agents, one on the South African 
side of the border and another on the Lesotho side.  
 
In terms of the ease of the documentary clearance process, the documents are 
submitted through the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development’s (UNCTAD) Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA). 
This is an online system that customs officials use to receive and check trade 
documentation. A trader can be requested to, for example, ascertain some 
unclear details in an invoice or other document. Traders reported that such 
verifications usually take five to ten minutes, maximum one hour. The officials 
at the border then relay the documents to the Customs Clearing House or 
Clearance Hub. This office is located at the LRA headquarters. The Hub does 
a final documentary check and gives instructions to the customs officials on 
whether or not to conduct a physical inspection. This directive will be based 
on a risk assessment.472  
 
A physical inspection requires that all of the items in a shipment must be 
offloaded and inspected. This sometimes has to be done at the premises of the 
business if there is insufficient space at the border to do so.473 Because of 
limited staffing and equipment, a very large truck could take an entire shift 
(eight hours) to inspect. Once an inspection has been conducted, the customs 
official has to write a report on the findings and relay it to the Clearance Hub 
for authorisation to furnish the trader with an exit note. Therefore, the 
procedural step of inspections can cause major delays for traders, not only 
through the inspection time, but also the consequent reporting process that 
 
472 It was reported that sometimes the system can be offline which can cause delays. Risk 
depends on factors such as:  the origins, classification or the quantity of the goods etc. 
473 When it is done at the border it can exacerbate congestion, due to lack of space. 
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has to be completed afterwards. An alternative would be to employ the use of 
x-ray scanners for conducting inspections. These are defined by the World 
Customs Organisation as ‘equipment/technology that is deployed to inspect 
all types of cargo and conveyances, such as a road vehicle, train, aircraft or 
ship, in a non-intrusive manner.’474 The scanners use x-ray to view the 
contents of a container and to verify whether the contents match the 
descriptions that have been declared by the trader. They can also check 
whether there are any illicit goods in carriage. The South African Revenue 
Services (SARS) is an example of a customs authority that uses scanners in 
order to expedite customs clearance.475 
 
After concluding customs processes, those traders that are importing animals 
and animal products must then obtain clearance from the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Department of Livestock. The mandate of this agency is disease 
control. Like the customs officials, these officials also conduct documentary 
and physical inspections. With documentary inspections they check that the 
trader has a health attestation476 and an import permit. Physical inspections 
are randomly conducted. They may be cursory or a full inspection of an entire 
shipment.477 The fieldwork discovered that, although there is only one officer 
in this department, traders do not wait long if their papers are compliant. The 
process was observed to only take a few minutes.  
 
Traders in animals and animal products also require clearance from the Port 
Health inspectors. These officials conduct yet another set of documentary and 
physical inspections. This is now the third, after Customs and Livestock. In 
terms of documentary compliance, Port Health officials mainly check for 
 
474 World Customs Organisation, Guidelines for the Procurement and Deployment of  
Scanning/Nii Equipment, December 2018. http://www.wcoomd.org/-
/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/facilitation/instruments-and-tools/tools/safe-
package/nii-guidelines-2018/nii-guidelines-en_dec-2018.pdf?la=en, accessed 4 November 
2020. 
475https://www.sars.gov.za/ClientSegments/CustomsExcise/Inspection/Pages/default.asp
x, accessed 4 November 2020. The Lesotho Revenue Authority only has one scanner. 
476 This is given by veterinary practitioners in South Africa who give farms, dairies, abattoirs, 
etc. clearance to export their products. This clearance certifies that their products are 
disease-free. 
477 Tšeliso Lethunya, Ministry of Agriculture port official. Interview 15 October 2018. 
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import permits. Physical inspections of vehicles, seals, goods etc. are 
conducted at random. The officials reported that, although there is only one 
official on duty at a time, they try to take no more than 10 to 20 minutes for 
an inspection. They explained that if, upon inspection, they find that products 
do not meet the required standards (for example, there is spoilage) then the 
goods will be rejected or condemned. Otherwise, there is no penalty that is 
charged for non-compliance.478 
 
A weighbridge was introduced at the Maseru Bridge in the year 2000. Its 
purpose is to prevent overloaded vehicles from crossing over from South Africa 
into Lesotho. This is in order to preserve the integrity of the roads, which have 
been constructed to carry a maximum axle load of nine tonnes. In South 
Africa, the roads can bear axle loads of up to thirteen tonnes.479 After 
completing Customs, Agriculture and Health checks and being furnished with 
an exit note in evidence thereof, traders must then proceed to the weighbridge. 
The Department of Traffic and Transport (DTT) operates the weighbridge on 
behalf of the Road Fund. The weighbridge is on one of the three lanes that 
exit the border. The procedure is that a vehicle parks in the weighbridge lane 
and its mass is recorded. The truck driver has to exit the vehicle (leaving it in 
the lane) and go inside the office of the DTT to get a print-out of the vehicle 
mass. The officials also perform documentary checks. This is primarily of 
cross-border driving permits.480 During the fieldwork this process was 
observed as taking approximately five to ten minutes, if the vehicle is within 
the weight limits.  
 
There are three instances that can cause delays at the weighbridge. The first 
is if a vehicle is found to be over the weight allowance. This is because the 
driver will be required to offload the excess goods there and then, blocking 
other trucks from accessing the weighbridge. This is also despite there being 
no storage facilities at the border for the secure stowing of off-loaded goods. 
 
478 Melida Letlola, Port Health border official. Interview 15 October 2018. 
479 The axle load depends on the thickness of the road. 
480 As per the Road Transport Act 8 of 1981. 
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Secondly, officials reported that, at times traders dispute the accuracy of the 
scales. The resolution of such arguments can take significant time.481 Finally, 
the fact that there is only one lane that has a weighbridge means that all of 
the goods-conveying vehicles have to queue in that one lane to await 
compliance checks. Furthermore, the lane with the weighbridge is not only 
dedicated to weighing commercial vehicles. Passenger vehicles also use that 
lane. This adds to the traffic attempting to exit the border through that lane. 
Ideally, there shouldn’t be any weighbridge at a border because of the delays 
that they cause.482 In South Africa the weighbridges are on highways, not at 
borders.  
 
Finally, all vehicles must pay a toll before leaving the border. The tolls that 
are at the Maseru Bridge are under the responsibility of the Road Fund, but 
the Lesotho Revenue Authority administers them on their behalf. Costs range 
from M40.00 to M280.00, depending on the weight of the vehicle.483 There are 
three toll gates at Maseru Bridge, one exclusively for pre-paid users,484 one 
for cash payments, and one at the weighbridge. Despite this designation of 
the tolls, there is no clear signage. This can cause confusion for drivers who 
are not accustomed to this border.  
 
Lesotho does not fare too poorly in terms of rankings on the ease of conducting 
cross-border trade. For example, the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 
(2020) ranks Lesotho at number 40 out of 190 economies in terms of the ease 
of trade (with respect to the time and costs of trade).485 However, the fieldwork 
revealed that, nevertheless, there remain a number of trade facilitation 
challenges in Lesotho, as evidenced by the processes at the Maseru Bridge. 
 
481 M Mothabeng, Inspector, Department of Transport. Interview 16 October, 2018. 
482 E Chibira & B Mdlankomo in The Impact of Corridor Delays on Cross Border Road Transport 
in the SADC Region: Findings From Research Conducted by the Cross-Border Road Transport 
Agency advise that “the SADC region need (sic) to adopt technologies that limits (sic) dwell 
time and the need for stopping a vehicle”. The main culprits for such delays are explained as 
being weighbridges and tolls. At 669. 
483 From USD 2.50 to USD 17. 50. As at 4 November 2020. 
484 Drivers who have pre-paid the toll swipe their cards in order to proceed through the border. 
485 World Bank Group, Doing Business 2020, Lesotho. 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders. Accessed 
27 October 2020. 
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These include: inadequate infrastructure, onerous documentary 
requirements and time-consuming processes. These lead to goods taking a 
long time to gain clearance from their arrival at the border to their exit. Delays 
are further exacerbated by staffing deficiencies, including limited internal and 
external cooperation. There are some costs of trading and penalties for non-
compliance. The relations between traders and officials are threatened by poor 
communication and lack of effective dispute resolution processes. Finally, 
safety and security breaches occur at the border and the mechanisms for 
addressing such are inefficient. 
 
Cognisant of these challenges, and with the aim of addressing them, the 
Lesotho government devised several policies and laws to redress them. This 
was also done in order to implement its regional and international 
commitments. The next section applies insights from the law and development 
theory to evaluate the regulatory design, regulatory compliance and quality of 
implementation of these laws and policies. It does so in seeking to understand 
whether these factors can explain the discrepancies that exist between, on 
the one hand, the commitments and the laws meant to implement them and, 
on the other hand, the bottlenecks that are still experienced by traders on the 
ground. In other words, the law and development theoretical framework is 
used to gain insights on the development outcomes of Lesotho’s trade 
facilitation commitments. In the sections below the three key conceptual 
issues identified in the theory advanced by Lee (regulatory design, regulatory 
compliance and quality of implementation) are discussed with reference to the 
challenges that are faced by traders in Lesotho. 
 
6.5. Regulatory Design 
The law and development theory proposes that, in order for law to have an 
impact on development, regulatory design is important. This refers to whether 
the law is optimally designed to meet its objectives. There are three sub-




§ Policy outcome 
§ Structural organisation and dynamics among law, legal frameworks 
and institutions 
§ Adaptability to conditions on the ground.486 
 
With respect to the first sub-element, in Lesotho there are few policy 
instruments that underpin promulgated trade legislation. There are only three 
policy instruments that speak to trade. These are: a 2010 National Industrial 
Policy,487 a National Quality Policy and a National Food Safety Policy, both of 
2014. However, none of these are specific on trade facilitation in particular. 
Where there is a dearth of policies underpinning laws, it becomes difficult to 
design laws that address specific policy objectives. Laws are supposed to 
deliver particular policy outcomes. 
 
In terms of the structural organisation of the law, the observation is that there 
are several laws that regulate one aspect or another of trade. The ones that 
regulate customs processes in particular are: the Customs and Excise Act,488 
Export and Import Control Act489 and the Value Added Tax Act.490 Laws 
controlling agriculture and health issues are: the Import and Export of 
Livestock and Livestock Products Proclamation,491 Stock Disease 
Proclamation,492 Public Health Order493 and the Drugs of Abuse Act.494 The 
toll gate is provided for under the Toll Gates Act.495 Issues related to cross 
border transport are regulated under the National Road Traffic Act.496 The 
relevant trade laws are thus spread out among diverse instruments and may 
be difficult for traders to determine. Propounding this is the fact that some 
external laws are also applicable to trade in Lesotho. In the main this is the 
 
486 Lee Op cit note 96 at 435. 
487 It calls for export-oriented industrialisation, financed by foreign investment. 
488 Act no. 10 of 1982. 
489 Act no. 16 of 1984. 
490 Act no. 9 of 2001. 
491 Proclamation 57 of 1952. 
492 Proclamation 10 of 1896. 
493 Order no. 12 of 1970. 
494 Act no. 5 of 2008. 
495 Act no. 2 of 1976. 
496 Act no. 93 of 1996. 
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South African Customs and Excise Act.497 This also complicates the 
determination of the laws that are applicable to trade. Finally, some laws are 
old, and have not been updated in quite some time. They may, thus, be 
inappropriate for the current lived experiences. The law and development 
theory proposes that laws must be adaptable to realities. 
 
In addition to the expansive legal framework, the institutional arrangements 
for implementing the trade laws are as confusing. The different laws have 
installed many different institutions, each with a specific role to play in the 
regulation of trade. There is little interplay or coherence to their functions. A 
trader thus has to go from one institution to another for different 
authorisations regarding different aspects of their compliance and may meet 
with conflicting interpretations and rules.498 
 
Good regulatory design for trade facilitation requires that laws establish 
efficient procedures that will cut time and costs for traders. However, this is 
not the case with the laws in Lesotho. This can be seen particularly with the 
multitude of behind-the-border requirements that delay trade in Lesotho. 
These are the processes that are required for acquiring permits, certificates 
and licenses necessary for trade. Although such authorisations may be 
informed by cogent motives, when the processes for securing them become 
too cumbersome this can lead to gratuitous costs, inconvenience and delays 
to traders. In Lesotho twenty-five per cent of the time delay in trade is said to 
be caused by behind-the-border processes.499  
 
The main licenses and permits are the: traders license, general import and 
export permits and specific import and export permits. Anyone who intends 
 
497 Act no. 91 of 1964. The Customs and Excise Act makes schs 1 to 7 of South Africa’s 
Customs and Excise Act applicable to trade in Lesotho. 
498 The institutions are: the Lesotho National Dairy Board, Central Bank of Lesotho and the 
ministries of Trade and Industry, Agriculture and Food Security, Natural Resources, Tourism, 
Environment and Culture, Health and Social Welfare, Home Affairs, Police and Mining. World 
Bank Group, World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement Lesotho Validation and 
Reform Map, Working Draft, May 2016. 
499  Ibid at 4. 
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to engage in the import or the export of goods for commercial purposes must 
first be in possession of a traders licence.500 The application requirements are 
cumbersome and time-consuming. The trader must submit nine documents, 
pay a license fee and wait for a minimum of five working days for processing. 
The One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre (OBFC) was created within the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) to expedite all services related to the 
conduct of business in Lesotho, including trade licensing.501  However, this 
has not had much impact on redressing delays because the unit is responsible 
for many other functions (such as company registration) and cannot commit 
focus to expediting trade licensing processes. It might have been more 
impactful to have addressed the excessiveness of the requirements, rather 
than to have created an institution to administer them. 
 
General import and export permits authorise the import of restricted 
commodities and goods that are imported from outside the Southern African 
Custom Union or exported outside SACU. They are also granted by the One-
Stop Business Facilitation Centre. Consequently, the process suffers the same 
defects as with the traders’ license regime, in terms of the inefficiency of the 
application procedures. Lastly, specific import and export permits can be 
required for the import or export of different categories of goods. For example, 
trade in milk and milk products is authorised by the Lesotho National Dairy 
Board (LNDB), medications by the Ministry of Health, the import of eggs is 
approved by the Ministry of Small Business Development, Cooperatives and 
Marketing and trade in crops, animals and animal products are authorised 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security.502 The problem with this 
requirement for vast permits is that any business that uses or sells a 
multitude of different products (for example restaurants and supermarkets) 
will find that it constantly needs a plethora of different permits from different 
institutions in order to import. The application processes can be time-
 
500 Trading Enterprises Order No. 11 of 1993. 
501 http://www.obfc.org.ls/licensing/default.php, accessed 17 December, 2018. 
502 Other agencies which may require certificates, permits and licenses (depending on the 
type of goods concerned) are: the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of 
Telecommunications, and the Ministry of Mining. The full list of goods that require licenses, 
permits and certificates is provided in Annex 6. 
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consuming and costly, because the permits are valid on a once-off basis (per 
import/export). A good regulatory design would establish a more integrated 
and efficient process. 
 
Traders reported that they take between three to five days between application 
and collection of most permits. They have to physically go to offices, fill out 
paper forms and make cash payments. The processes cannot be done online. 
This is despite trade agreements requiring members to automate processes 
as much as possible, including making provision for electronic payments.503 
The time needed for these processes have led some traders to employ 
additional staff who focus making the applications, or they pay agents to do 
so on their behalf. Either way, there are cost repercussions for the trader.  
Traders also complain that the procedures are inconvenient because there 
can be restrictions on the days that applications can be made and collected,504 
that the application procedures constantly change without warning, and that 
the permits can take too long to process.  
 
The third and final aspect of good regulatory design requires adaptability. This 
means that laws should conform to local conditions. This encompasses  
 
social, political, economic, and cultural conditions that are essential to the 
successful operation of law, including social or religious norms… competent 
personnel, technical expertise, financial resources, and cultural and political 
acceptance of their regulatory objectives.505 
 
The research discovered that some trade laws in Lesotho are not sensitive to 
the local conditions. For example, some laws institute processes that are 
difficult to enforce. A good example is the requirement that every vehicle that 
is over the weight allowance should be offloaded. Yet, there are no storage 
facilities at the border. If enforced, this rule would subject a consignment of 
 
503 For example, in art 8 of annex 4 to the AfCFTA’s Goods Protocol and art 7.2 of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement. 
504 For example, for the importation of animals and animal products, licences are granted by 
the Livestock Division of the Ministry of Agriculture. Applications are made only on Mondays 
and Tuesdays between 8:00a.m. and 4:30p.m and to be collected only on Thursdays and 
Fridays. Interview Livestock Division 3 October 2018. 
505 Lee Op cit note 96 at 445. 
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perishable goods to spoiling, or generally leave goods at risk of theft while they 
lie out in the open. Laws should take cognisance of the availability of 
resources that are present on the ground for their enforcement. Another 
example of the disjunct between law and local realities was pointed out by 
traders who reported that requirements do not take into account business 
expediencies. For example, traders may have credit facilities with their 
suppliers yet, when they import goods, the law requires that they must 
furnish proof of payment. This means that they have to make an upfront 
payment to suppliers when they source goods, even though the suppliers are 
willing to give them credit.  
 
6.6. Regulatory Compliance 
In addition to the importance of good regulatory design, the law and 
development theory also proposes that, in order for laws to be impactful, there 
must be compliance by those who are subject to the application of the law. In 
this instance we will look at compliance on the part of traders, since trade 
laws are to be complied with by them. Different border authorities reported 
different impressions of compliance by traders. The Livestock Division 
reported that, by and large, traders are compliant with their procedures and 
requirements. The same was reported by Port Health authorities. Conversely, 
customs officials reported higher incidents of non-compliance. They spoke of 
their frequent discovery of offences, (such as trading without requisite 
permits, under-declaration, smuggling, etc.) when conducting inspections. 
The variance between the institutions is understandable because there are 
higher and more direct revenue implications for traders’ compliance with 
revenue laws than there are for their compliance with the mandates of the 
other agencies.  
 
Law and development theory submits that rates of compliance can be 
improved. It makes a connection between, on the one hand the extent of 
participation in law-making and knowledge of laws and, on the other hand, 
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rates of compliance.506 This idea of the importance of participation and 
knowledge of the law is reflected in articles 1 and 2 of the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement. The former calls for governments to promptly publish trading 
information (including through the internet, or enquiry points, if possible).507 
The latter urges that traders should be given ample time and opportunity to 
comment on proposed laws before their implementation. Further, that 
governments should maintain regular consultation with stakeholders. Where 
traders have participated in law-creation, understand the rationale behind 
the laws, and see their interests reflected in the final outcomes, then there 
should be greater likelihood of their compliance with the laws. 
 
The fieldwork unearthed evidence of lack of knowledge of the rules on the part 
of traders. For example, as discussed above, customs documentary 
compliance requires the submission of the SAD forms, CN1 and CN2 forms, 
invoices and any applicable permits. However, when traders were asked which 
documents are required for trade, some also mentioned company registration 
certificates, Value Added Tax (VAT) registration and tax clearance certificates, 
among others. This shows that they are confused about the documents that 
are actually required and, perhaps, not enough is being done to inform them 
of the legal requirements.  
 
In addition, traders seemed to also not understand the reasons for some of 
the requirements and attendant procedures. For example, they complained 
that the revenue authority is not sensitive to business expediencies because, 
when there are minor variances between the invoice and the shipment (‘overs’ 
or ‘shorts’) the revenue authorities become suspicious and implement 
extensive documentary and physical examinations, despite there not having 
been an intention by the trader to commit a fraud.  This can delay their trade 
by days. Lack of knowledge and understanding of why things are done 
increases the motivation to avoid compliance (e.g. by not 
 
506 Lee Op cit note 96 at 447. 
507 Arts1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
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declaring/smuggling).508 However, such reactions will only serve to cause the 
authorities to become even stricter since non-compliance threatens revenue 
collection.509  
 
In terms of the publication of trade laws and procedures, the World Bank 
Group found that, although the various authorities, which regulate trade in 
Lesotho have websites, many of the sites contain incomplete information (for 
example, they do not include the forms that are required for the processes) or 
they contain outdated and/or incorrect information.510  To date there are still 
examples of regulators who do not provide full information to traders on their 
websites. One example is the website of the One-Stop Business Facilitation 
Centre. This is an institution that is responsible for general trade licensing 
and for registering exporters. The website contains the procedural steps for 
these, but the forms that are required are not provided on the site. Nor is 
there any information on the fees that are payable for these licenses.511 The 
Lesotho Revenue Authority fares better because it provides all of the relevant 
forms for customs processes on its website.512 When traders do not have 
access to the correct information this contributes to them arriving at the 
border non-compliant and, thus, they end up spending an inordinate amount 
of time correcting their non-conformity in order to successfully complete the 
required processes.  
 
In order to rectify this challenge, Lesotho launched a trade portal in 2014 
where importers and exporters can obtain complete and up-to-date 
information on trade regulation, processes, and requirements.513 Relevant 
forms are also available on the site. The Ministry of Trade and Industry is 
 
508 They also reported that they do not understand the requirement of a health attestation by 
the Livestock Division.  
509 Rege argues that in many developing countries rampant under-declaration and smuggling 
cause customs officials to become generally more suspicious and leads them to over-inspect. 
Rege Op cit note 146 at 156. 
510 World Bank Group, WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, Lesotho Validation and Reform 
Map (2016) at 19–23. 
511http://www.obfc.org.ls/licensing/default.php  and 
http://www.obfc.org.ls/business/default.php, accessed November 4, 2020. 
512 http://www.lra.org.ls/forms, accessed November 4, 2020. 
513 www.lesothotradeportal.org.ls, accessed 2 June, 2018. 
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responsible for the portal. However, finances are a threat to its viability. This 
is because of the substantial license fees that are paid to the domain host, 
and the fact that the technology that is applied to the portal constantly needs 
to be upgraded. In addition to this initiative, the Lesotho Revenue Authority 
conducts public awareness campaigns through its Taxpayer Unit. It meets 
with clearing agents on a monthly basis to educate them about the required 
procedures and requirements.514 These efforts are hoped to bridge the 
knowledge gap and to support greater regulatory compliance. 
 
Compliance can also be motivated by incentivisation. An example of this can 
be seen with the launch of a pilot programme on preferred traders in Lesotho. 
This is an approximation of the Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) concept 
in Article 7 of the TFA. This was a project of the Lesotho Revenue Authority. 
Preferred traders would be exempted from compliance with customs 
formalities when their goods cross the border. In order for a trader to be 
“preferred” they had to undergo several evaluations and audits. Only those 
with high compliance records earned the benefit. Fourteen traders qualified 
for the treatment.515 One reported that the process was taxing but that it has 
eased the time and costs of trading because they are permitted to bypass the 
customs clearance queues at the border. 
 
Finally, compliance can also be affected by the quality of state action taken to 
enforce compliance. States can use penalties to encourage compliance. In 
Lesotho, if non-compliance is discovered during customs clearance, the 
punishment is usually the payment of a penalty,516 or the detention of the 
goods, if the trader is unable to immediately pay the penalty. Other penalties 
can be the confiscation of goods, embargo, or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding six months. The Trade Facilitation Agreement recommends that 
penalties be commensurate with the offence.517 Harsh penalties can motivate 
 
514 Tseko Nyesemane, Deputy Commissioner of Customs (Central Region), Lesotho Revenue 
Authority. Interview 10 October 2018. 
515 A list of these traders is provided in Annex 7. 
516 Under the Customs and Excise Act no.10 of 1982 or the Value Added Tax Act no. 9 of 
2001. The Clearance Hub determines the penalty amount. 
517 Art 6.3.3 of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
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corruption. However, where penalties are too lenient, they may not have the 
effect of compelling the desired behaviour. For example, vehicles park on the 
bridge that lies between the South African side of the border and the Lesotho 
side of the border (no man’s land). This is against the law because the bridge 
was not constructed to withstand the weight of moving vehicles as well as of 
stationary vehicles loaded with cargo. This is a threat to the structural 
integrity of the bridge. Fines were instituted for this transgression by the 
Lesotho Revenue Authority. They were subsequently reviewed upwards 
because the infraction continued. Despite this, the violation continues 
because of the failure to set the penalties at a significant level to counter the 
behaviour. 518 
 
6.7. Quality of Implementation 
The final factor that may affect the ability of a law to positively impact 
development is the quality of the implementation of the law. This factor speaks 
to whether a state executes suitable measures to ensure the fulfilment of the 
requirements of the law.519 Its ability to do so depends on several factors. For 
example, whether there is the political will to implement, the extent of its 
capacity to implement and the ability to curb threats to effectiveness, such as 
corruption. This section analyses the quality of implementation of trade 
facilitation laws in Lesotho. It argues that the most salient factors that are 
negatively affecting implementation appear to be lack of capacity (human, 
financial and technical resources) and the paucity of arrangements to 
counteract threats to efficacy, the biggest one being corruption on the part of 
those who are entrusted with the role of executing the laws. 
 
Human Resources and the Quality of Implementation 
The state needs to engage an adequate number of personnel to execute its 
functions. Otherwise, implementation will stall. The Lesotho Time Release 
Study found that  
 
518 The fine was originally M100 (USD 6.30). As of 27 November 2018 it is now M1,000 (USD 
62.80), rate accurate as at 4 November, 2020. 
519 Lee Op cit note 96 at 451–452. 
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traders experience delays in the process of receiving approved certificates, 
permits and licenses as a result of the unavailability of relevant ministerial 
officials to either receive or approve applications. This was particularly the 
case for the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, Department 
of Livestock.520 
 
During the fieldwork licensing officials complained that they receive an excess 
of applications to process on a weekly basis and that there are few staff to 
process them - sometimes only two or three.521 Staff deficiencies are also seen 
at the border. Some agencies only have one member of staff on hand per any 
shift. This is so with the Livestock Division and Port Health. This can cause 
delays in receiving services from these agencies, especially during peak 
business times. The situation is exacerbated when inspections have to be 
conducted because it means that staff have to leave their offices vacant for 
long periods of time while they conduct the inspections. Meanwhile traders 
cannot receive services during such time. 
 
Besides the quantity of staff, the adequacy of human resources also depends 
on the quality of staff. This relates to the knowledge and skills that are 
possessed by the staff who have to administer measures. In Lesotho, trade 
delays are, in part, caused by having few border agencies that use risk 
assessment principles to inform their inspections (i.e., when to inspect and 
the degree of inspection). This is because staff are not skilled in making such 
assessments.522 Both the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement require post clearance audits to be conducted 
in order to determine how expeditiously clearance is being conducted.523 In 
addition, states are recommended to establish and to publish average release 
times.524 However, Lesotho does not have the capacity to implement either of 
 
520 Op cit note 454 at xiii. 
521 For example, there is only one veterinary surgeon who approves permits for the import of 
animals and animal products in the Livestock Division of the agricultural ministry. This is 
besides their other duties and is why they insist on dealing specifically with permits only on 
specified days. Interview, Livestock Division, 3 October 2018. 
522 Only the Lesotho Revenue Authority relies on risk assessments in making decisions on 
which actions to take in processing goods. 
523 Art 11 of annex 4 of the AfCFTA protocol and art 7.5 of the TFA. 
524 Art 12 of the AfCFTA protocol and art 7.6 of the TFA. 
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these measures. The closest approximation to these is that the revenue 
authority has monthly meetings to assess its inspection experiences. This is 
meant to help them with case selection analysis so that they can better select 
and not over-inspect. 
 
The Impact of Cooperation and Collaboration on the Implementation of Laws  
Good human resource arrangements also includes the extent of cooperation 
between agencies. It is important that border agencies work well together, so 
as to avoid duplication and conflicts, which increase delays. The inefficiencies 
of one agency can hold up the chain of connected processes. There is an 
internal dimension to cooperation and an external dimension. The former 
refers to the border agencies of one country working together. The latter refers 
to the extent of collaboration between the agencies of two countries. The 
fieldwork discovered that there is some evidence that the domestic border 
agencies at Maseru Bridge sometimes do cooperate. For example,  
 
§ At times the Lesotho Revenue Authority allows officials from the other 
agencies to use its one scanner to conduct their physical inspections 
§ Officials from the Department of Livestock and Port Health collaborate 
with each other to check import permits and heath attestations 
§ Officials from the Department of Livestock are only at the port Mondays 
to Fridays from 8:00am until 4:30pm. In their absence, customs officers 
(who are posted at the border twenty fours a day, seven days a week) 
fulfil their duties on their behalf. 525  
§ The tolls that are at the Maseru Bridge are under the responsibility of 
the Road Fund. There is, however, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between the Road Fund and the Lesotho Revenue Authority (LRA) 
whereby LRA collects the tolls on behalf of the Road Fund, and does the 
reconciliations for collections. 
 
 
525 However, some traders reported that sometimes police officers stop them from importing 
animals and animal products if the Department of Livestock official has knocked off. This 
shows that there are conflicting approaches that are taken by the different agencies. 
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However, despite these examples, there remains scope for improvement. For 
example, the different agencies implement different working shifts.526 This 
prevents seamless co-operation across agencies. Secondly, there is no inter-
connectivity between the systems of the various agencies. Thirdly, the lane 
that operates as both a weighbridge and a toll is operated by two different 
agencies (The Lesotho Revenue Authority (for tolls) and the Department of 
Traffic and Transport (for the weighbridge)). They have two different mandates 
and procedures. This can sometimes lead to conflicts and delays. Another 
conflict exists between customs and immigration. The customs arm requires 
a trader to lodge a declaration before arriving at the border, but immigration 
requires persons to report to them before doing any business in the country. 
Lastly, every agency can conduct individual inspections of the same goods, 
for different reasons, with different risk profiles for the same client; some do 
not have risk profiles at all. Traders reported that, in their experience, the 
officials of the various agencies operate independently and that is a major 
cause of delays. They asserted that the agencies have inconsistent policies 
and procedures and that this leads to conflicts and confusion. All of these 
create the perception of arbitrariness and frustrate traders. 
 
The World Bank’s Time Release Study for Lesotho and the World Bank 
Group’s validation exercise both propose that Lesotho should implement a 
single window.527 This has been defined as: 
 
a facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge 
standardized information and documents with a single entry point to fulfil all 
import, export, and transit-related regulatory requirements.528  
 
The aim of a single window is to have one point for the submission of 
documents and processing of trade transactions. This entrance point should 
 
526 See annex 8. 
527 Both Op cit note 545. 
528 The United Nations Commission for Europe (UNECE) Recommendation 33 
tfig.unece.org/contents/recommendation-33.htm and The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) The Single Window Concept: Enhancing the Efficient 
Exchange of Information between Trade and Government,  available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/ctied7/ece_trade_324e.pdf, both accessed 16, 
August 2019. 
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be managed by one lead agency. As yet there is no such facility in Lesotho. 
However, as a step towards that, an important intervention that has been 
implemented towards greater collaboration is the creation of the Heads of 
Border Agencies (HOBA) Committee in 2013.529 It meets once a month (or 
when necessary) to collaborate on strategies to improve the coordination of 
border agencies.530 The ultimate intention is to have one agency that will serve 
the client at the border, in implementation of article 8 of the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement. The HOBA is at the stage of trying to assess the roles of the 
different agencies at Maseru Bridge in order to understand how they all serve 
the client. There is also a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that has been 
signed. A Business Process Map will be devised as a stepping-stone to the 
launch of the one border agency.531  
 
The border agencies also work together in the National Trade Facilitation 
Committee (NTFC). This was established in September 2017 in furtherance of 
Article 23.2 of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. It is made up of public sector 
and private sector representatives. It is responsible for monitoring Lesotho’s 
compliance with the TFA and determining what interventions are necessary 
to ensure its further compliance. It makes recommendations for approval by 
the Lesotho Coordinating Committee on Trade (LCCT).  
 
With respect to external cooperation, it is only the revenue authority that 
reported that it has some semblance of relations with their external 
counterparts.532 The Lesotho Revenue Authority and the South African 
 
529 It contains representatives from the Road Fund, Department of Traffic and Transport of 
the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Department of Immigration and Passport 
Services of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Lesotho Mounted Police Service, Customs and Excise 
Administration of the Lesotho Revenue Authority, Lesotho Tourism Development Corporation 
(LTDC), Department of Livestock Services of Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Port 
Health from the Ministry of Health and  National Security Service (NSS) of the Ministry of 
Defence and National Security. 
530 For example, devising a common policy and legal framework, common risk management 
approaches, and developing a common strategic development plan. Heads of Border 
Management, Border Management Strategy, June 2015. 
531 The one border agency should have been launched by 1 April 2019 according to the plans. 
However, this has been delayed. 
532 Tseko Nyesemane, Deputy Commissioner of Customs (Central Region), Lesotho Revenue 
Authority. Interview 11 October 2018. 
 158 
Revenue Services (SARS) have monthly meetings of their border managers. 
They discuss operational issues and any other updates.  
 
The Role of Committed Administration in Driving Implementation 
It is not only the quantity, quality and collaboration of staff on the ground 
that affects the quality of implementation. The seriousness of administrators 
also counts. Often, administrative arrangements fail due to lack of planning, 
coordination and dedication, thus stalling efforts to implement. For example, 
section 6.5 of this work reported that the Maseru Bridge is a congested border 
and that there is little room to effect design and infrastructural improvements 
that would assist to facilitate trade. A proposal was made that the border 
should be moved 5 kilometres inland, into South African territory, so that 
there could be more space to expand the border. However, this never 
materialised because of constant changes in the portfolios of the responsible 
ministers in both countries. This scuppered the continuity of the plans.533 The 
failure to install sound administrative follow-ups obstructed implementation 
of a very necessary improvement. 
 
A second example relates to infrastructural upgrades. The United States 
Agency for International Development Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 
update for Lesotho (2012), the Time Release Plus and the Investment Climate 
Reform Implementation Framework are all reports that advise that 
infrastructural development is a pressing need for enhancing in Lesotho.534 
However, infrastructural deficiencies persist at Maseru Bridge because there 
has been little administrative follow-through with implementing improving 
strategies. For example, in a bid to implement the 1996 SADC Protocol on 
Transport, Communications and Meteorology Lesotho made plans to improve 
the layout and infrastructure at the border. However, the plans were shelved 
due to the absence of an implementing strategy. A few aspects of the plans 
 
533 Hlouhla Lelosa, Operations Manager, Department of Traffic and Transport. Interview 
October 2, 2018.  
534 For example, the World Bank’s Time Release Study for Lesotho (Op cit note 454) advises 
construction to separate traffic flows at the border, based on risks and controls. 
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only began to be implemented starting from 2019.535 Another example is that, 
in 2005, the governments of Lesotho and South Africa entered into a 
memorandum of understanding on cooperation in science and technology. 
This included the mandate to grow their trade by cooperating in seeking 
external assistance to apply technology to trade. However, nothing came of it 
because there was no implementation strategy. This was until the two 
governments approached the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 2018 seeking technical assistance to 
devise an action plan to operationalise the MOU.536 Therefore, a significant 
challenge is that, while there can be laws or plans in place, administrative 
failure to devise strategies on implementation impede progress.  
 
A final example of how poor administrative arrangements can sabotage the 
quality of implementation of trade facilitation efforts is with respect to the 
police services. Police are stationed at borders to detect and to respond to 
crimes, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, etc. There is a police 
presence at the Maseru Bridge, but it is not fully capacitated to respond to all 
security events. For example, on the 15 October, 2018, the researcher 
witnessed a traffic accident at the border. A large truck had collided with the 
boom gate at the weighbridge. The police at the border could not respond 
because they said that the law only empowers the Traffic Police to respond to 
accidents on a public road.537 It took over four hours for the traffic police to 
arrive at the scene. Meanwhile, the truck remained stationary in the lane and 
other vehicles could not pass because they had to be weighed in the very same 
lane. This led to unnecessary delays.  
 
 
535 For example, a drive-through Home Affairs service, which allows clients to be served 
without alighting from their cars. 
536 Lefa Thamae, Director of Science and Technology. Interview at the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. 8 October, 2018. 
537 Section 88(1) (e) of the Road Traffic Act 8 of 1981 says that, in the event of an accident, 
those concerned  ‘(e) shall notify the police and remain on the scene of the accident, or return 
to it and wait there until such police arrive’. Section 88(1) (a) says that the vehicles involved 
shall not be moved before the police arrive. 
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In 2014 the Lesotho government created an Investment Climate Reform 
Implementation Framework. The purpose of this exercise was to include all 
stakeholders in the designing of a plan to improve Lesotho’s ranking across 
all of the World Bank Doing Business indices.538 Many of the plans that are 
made under the ‘Trading Across Borders’ mandate target the weaknesses that 
have been identified in sections 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 of this chapter. For 
example,  
 
§ To improve transparency and stakeholder consultation, the Lesotho 
Revenue Authority is tasked with spearheading the web-based trade 
portal; developing an education programme to train all stakeholders 
(such as clearing agents and freight forwarders) on border control 
(including the relevant documents and procedures) and devising a 
communication strategy to inform stakeholders on any changes to trade 
regulations and/or procedures.539 
§ To improve procedural efficacy by simplifying formalities, procedures 
and documents; enabling online permit processing; automating 
customs procedures; and developing a single window.540 
§ To encourage compliance, a Compliance Reward system is to be created 
to incentivise compliant traders.541 
§ Trade infrastructure is to be improved in order to enhance trade 
facilitation. This includes, for example, the installation of automated 
goods clearance (e.g. by the use of scanners/sensors); the construction 
of inspection shelters; provision of adequate lanes to channel traffic and 
of and appropriate parking and fencing to secure the border area.542  
§ To improve internal cooperation, the National Trade Facilitation 
Working Group (NTFWG) is to be capacitated so that it can better 
 
538 The areas are: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, 
registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across 
borders, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency. Available at 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2020, accessed 
13 October, 2020. 
539 At 17. 
540 All agencies are to collaborate in this, led by the revenue authority. At 15. 
541 Ibid. 
542 All agencies are to collaborate on these improvements. At 14. 
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coordinate all of the agencies that are represented in the committee. 
Furthermore, all border agencies are to harmonise their practices (for 
example, by agreeing on a common approach to risk management) to 
avoid the duplication of processes. 543 
§ To improve external cooperation, there is a call to engage with South 
African authorities to address cross border issues that cause delays at 
the border. This includes plans to link border systems and to harmonise 
laws and regulations 544 
 
Hopefully these arrangements will bear fruit because, not only are there 
plans, but there are also concrete strategies on what needs to be done and 
how. This had been missing in many of the previous initiatives, thus impeding 
implementation. Furthermore, there are clearly allocated responsibilities that 
are shared across all stakeholders and there is yearly monitoring and 
reporting back. Time will tell whether this framework will lead to 
improvements in trade facilitation in Lesotho. 
 
Technological Capacity and the Quality of Implementation 
The successful implementation of reforms that will stimulate development can 
require the application of technology. This is particularly true of trade 
facilitation reforms. For example, automation can assist to speed up trade 
processing. However, where there is little use of machinery and systems at a 
border, this can cause border clearance processes to be slow. In Lesotho 
equipment deficiencies hamper the efficient processing of cross-border trade 
at all stages of processing. For example, the office of the Department of 
Livestock at Maseru Bridge only has one computer for capturing data. The 
Port Health authorities also reported that the lack of appropriate equipment 
hinders their ability to discharge their functions. For example, they are 
supposed to check the refrigeration temperature in vehicles. This is because 
sometimes truckers will turn off their engines because they have been idling 
 
543 At 17. 
544 The Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
are designated to follow up on this commitment. At 17. 
 162 
for long periods of time at the border, thus depleting their fuel. Switching off 
the ignition turns off the refrigeration in the truck, thus causing a threat to 
the safety of the conveyed products. However, staff reported that they  do not  
have their own thermometers to check temperatures in the trucks. They rely 
on the readings on the vehicles’ thermometers (if they are there/ 
working/accurate), instead of being able to independently verify the 
temperatures for themselves. They also do not have their own scanners to 
speedily conduct physical inspections, nor do they have food safety testing 
equipment to test whether products have spoiled or expired and are no longer 
fit for human consumption.  Technological capacity constraints also disrupt 
processes at the weighbridge. When the scale is due for service (which 
happens on a quarterly basis) or for repair, the government issues a tender. 
Only South African firms respond to the tender because there is no expertise 
for such services in Lesotho. Waiting for the tendering process can mean that 
the scale is not working for long periods of time, thus impeding weighbridge 
processes. 
 
In an attempt to address its technology gaps, the revenue authority 
introduced a Customs Modernisation and Automation programme in 2017. 
This was with an aim of reducing customs clearance time by using 
information and communications technology (ICT). The initiative saw the use 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) 
Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) World System for customs 
clearance processes. This has brought many visible improvements to the 
speed of trade. For example, before the system was adopted, there was no 
possibility of pre-clearance. However, currently goods arrive at the border with 
the traders having already lodged their declarations online. However, 
automation requires solid infrastructure, which is a challenge in Lesotho. 
Electricity interruptions and network failures often disrupt operations. Thus, 
traders cannot always enjoy the benefit of initiatives that are geared towards 
expediting their trade.545  
 
545 Tseko Nyesemane, Deputy Commissioner of Customs (Central Region), Lesotho Revenue 
Authority. Interview 10 October 2018. 
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The Threat of Finances to Successful Implementation 
Financial capacity is another aspect that is instrumental in supporting 
effective implementation of trade facilitation strategies. For example, to install 
necessary trade infrastructure. The Ministry of Communications, Science and 
Technology is responsible for coordinating and facilitating scientific and 
technological innovation countrywide. However, it does not have adequate 
funds nor the expertise to fulfil this mandate in a manner that is economically 
impactful.546 Where technology is acquired, lack of financial resources pose a 
challenge to sustainability because technology becomes obsolete quickly and 
replacing it or upgrading it is a costly venture. Lastly, many trade reforms 
require education and change management. There are few resources for that. 
Therefore, the roll-out of such programmes becomes obstructed.  
 
The Need to Install Internal Controls to Avoid Threats to Implementation 
Finally, the quality of implementation can be impaired by lack of internal 
controls against implementation threats. One example of this is that of 
corruption, which undermines effective implementation. Corruption can arise 
at several stages of the trade process. For example, vehicles which are 
discovered as being overloaded at the weighbridge are not only forced to 
offload the extra weight, but drivers are also fined a flat rate of M300.00.547 
However, the fine cannot be paid at the border. It is to be paid at the Head 
Office of the Department of Traffic and Transport. This is approximately five 
kilometres away from the border post. This procedure was implemented after 
allegations of corruption. Money was being misappropriated when payments 
were being made at the border. However, it adds great inconvenience and 
delays when payments are to be made far from the scene of infringement. This 
has not cured corruption, if anything it has increased incentive for it. A more 
efficient payment system that also caters for the curbing of corruption has to 
be urgently implemented. 
 
 
546 Lefa Thamae, Director Science and Technology, Ministry of Communications, Science and 
Technology, interview 8 October 2018. 
547 USD 18.84, as at 4 November 2020. 
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6.8. Chapter Conclusions 
Chapter five revealed that there are many trade facilitation challenges that 
broadly arise in the Southern African Development Community. The 
cumulative effect of these has been the perpetuation of subdued regional trade 
and integration. The theory of international trade postulates that trade can 
have positive effects on development. Because of this, SADC states have 
entered into numerous regional and multilateral agreements hoping to 
address impediments to trade.548 However, not much has visibly changed with 
respect to the speed and cost of trade in SADC, despite these efforts. 
 
This chapter studied the Kingdom of Lesotho as an example of a SADC state. 
Although Lesotho does rank comparatively better than its regional 
counterparts in terms of the ease of trading across borders,549 it still 
experiences impediments to trade which, if addressed, it is argued, may 
contribute to improved development prospects for the country. The purpose 
of this chapter was two-fold. First, to discover the trade facilitation challenges 
that manifest in Lesotho. Secondly, to interrogate why the challenges persist 
despite domestic, regional and multilateral efforts to address them. The 
chapter proposed that the theory of law and development may be instructive 
in assisting us to uncover the reasons. The theory proposes that regulatory 
design, regulatory compliance and the quality of implementation of domestic 
efforts may determine the effectiveness of laws.  
 
The theory was applied to trade facilitation efforts in Lesotho. The conclusions 
of the exercise are as follows: first, deficiencies in regulatory design can be 
observed from the lack of strong policy frameworks as a basis for legal 
reforms. They are also apparent from the failure of laws to create streamlined 
processes, with coordinated institutional arrangements and requirements 
that fit the local conditions. Secondly, there are weaknesses in regulatory 
compliance. It is not enough to simply have laws. Those who are subject to 
the laws have to comply with them in order for the laws to be successful in 
 
548 These were discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
549 World Bank Doing Business, Trading Across Borders (2020), Op cit note 337. 
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meeting their objectives. Compliance can be supported by ensuring that those 
who are subject to laws know and understand the laws at all times (be it law 
creation, amendment, supplementation, abrogation etc). This requires 
publication and consultation with stakeholders. Compliance should also be 
incentivised and non-compliance should be punished. In Lesotho there are 
have been a few efforts to publicise and to consult, but the fieldwork exposed 
that perhaps not enough is being done because there is still confusion among 
traders regarding requirements. Compliance has been somewhat incentivised 
by the launch of the preferred trader scheme, but it could also be expanded 
to accommodate more firms. Non-compliance has been found to not be 
adequately punished, regard being had to continuing breaches of rules.  
 
Thirdly, this chapter concludes that a state’s efforts to implement laws is key 
to the effectiveness of legal regimes. The quality of implementation can be 
affected by state capacity (personnel, technological, financial and otherwise), 
political will, as well as curtailing implementation threats. In Lesotho capacity 
constraints have undermined the quality of implementation. Political will may 
exist, but poor organisation has led to the stalling of much-needed reforms. 
Implementation threats (i.e. corruption) have been addressed in ways that 
frustrate trade processes. 
 
The theory on law and development, as applied to the case study of Lesotho, 
provides researchers and policy makers with key insights on the limited 
developmental impact of SADC states’ commitments in regional and 
multilateral trade facilitation agreements. Notwithstanding its membership in 
regional and multilateral trade facilitation agreements, Lesotho has not 
experienced significant economic development. The insights gained from the 
case study are suggestive of the reasons for the similar lack of developmental 
outcomes in other SADC countries that have made similar trade facilitation 
commitments. In the next chapter the World Trade Organization’s Trade 
Facilitation Agreement is studied in terms of how it may potentially assist the 
SADC states to escape the disparity between participation in legal 
instruments and successful trade and development outcomes. 
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Chapter 7 – The World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement: 




Previous chapters have argued that freer trade can be beneficial for 
development.550 Free trade encompasses both trade liberalisation as well as 
trade facilitation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) defines trade 
facilitation as ‘the simplification, modernization and harmonization of export 
and import processes’.551 Trade facilitation contributes to the freeing of trade 
by assisting to reduce obstacles to the physical movement of goods across 
national borders. Regional and multilateral agreements can be used to 
cooperate on facilitating trade. Chapter four discussed the regional and 
multilateral initiatives that the countries in the Southern African 
Development Community have engaged in to facilitate their trade. This thesis 
argues that the impact of these efforts has been minimal, regard being had to 
the experiences of traders and to reports and statistics on trade and 
development in the region. Chapter five and six considered why these 
arrangements have achieved limited success. They propose that compliance 
and implementation challenges are convincing reasons.  
 
This chapter evaluates the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA). In particular it considers how this treaty addresses 
compliance and implementation challenges. It has been argued, in the 
previous chapters, that it is insufficient for a treaty to merely contain good 
provisions; what is most important is its inclusion of mechanisms to ensure 
that members can comply with and implement the rules. It is argued that the 
TFA has these. The chapter, first, gives a brief history to the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement, including the negotiation process that brought it into being. It 
then reviews the main treaty provisions. Using the enmeshment theory and 
 
550 Chapters 2 and 3. 
551 WTO Trade Facilitation (2020), available at   
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm#I, accessed 7 April 2020. 
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the managerial approach to compliance, it considers the compliance 
implications thereof. Finally, it assesses the treaty’s mechanisms to enhance 
the implementation capacities of members. It concludes that the TFA is likely 
to contribute to the improved facilitation of trade in SADC, over and above 
what the existing agreements have managed to achieve.  
 
7.2. Background to the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
The inaugural WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Singapore in 1996 to 
set the agenda (or the ‘work programme’) of the organisation. The declaration 
that ensued therefrom identified four main areas as being ripe for the 
development of WTO rules: 552  
 
§ Trade and competition policy 
§ Trade and investment553  
§ Transparency in government procurement and  
§ Trade facilitation.554 
 
These came to be known as the ‘Singapore Issues’.  There are different views 
and perspectives, rooted in different interests, on the importance of these 
‘Singapore issues’.555 With respect to trade facilitation, the Council for Trade 
in Goods (CTIG) was tasked with conducting studies to determine the 
 
552 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December, 1996. WT/MIN (96)/DEC 
of  18 December 1996. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, available at  
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm, accessed on 6 
March 2017.  
553 This inclusion was first proposed by the European Communities. It is contained in 
paragraph 20 of the declaration. Working Groups were created to study the correlation 
between trade and investment and trade and competition policy. Further, to identify areas 
that may warrant further action. 
554 The former was proposed by the United States and the latter was a proposal of the 
European Communities. They appear in paragraph 21 of the declaration. For the former, a 
Working Group was established to conduct a study on transparency in government 
procurement practices and to develop elements for their inclusion in an agreement. 
555 See, for example, Rorden Wilkinson, Erin Hannah & James Scott  (2014) 35 (6) ‘The WTO 
in Bali: what MC9 means for the Doha Development Agenda and why it matters’ Third World 
Quarterly at 1039, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.9077, accessed on 
13 July 2019. 
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feasibility of WTO rules on trade facilitation.556 The results of the studies were 
discussed at the Doha Ministerial Conference.557 The conclusion that was 
reached thereat was that there was indeed scope for WTO rules on trade 
facilitation. The developed members were anxious to have binding rules on 
the issue. They felt that it was important to have members commit to the 
uniform application of harmonised rules. On the other hand, developing 
country members agreed, in principle, that trade facilitation was important to 
global trade and that border inefficiencies should be reduced. For example, in 
paragraph 12 of the Cairo Declaration African ministers of trade express that 
they 
 
recognize the potential benefits that would accrue to African countries from 
undertaking trade facilitation measures. The critical importance of trade 
facilitation for enhancing the competitiveness of African economies, for 
promoting intra-African trade and for harnessing the benefits of globalization 
cannot be overemphasized.558 
 
However, they also expressed fears that they would not be able to commit to 
trade facilitation reforms without assistance. Paragraph 13 of the declaration 
notes that ‘there are costs associated with the pursuit of trade facilitation as 
a legitimate policy objective.’ Therefore, they call for ‘closer collaboration and 
enhanced coordination among relevant international, regional and sub-
regional organizations in the delivery of technical assistance and capacity 
building support to African countries.’559 Furthermore, for special and 
differential treatment provisions that are ‘precise, effective and operational’ as 
well as ‘policy space and flexibility for African countries.’560 A research paper 
by Oxfam argues that the WTO’s special and differential treatment regime was 
 
 
556 The mandate was expressed as ‘to undertake exploratory and analytical work . . . on the 
simplification of trade procedures in order to assess the scope for WTO rules in this area.’ 
Paragraph 21 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration. Working Groups were also established 
to conduct similar exercises for the other issues. 
557 Doha Ministerial Declaration, Adopted 14th November, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 of 20 
November 2001. 
558 The Cairo Declaration and Road Map on the Doha Work Programme, African Union, 9 
June 2005, TI/TMIN/EXP/6 – b (III) Rev. 4. 
559 Ibid paragraph 14. 
560 Ibid paragraph 15. 
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inadequate in promoting development, since it consisted in many cases merely 
of extended deadlines for compliance with WTO rules that were not necessarily 
pro-development in the first place. Further, the timelines for compliance were 
arbitrary and unrelated to the level of members’ economic development. This 
meant that at some arbitrary point in time, developing countries and LDCs 
would have to implement Uruguay Round rules, whether their economies were 
ready or not. And the provisions requiring rich countries to assist developing 
countries with technology transfer, enhanced market access, or other 
development needs consisted of ‘best endeavours’ language only and were 
never enacted.561  
 
In addition, developing nations expressed that they had far more pressing 
developmental issues to deal with and that that trade facilitation wasn’t as 
urgent a matter.562 They were also opposed to having binding rules because 
this would subject them to the stringent WTO dispute settlement 
mechanisms, should they fail to honour their commitments.563 Dani Rodrik 
proposes that this was a reasonable position. 
 
When other worthwhile policy objectives are competing for scarce 
administrative resources and political capital, deep trade liberalization 
often does not deserve the high priority it typically receives in development 
 
561 Africa and the Doha Round: Fighting to Keep Development Alive, Oxfam Briefing Paper 80. 
November 2005 
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/114077/bp80-africa-
doha-091105-en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 4 July, 2019. 
562 Jensen and Gibbon agree that the issues put forward in the Doha round were of limited 
relevance to the African context and to its development aspirations. Further, that they were 
unlikely to create any new opportunities for the states but would, instead, likely create undue 
challenges. Michael Friis Jensen & Peter Gibbon, Africa and the WTO Doha Round: An 
Overview, Development Policy Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2007, 5-24. See also Kevin P. 
Gallagher, Understanding developing country resistance to the Doha Round, Review of 
International Political Economy, Volume 15, Number 1, (2007) 62-85. 
563 Martin Khor explains that, although there was a mutual understanding that trade 
facilitation would have positive effects, there was disagreement on what should be required 
of members to bring about the improvements; in particular whether binding multilateral rules 
were appropriate, or merely international cooperation, or possibly domestic initiatives. Martin 
Khor ‘Many developing countries against trade facilitation rules in WTO‘ Third World Network 
Info Service on WTO Issues 28 June 2003, https://www.twn.my/title/twninfo35.htm, 
accessed 10 July 2019. 
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strategies. This is a lesson that is of particular importance to countries, 
such as those in Africa, that are in the early stages of reform.564  
 
Regardless of the reservations, the TFA negotiations were scheduled to be 
launched at the Cancun Ministerial Conference that was to be held in Mexico 
in 2003. However, the negotiations were not launched as planned, due to a 
breakdown in talks between WTO members.565 The disagreement was not 
about trade facilitation per se. It was broadly related to all of the issues in the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA), which the developing countries felt were 
being ignored. For example, they had demanded that the developed countries 
should dismantle their export subsidies.566 They had also wanted the other 
Singapore issues to be taken off the negotiating table. They wanted the 
granting of non-agricultural market access (NAMA) by the reduction of 
tariffs.567 They were also pushing for an expansion of special and differential 
treatment (i.e., for it to stretch beyond merely the granting of longer transition 
periods before implementation but to include increased financial support to 
overcome implementation challenges). They expressed their sentiment that 
the WTO seemed to advance issues that were only in the interests of more 
developed members and side-lined those that were in their interests. 
 
With respect to trade facilitation in particular, they agreed that it was an 
important barrier to address but they felt that it would be inappropriate to 
 
564 Dani Rodrik ‘Trade policy reform as institutional reform’ Op cit note 76 at 10. Several 
letters were sent to delegates in Geneva by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) advising 
against developing country participation in the TFA. For example, on  6 June, 2013 the 
OWISFS Group (endorsed by 188 regional, international, and national NGOs from developed 
and Developing nations) criticised the policy implications of trade facilitation for development 
and alleged that there is no empirical evidence of benefits for developing countries. 
http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/en/article/international-civil-society-opposes-
binding-rules-trade-facilitation-wto/ Another letter was sent on 18 July by a coalition of 150 
civil society groups and trade unions that called on members to condition the entry into force 
of the TFA on the conclusion of the Doha Development Round negotiations.  
565 The conference was suspended on day 5 (14 September 2003). The WTO reports that 
‘Chairperson Luis Ernesto Derbez concluded that, despite considerable movement in 
consultations, members remained entrenched, particularly on the ‘Singapore Issues’, 
available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm, 
accessed on 10 July, 2019. 
566 Expressed, for example, in the Cairo Declaration. Ibid note 558. 
567 Expressed, for example, in the Livingstone Declaration. This was concluded during the 
4th LDC Trade Ministers' Meeting in Livingstone, Zambia, on 26 June 2005. 
 
 171 
attempt to create uniform rules for all WTO members, in light of their differing 
levels of development and, thus, differing capacities. They felt that 
international efforts in that regard could be better managed by other 
organisations such as the World Customs Organization or the United Nations 
Centre for Trade Facilitation and Economic Business.568 On the other hand, 
developed countries were not ready to give up their subsidies and they felt 
that the demands of the developing countries were too intrusive on their policy 
autonomy. They were also against more advanced developing countries (such 
as China, India and Brazil) claiming the benefits of ‘developing’ status in the  
WTO.  
 
These conflicts led to the breakdown of talks in Cancun. The tensions 
continued until the impasse was finally ended in 2004 when the General 
Council agreed on what was termed ‘the July Package.’ This was a set of 
decisions that aimed to bring the derailed trade facilitation talks back on track 
and to a conclusion. 569 In order to bring the developing countries on board 
six assurances were given. First, the negotiations were to have a limited scope. 
Paragraph 1 of Annex D to the July 2004 Decision stipulated that  
 
[T]the negotiations shall aim to clarify and improve (own emphasis) 
relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994 with a view to 
further expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, 
including goods in transit. 
 
This phrasing seemed to exclude the addition of any new commitments. 
Secondly, the negotiations were to be held ‘without prejudice’. This suggests 
that members would not be bound by the result at the end of negotiations, 
should they choose not to be.570 Thirdly, it was agreed that implementation 
 
568 Rege Op cit note 146 at 154. 
569 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004. 
WT/L/579, 2 August 2004. Annex A is the Framework for Establishing Modalities in 
Agriculture, Annex B is the Framework for Establishing Modalities in Market Access for Non-
Agricultural Products, Annex C is the Recommendations of the Special Session of the Council 
for Trade in Services and Annex D is the Modalities for Negotiations on Trade Facilitation. 
570 Footnote 4 in the annex indicated that the negotiations were to be held ‘without prejudice 
to the possible format of the final result of the negotiations and would allow consideration of 
various forms of outcomes’ (own emphasis). This left open the possibility of a non-binding 
outcome. 
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challenges would be addressed by the more developed members availing 
technical assistance.571 The developing members were also assuaged by the 
promise that the principle of special and differential treatment (S&DT) would 
be expanded beyond how it had previously been applied. Paragraph 2 of 
Annex D provided that 
 
this principle should extend beyond the granting of traditional transition 
periods for implementing commitments. In particular, the extent and the 
timing of entering into commitments shall be related to the 
implementation capacities of developing and least developed Members.  
 
Furthermore, developing countries were promised certain concessions that 
they had long demanded. For example, the developed countries agreed to 
eliminate their agricultural export subsidies by 2013. The other Singapore 
issues were to be taken off the work programme and future negotiations in 
the WTO were to prioritise non-agricultural market access and services. 
Further, they were encouraged by article 47 of the Doha Declaration that 
connoted that the TFA would be taken as part of a larger single undertaking. 
 
With the exception of the improvements and clarifications of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, the conduct, conclusion and entry into force of 
the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single 
undertaking.  
 
Therefore, the developing members believed that the TFA would not be 
enforceable until the other DDA issues also became enforceable. Because they 
already believed, in principle, that trade facilitation was important, and that 
it could potentially have a positive impact on their economies, these further 
assurances secured their conviction that they should participate in the 
negotiations. 
 
A Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation (NGTF) was established on 12 
October 2004 by the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC). Members were 
 
571 Paragraph 27 of the Doha Declaration provided that ‘adequate technical assistance and 
support for capacity building’ would be sought for them. According to para 1 of Annex D to 
the July 2004 Decision of the WTO General Council ‘negotiations shall also aim at enhancing 
technical assistance and support for capacity building’. 
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invited to submit proposals to the NGTF. The SADC countries are members 
of various WTO groups that made submissions to this body.572 These are 
primarily the African Group,573 the group of Least Developed Countries,574 the 
Core Group of Developing Countries575 and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) Countries.576 The submission of proposals continued until the Draft 
Consolidated Negotiating Text was finally concluded on 14 December 2009.577  
The negotiations were concluded at the Bali Ministerial Conference in 
December 2013.578 Two thirds of the WTO membership579 deposited valid 
acceptance instruments, allowing the treaty to enter into force on 22 February 
2017. This made the TFA the first significant addition to the WTO agreement 
since its creation in 1995.  
 
 
572 World Trade Organization Groups in the Negotiations (2017) , available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp001, accessed 
on 10 July 2019. 
573 This has 43 WTO members. The SADC members are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm. Accessed January 
13 2019. Notable examples of their submissions include TN/TF/W/33 of 28 April 2005, 
TN/TF/W/56 of 22 July 2005 and TN/TF/W/95 of 9 May 2006. 
574 This has 36 WTO members. The SADC members are:  Angola, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm. Accessed January 
13 2019. 
575 Notable examples of their submissions are TN/TF/W/161 of 29 October 2009 and 
TN/TF/W/173 of 22 September 2011. 
576 This group has 62 WTO members. The SADC members are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm. Accessed January 
13 2019. Notable examples of their submissions are: TN/TF/W/73 of 10 November 2005, 
TN/TF/W/161 of 29 October 2009 and TN/TF/W/173 of 22 September 2011. 
577 First Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text (TN/TF/W/165). 
578 Ministerial Conference, Ninth Session, Bali, 3-6 December 2013. Adopted 7 December 
2013. WT/MIN (13)/DEC. It was at this conference that the initial negotiation agenda of the 
DDA was narrowed down after the constant collapse of negotiations. This was narrowed down 
to the so-called Bali Package which consisted of trade facilitation, agriculture (for example 
public stockholding for food security and the administration of tariff rate quotas), cotton, and 
LDC issues. Therefore, trade facilitation remained as one of few issues that were seen as being 
viable and likely to secure agreement among the members. WTO Bali Package and November 
2014 Decisions (2014), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/balipackage_e.htm, accessed on   
10 July, 2019. The other issues have not been totally abandoned, there is still hope that they 
will be returned to at a later, more feasible, stage. 
579 That is 110 members. 
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The next sections discuss the extent to which the agreement supports 
compliance with, and the implementation of, its rules. Compliance and 
implementation have been identified as being crucial to treaty effectiveness. 
The enmeshment theory is used to examine whether the quality of norms and 
the institutional arrangements favour compliance. The managerial approach 
is used to analyse whether capacity challenges, which could potentially hinder 
compliance, are adequately addressed in the treaty. Finally, we discuss what 
means have been provided in support of domestic implementation. The 
conclusion is that, overall, the agreement caters for compliance and 
implementation challenges and is likely to be impactful in the gradual 
resolution of impediments to trade facilitation in the Southern African 
Development Community. 
 
7.3. Assessment of the Trade Facilitation Agreement’s Compliance 
Mechanisms 
This section concentrates on how compliance may be better assured by the 
TFA as compared to the previous regional and multilateral agreements that 
were studied in chapter 4. It argues that the quality of the norms, the quality 
of the institutions and the provisions that address technical assistance and 
capacity building may assist to support compliance by developing nations, 
such as the SADC states. Insights from the theories on compliance will inform 
the analysis. 
 
The Quality of the Norms 
In order for an agreement to be successful in fulfilling its mandate, the 
enmeshment theory proposes that the quality of its norms is important. The 
norms should be precise and obligatory, rather than being ambiguous and 
broad. The Trade Facilitation Agreement is divided into three sections. Section 
I consists of twelve articles. These contain the substantive obligations.580 It 
contains disciplines on the following trade facilitating measures: 
 
580 Section II addresses support for developing countries in articles 13 to 22. This is in the 
form of special and differential treatment (S&DT) and technical assistance. Section III outlines 
the institutional arrangements. 
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Article 1 Publication and availability of information 
Article 2 Opportunity to comment, information before entry into force and 
consultation 
Article 3 Advance rulings 
Article 4 Procedures for appeal and review 
Article 5 Other measures to enhance impartiality, non-discrimination and 
transparency 
Article 6 Disciplines on fees and charges imposed on or in connection with 
import and export and penalties 
Article 7 Release and clearance of goods 
Article 8 Border agency cooperation 
Article 9 Movement of goods intended for import under customs control 
Article 10 Formalities connected with import, export and transit 
Article 11 Freedom of transit 
Article 12 Customs cooperation. 
 
There are some provisions which express compulsory commitments. This is 
achieved by use of the word ‘shall’. This appears, for example, in article 6   
disciplines on fees and charges. However, in many other instances, non-
binding language is used. The phrasing that is adopted to indicate such 
includes:  ‘whenever practicable’, ‘members are encouraged to’, ‘within 
available resources’, ‘shall, as appropriate’, ‘to the extent possible’, and ‘shall 
endeavour to’. These signify that the measures in question are not binding on 
members. While this may appear to compromise the obligatoriness of the 
norms, it reflects the desire to accommodate the varying capacities of member 
states. If all of the norms had been made strictly applicable, then developing 
countries might not have been able to participate in the regime. Therefore, the 
language makes sense, given the agenda of the agreement, which is to balance 
harmonisation with inclusivity. 
 
The substantive section of the TFA builds on the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) - viz, Articles V, VIII and X- by providing more detailed 
provisions on customs regulations. It aims to modernise customs regulations 
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because technologies have become more advanced since the GATT. It also 
seeks to harmonise customs rules and to strengthen the obligations of 
members. The TFA builds on the rules of the World Customs Organization 
which are non-binding, as the WCO is not a negotiating body but more of a 
technical institution that provides assistance and seeks to harmonise 
customs rules. The TFA thus adds value to the WCO regime by creating 
concrete obligations on its disciplines. In terms of how it compares to the 
multilateral agreements of the World Trade Organization that pre-date it, it 
builds on them too. The previous agreements addressed trade facilitation 
reforms in a piecemeal manner across several agreements that looked at one 
aspect or another of facilitating trade. The TFA, on the other hand, is a single 
consolidated and comprehensive agreement.  
 
Normatively, the Trade Facilitation Agreement also compares favourably to 
the current regional instruments. Its measures are far more wide-ranging 
than those of the SACU agreement, which only has two articles on trade 
facilitation.581 It also compares favourably with the SADC Protocol on Trade 
in that it has many provisions that are not in the protocol at all.582 Even where 
there are some areas of overlap of coverage583 the TFA contains more extensive 
 
581 Article 23(2) on the simplification and harmonisation of trade documentation and 
procedures and customs cooperation. Also, art 24 on the freedom of transit. See s 3.2.2. 
above. 
582 These are: appeal and review, enquiry points, use of international standards, use of 
customs brokers, rejected goods, advance rulings, pre-arrival processing, pre-shipment 
inspections, enhanced controls (SPS inspections), fees, charges and penalties, electronic 
payments, separation of release from final determination of customs duties, taxes, fees and 
charges, adoption of risk management systems, post clearance audit, establishment and 
publication of average release times, authorised operators, perishable goods, expedited 
shipments, outward and inward processing, temporary admission of goods, border agency 
cooperation, consultation, and single window. 
583 For example, both instruments mandate members to review their trade requirements in 
order to ensure a reduction in the time and cost implications of trade documents and 
procedures. They also prescribe many different actions that are to be taken to achieve this 
(arts 3 and 5 of Annex III to the protocol and art 10 of the TFA). Further, freedom of transit 
is another area where both instruments contain quite detailed stipulations for facilitating 
transit trade (arts 2, 8 and 11 of Annex IV to the SADC Protocol on Trade and art 11 of the 
TFA). Customs Cooperation for efficiency and for security in trade is covered by arts 7 and 9 
of Annex II to the protocol and arts 8 and 12 of the TFA. 
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disciplines (i.e., deeper commitments).584 However, there are some respects 
where the SADC trade protocol has advantages over the TFA. For example, 
the protocol provides more specific measures on customs cooperation. 
Members are to consider developing common customs application systems,585 
to develop joint training programmes and staff exchanges, to share facilities 
and resources586 and to consult each other on the establishment of common 
border posts.587 The TFA does not have such specificity of obligations on 
customs cooperation. However, it is understandable that the trade protocol 
has been able to achieve this, and that the TFA has not. Calls for this level of 
uniformity in a multilateral agreement would be harder to secure. 
 
Comparing the TFA provisions to those of the African Continental Free Trade 
Agreement (AfCFTA), a different picture emerges. The AfCFTA negotiations 
were launched in 2015.588 By this time the TFA negotiations had already been 
concluded. Because the African states had been party to the TFA negotiations, 
they incorporated many of its provisions into their regional instrument. This 
has largely been the case throughout the history of international trade treaty 
making - regional agreements that are concluded after or during the time of 
multilateral negotiations tend to resemble the provisions of the latter. There 
are a few commitments that are in the AfCFTA589 that are not in the TFA, and 
others which are in the TFA and not the AfCFTA.590 However, by and large, 
most of the provisions in the two instruments are comparable. Since the 
AfCFTA is similar to the TFA, the implementation of the AfCFTA will ipso facto 
be the implementation of the TFA. 
 
584 For example, with respect to publication. Article 3.1.b of Annex II to the SADC Protocol on 
Trade requires the publication of trade statistics in conformity with the Harmonised System 
(HS) codes. However, art 1 of the TFA requires the publication of a much wider range of 
information. For example, trade procedures, required forms and documents, applied rates of 
duties, taxes, fees, charges and penalties, rules, laws, regulations, and administrative 
rulings, import, export or transit restrictions or prohibitions, etc. 
585 Art 6.5 of Annex II. 
586 Art 8 and 10 of Annex II. 
587 Art 7 of Annex II. 
588 See s 3.2.4. above. 
589 These are: the duty of harmonisation (art 3 of Annex 3), computerisation (art 6 of Annex 
3 and art17 of Annex 4).  
590 These are: notifications for enhanced controls or inspections (art 5.1), temporary 
admission and inward and outward processing (art 9) and rejected goods (art 10.8). 
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The Quality of the Institutional Arrangements 
The enmeshment theory argues that the installation of a sound institutional 
framework is of vital importance for securing compliance with any agreement. 
One of the primary reasons why the developed countries wanted the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement to be created under the World Trade Organization, 
even though the issue was already regulated under the World Customs 
Organization, was because of the credibility of the WTO as organisation and 
its strong dispute resolution system – through the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). Characteristics such as: the employment of reverse 
consensus to prevent the blocking of processes, the authorisation of 
compensation and the suspension of concessions, and the ability to monitor 
compliance with recommendations and to exercise oversight over the methods 
of compliance have made the WTO’s dispute resolution processes one of the 
most effective in international law. Vazquez and Jackson adjudged it ‘far 
better developed and more intrusive than other dispute settlement regimes 
that exist internationally’.591   
 
However, this initial advantage of the WTO has since been compromised by 
the crisis facing the Appellate Body. The United States of America has blocked 
the appointment of new members of the Appellate Body as old members’ terms 
expire. It argued judicial overreach by the body.592 Therefore, as of 10 
December 2019, when the terms of two Appellate Body members expired, 
(leaving only one member remaining) the appellate procedure has been 
suspended, because at least three members are required to hear a case.593   
 
591 Carlos M Vazquez &  John H Jackson, Some reflections on compliance with WTO Dispute 
Settlement decisions (2001) 33 (4) Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus- at 561–562. 
592 Chad P Brown ‘The 2018 Trade War and the end of dispute settlement as we knew it’ in 
Meredith A Crowley (ed) Trade War: The Clash of Economic Systems Endangering Global 
Prosperity (2019) at 15. 
593 Joost Pauwelyn ‘WTO Dispute Settlement post 2019: What to expect? (2019) 22 (3) Journal 
of International Economic Law. Cosette D Creamer ‘From the WTO’s crown jewel to its crown 
of thorns; (2019) 113  American Journal of International Law. In a speech on 28 May 2019, 
Ambassador Ujal Bhatia of India (who had been one of the three remaining members of the 
Appellate Body) remarked that it was ‘the transformation of the AB from ‘crown jewel’ to a 
problem child’. Launch of the WTO Appellate Body’s Annual Report for 2018, Address by 
Ambassador Ujal Singh Bhatia, 2018, Chair of the Appellate Body, May 28, 2019, available 
at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_report_launch_e.htm, accessed on 1 
March 2020.  
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These threats to the WTO dispute resolution system are important to consider 
because they jeopardise compliance. Therefore, they cannot be ignored. 
However, besides these broader issues that are facing the organisation as a 
whole, with respect to the Trade Facilitation Agreement in particular, it 
provides for good quality institutions that are empowered to take decisions, 
to scrutinise the implementation of the agreement and to take remedial 
actions, when necessary. These elements can support member compliance. 
The arrangements are contained in section III of the agreement. Article 23 
establishes the Committee on Trade Facilitation. This body is responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of the agreement. Members have several 
binding obligations to submit notifications to this body.594 
 
The TFA institutional provisions are an improvement on those that had 
existed in the agreements that pre-dated it. As far as the regional agreements 
are concerned, the SACU Agreement did not have strong institutional support 
for trade facilitation. The institutions that it creates are responsible for a 
diverse range of general issues; there is no particular organ that is devoted to 
exclusively focus on trade facilitation. The SADC Protocol on Trade creates a 
Committee of Ministers Responsible for Trade Matters (CMT)595 and two sub-
committees – one on customs cooperation and another on trade facilitation.596 
This is an improvement on the SACU regime because trade facilitation 
activities are not left to the general executive structures of the organisation; 
there are micro-structures that are explicitly created to specifically focus on 
the trade facilitation project. However, the lack of political and economic 
power have constrained the effectiveness of these institutions. The African 
Continental Free Trade Agreement has specialised sub-committees on trade 
facilitation, customs cooperation and transit.597 However, the African Union, 
 
594 For example, under art 1 (publication), art 10 (single window and customs brokers, 
category A, B and C implementation dates and shifting between categories (arts 16-19). 
Further, donors must notify the Committee on Trade Facilitation on their arrangements for 
technical assistance. 
595 The CMT is created in art 12 of Annex II, art 7 of Annex III, and art 12 of Annex IV to the 
Trade Protocol. 
596 The sub-committees are created in art 11 of Annex II and art 6 of Annex III respectively. 
597 Art 13 of annex 3, art 27 of annex 4 and art 12 of annex 8. 
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like the SADC, faces financial challenges to the effectiveness of its 
institutions. 
 
In terms of the World Customs Organization and the previous World Trade 
Organization institutional frameworks, the WCO is weak because its organs 
cannot compel members to act. The previous WTO agreements also had 
different institutional weaknesses. For example, some agreements did not 
create specific institutions that would be responsible for the monitoring and 
enforcement of the agreement; rather they relied on the general organisational 
structures to administer the agreement.598 This is not as efficient because 
general institutions are responsible for a multitude of functions. Others fared 
better by creating one institution for policy-making and enforcement,599 or 
creating a dual structure with a policy-making body and an implementing 
body.600 The TFA remains an improved model on these arrangements. 
 
Addressing Capacity Constraints to Enhance Prospects for Compliance 
The managerial approach to compliance argues that non-compliance is 
involuntary and that members fail to comply with treaties when they are not 
capacitated to do so (i.e. provided with scientific, technical, bureaucratic, 
financial, etc. capacity) and given reasonable timelines within which to 
comply. Section II of the TFA attempts to address these compliance issues by 
addressing special and differential treatment. 
 
 
598 For example, the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspections does not create its own 
independent organs. Instead it refers members to submit their notifications to the general 
WTO Secretariat. Article 6 of the same agreement provides that ‘the ministerial conference 
shall review the provisions, implementation and operation of this Agreement, taking into 
account the objectives thereof and experience gained in its operation. As a result of such 
review, the Ministerial Conference may amend the provisions of the Agreement.’ Therefore, it 
relies on the general structures of the organisation, rather than creating specific institutions 
to advance the peculiar interests of the agreement. 
599 Such as art 12 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures which creates 
a Committee for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, a forum for consultation and  that 
monitors implementation and receives notifications from members. Article 13 of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is similar. Arts 4 and 7 of the Import Licensing 
Agreement also create a committee as a forum for consultation and accords review powers. 
600 For example, arts 4 and 6 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin and art 18 of the Customs 
Valuation Agreement. 
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The WTO has generally favoured the adoption of harmonised rules, with very 
little scope for opting out of commitments, regardless of implementation 
difficulties.601 This was despite the compliance challenges that were 
experienced by the lesser-developed members.602 African WTO members have 
worked hard to try to change this dynamic. As far as the TFA is concerned, 
the African Union Ministers of Trade adopted a declaration that 
 
obligations and measures being negotiated under the Trade Facilitation 
consolidated text must include binding, effective and operational rules on 
Special and Differential Treatment. The obligation on developing countries 
and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to implement the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement should be based upon their acquisition of capacity to 
implement, including through fulfilling, by developed countries, the 
obligation of delivering binding, new and long-term technical and financial 
assistance and capacity building necessary for African countries to 
achieve full implementation capacity.603 
 
Section II of the TFA represents an attempt to take cognisance of the special 
position of developing members, such as the SADC countries. The section 
showcases the novel architecture of the TFA’s provisions on special and 
differential treatment for developing and least developed WTO members. This 
is to assist them to be able to comply with the commitments that are 
contained in Section I of the agreement. 
 
Special and Differential Treatment 
The concept of special and differential treatment means that the lesser-
developed members are excused from having to grant full reciprocity in the 
implementation of an agreement.  They are either exempted from some of the 
rules or they are given longer transition periods for implementing obligations. 
 
601 Robert Wolfe ‘The WTO single undertaking as negotiating technique and constitutive 
metaphor’ (2009) 12 (4)  Journal of International Economic Law; Michael Trebilcock, Between 
Theories Of Trade And Development: The Future Of The World Trading System, (2016);  Diana 
Tussie & Miguel F. Lengyel ‘Developing countries: Turning participation into influence’ Op cit 
note 76. 
602 Finger &  Schuler ‘Implementation of WTO commitments: The development challenge‘ Op 
cit note 76. 
603 Conference of the African Union Ministers of Trade 24 - 25 October 2013, Addis-Ababa 
(Ethiopia), Addis Ababa Declaration On WTO Issues, available at  AU/TI/TD/Camot-
8/WTO/DECL.FINA, accessed on 17 February 2019. They also pushed for these approaches 
in their submissions to the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation 
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Special and differential treatment is an essential component of the 
multilateral trading system.604 The original imagination of the concept 
primarily focused on giving lesser developed members longer timeframes to 
implement obligations as well as assistance to mitigate capacity challenges. 
This can be seen in agreements such as those on customs valuation and 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures.605 However, there has been some 
controversy regarding the principle. Some believe that it is not helpful because 
it prevents developing countries and LDCs from dealing with their unhelpful 
trade policies by granting them flexibility and exemption from applying 
necessary reforms.606 Delaying implementation is argued to be tantamount to 
delaying the taking of much needed corrective actions. Finger and Schuler 
argue that  
 
[W]e should be careful not to be lulled into the mercantilist ethic of 
reciprocal negotiations in which delay is itself victory. Nor should we 
ignore the potential benefits of pursuing multilateral reform. Where reform 
is needed, to delay improvements is to prolong the time that people in 
developing countries remain poor. Time will, of course, be needed for 
implementation, but implementation periods should be based on the 
engineering requirements for accomplishing the required infrastructure 
improvements and making the investments associated with 
complementary, supporting institutional strengthening, not handed out 
as a second prize in a tough negotiation.607 
 
However, this is not to completely discount the importance of S&DT. The 
principle is necessary to ensure ‘that there is proportionality in the 
commitments undertaken between developed and developing countries, 
reflecting their different levels of development and gains from the trading 
system’.608 It is important that the characteristics of developing countries, and 
 
604 Faizel Ismail Mainstreaming Development in the WTO Developing Countries in the Doha 
Round, 2007, Chapter 6, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/04888.pdf, 
accessed on  23 August, 2019. See also J. Michael Finger & John S Wilson  Implementing a 
WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation: What Makes Sense?, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3971, WPS 3971, August 2006, p.9. 
605 Michael Finger & Philip Schuler ‘Implementation of WTO commitments: The development 
challenge’ Op cit note 76 at 500. 
606 T Ademola Oyejide Special and differential treatment’ in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya 
Mattoo  & Philip English (eds) Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook, (2002). He 
traces the application of S&DT from UNCTAD II (1968), to the GATT and  through the Tokyo 
Round Enabling Clause. 
607 Finger & Schuler Op cit note 605 at 501.  
608 Ismail Op cit note 604 at 84.  
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their capabilities (economic, technical or otherwise) be considered in 
expecting their compliance. 
 
Of the regional agreements, only the African Continental Free Trade 
Agreement recognises the principle of S&DT. Article 30 of its Protocol on Trade 
in Goods provides for special and differential treatment to be given whereby 
flexibilities are extended to certain states in view of their weak capacity to 
implement obligations. The flexibilities are in the form of ‘special 
consideration and additional transition periods’ for implementation, on a case 
by case basis. Those states that want to comply with measures, but would 
struggle to do so if there was pressure to do so immediately, are given some 
breathing space to get capacitated before attempting to comply. Furthermore, 
article 29.2 of annex 4 and article 13.2 of annex 8 to the Protocol on Trade in 
Goods both provide that the extent and the timing of implementation of their 
provisions shall be tied to the capacities of states, as notified to the Sub-
Committee for Trade Facilitation, Customs Cooperation and Transit or under 
the TFA. Despite the other regional arrangements (SADC and SACU) also 
having members that are at differing levels of economic development, they do 
not provide for any special considerations of this fact. This means that those 
countries that have lower levels of capacity are still required to undertake the 
same level of commitments as those countries that have more capacity. This 
may contribute to compliance problems under those arrangements. 
 
Likewise, special and differential treatment does not feature in the agreements 
of the World Customs Organization, save for in the Convention on the 
Harmonised Description and Coding System.609 Its article 4 grants developing 
countries S&DT in that they can delay the implementation of some of its 
provisions. This is a limited construction of S&DT (i.e., limited to only 
extending implementation time, without linking implementation to 
capacitation). The WTO Agreements on Import Licensing Procedures and on 
 
609 Also called the HS Convention of 14 June 1983, as amended by the Protocol of Amendment 
to the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System of 24 June 1986. 
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Rules of Origin are both silent on special and differential treatment. The other 
WTO agreements recognised the principle, but they considered it in narrow 
terms (i.e., as merely the delaying of implementation).610 In contrast, the TFA 
goes further in its conceptualisation of S&DT. Not only are members granted 
longer transition periods for implementing obligations, but they are also 
allowed to implement based on their self-determined capacity to do so. This 
is done by self-designating categories of commitments. This is made possible 
by article 14 of the agreement, which differentiates between three categories 
of commitments. 
 
§ Category A commitments611 are those obligations which members 
pledge to implement immediately upon the entry into force of the 
agreement612  
§ Category B commitments613 are those measures which members will 
only implement after a notified transitional period following the entry 
into force of the agreement614  
§ Category C commitments615 relates to measures which a member 
notifies that they can only implement after a transitional period, 
provided that they are given technical assistance (TA).616  
 
This reflects the theory of embedded liberalism.617 It argues that the 
international trade system is not unbending, but rather that it recognises 
scope for flexibilities, when needed. This is achieved in that the TFA offers 
policy space for countries to self-designate capacity to implement. There is no 
 
610 For example, art 10 (3) and art 14 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
measures, art 12 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and art 20 of the 
Agreement on Customs Valuation. 
611 Art 15 of the TFA. 
612 However, Least Developed Countries are given an allowance to implement Category A 
commitments up to a year after entry into force (art 15.2). 
613 Art 16.1 of the TFA. 
614 Developing countries were given one year after the entry into force of the agreement to 
definitively notify implementation dates. LDCs were given up to two years. The time could be 
extended upon application (Art 16.2 (a) and (b)). 
615 Art 16.2 of the TFA. 
616 Least Developed Countries had one year after the entry into force of the agreement to 
notify category C commitments. It is possible for a member to shift provisions between 
category B and category C by notifying the Committee. 
617 Section 2.4.3. above. 
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expectation that all members will assume all obligations all at once. Policy 
autonomy is safeguarded. This is because substantial resources will be 
needed to comply with the agreement, (for example, to develop and amend 
policies and laws, to train officials, to install systems, etc.) These will take 
time and the TFA provides scope for this time. This heightens the probability 
that nations will be able to comply with the provisions that they commit to, 
because they will be those commitments of their choosing. 
 
Special and differential treatment in the Trade Facilitation Agreement also 
involves the granting of flexibilities regarding the prescribed deadlines. Any 
member who experiences problems meeting the deadlines may notify the 
Committee on Trade Facilitation and the deadline may be extended or other 
assistance granted.618 Article 17 recognises that, even though a member may 
have designated certain timeframes, it may not be able to ultimately meet 
them when the time comes. It provides for an early warning mechanism. The 
Committee can be notified of the challenge and a member may be granted 
additional time to implement. This can be up to 18 months for a developing 
country and up to three years for a Least Developed Country. These 
extensions can be repeated if the member still fails to meet the deadline. There 
are mechanisms in place to prevent the abuse of the flexibilities.619 These are 
useful flexibilities for lesser-developed countries and may contribute towards 
alleviating compliance pressures. However, the reasons for the failure to 
implement may be such that being granted additional time is not enough. 
Sometimes the state will need special support in order to implement. This will 
be in the form of technical assistance and capacity-building, which are also 
catered for in the agreement.  
 
7.4. Assessment of the Trade Facilitation Agreement’s Implementation 
Mechanisms 
It is recommended that, in order to improve the prospects of implementation, 
it is essential to examine a state’s capacity to implement, to identify any gaps 
 
618 Art 16.3. 
619 Art 18. 
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in capacity, and to build up capacity through technical assistance.620 The 
concept of technical assistance refers to members being supported to 
implement their treaty obligations. The assistance can be of a technical, 
financial, advisory or other nature. This includes assistance with policy 
formulation or towards the improvement of human, institutional, and 
infrastructural capacities.621 The 4th Ordinary Session of the African Union - 
African Economic Community (AU-AEC) Ministers of Trade was convened in 
Abuja, Nigeria from 22 to 23 September 2001. It was a high-level 
brainstorming meeting in preparation for the Doha Ministerial Conference. 
Members thereat agreed that, in order for them to be able to implement trade 
facilitation measures, they would require ‘technical and financial assistance 
to narrow the technology and human resources gaps that exist between 
developed and developing countries’.622  
 
LDC ministers reiterated this same sentiment in their meeting leading up to 
the Cancun ministerial conference.623 The countries were, therefore, using 
their external meetings to build consensus on what their common approach 
would be in the WTO negotiations. They consistently insisted that the TFA 
should take cognisance of their resource and capacity constraints. They 
rationalised that, because they have many developmental challenges, they 
cannot devote significant resources to trade facilitation reforms (as the more 
developed members could) and that they would need assistance with closing 






620 Lee Op cit note 74 At 469. 
621 David F Luke ‘Trade-related capacity building for enhanced African participation in the 
global economy’ in Bernard Hoekman, Philip English & Aaditya Mattoo (ed) Trade, 
Development and the WTO: A Handbook   at 509–510. 
622 The document is titled Africa’s Negotiating Objectives for the Fourth Ministerial Conference 
of the WTO. 
623 Dhaka Declaration, Second LDC Trade Ministers' Meeting, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 31 May to  
2 June 2003. 
 187 
Technical Assistance and Capacity- Building in the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement 
There are many costs that are associated with implementing the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement.624 First, legislation may have to be promulgated or 
amended in order for it to be in line with the provisions of the agreement. 
Secondly, there are costs involved in sensitising stakeholders about potential 
changes to policy and practice. Thirdly, there are institutional costs in that 
members may have to create new institutions, such as enquiry points. 
Investments will also be required to boost human resources, for example, 
training costs may be incurred to capacitate officials who will have to apply 
new processes to expedite the movement of goods. The requirement to ensure 
coordination among all entities involved in cross-border trading may also 
result in costs related to implementing the channels for such coordination. 
Lastly, there is are costs involved in upgrading equipment and infrastructure 
(for example, ICT systems).  
 
Developing countries demanded that there be ‘a linkage between the 
implementation of each provision under the Trade Facilitation agreement and 
the delivery of technical assistance’.625 The United Nations has estimated the 
implementation cost of trade facilitation measures to be in the range of $1-15 
million for each country (excluding the cost of hard infrastructure). The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development estimated the cost 
at likely being on average about €11.6 million over a three to five year 
period.626 It is difficult to estimate the costs because they depend on various 
factors, such as the systems, equipment, etc. that a country will elect to 
install. 
 
624 Archana Jatkar & Chenai Mukumba Unpacking the Bali Package: A Snapshot of the Bali 
Ministerial Decisions of the WTO Members (2014) at 5. 
625 Jatkar & Mukumba ibid at 3–4.  
626 Christian K M  Kingombe Multi-year Expert Meeting on Transport, Trade Logistics and Trade 
Facilitation Second Session:  Trade Facilitation Rules as a Trade Enabler: Options and 
Requirements Geneva, 1–3 July 2014: Hard and Soft Infrastructure Development in Africa, 
Implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in Africa, the Role of the AfDB (2014)   at 
23, available at https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Multi-year-Expert-Meeting-on-
Transport-%2C-Trade-and-Kingombe/10d9d3e647be5e0b1542ea989bc5fa78d46b3769, 
accessed on 11 July 2019. 
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These cost implications have led some scholars to conclude that developing 
countries do not need the Trade Facilitation Agreement and that it will 
actually do them more harm than good should they set out to implement it. 
They say that developing countries cannot afford the costs of trade facilitation 
in the long term. This is also because some of the costs are not once-off; they 
will require recurring expenditure. For example, a United Nations study 
estimated that the installation of a single window can cost anywhere between 
€8 - 40 million, depending on the size of the country and the complexity of 
the system. Apart from this implementation cost, the running costs can range 
from €160,000 - 6.5 million per annum.627 This is the reason for some of the 
criticisms that have been levelled against developing country participation in 
the TFA. However, conversely, there are other writers who argue that the costs 
are moderate in comparison to the potential gains from improved trade 
efficiency.628 They even suggest that some of the initial costs could be 
transferred to traders through charges for the improved services that they will 
be receiving at borders. However, traders in the developing world are already 
struggling with low profit margins in their businesses, so this may not be a 
feasible solution.  
  
It is argued that cost implications cannot be downplayed when the countries 
that are involved are poor countries, such as the SADC states. This is more 
so when we also consider that there are costs that are incurred even before 
implementation begins.  For example, studies will have to be undertaken in 
order to determine where the impediments lie. Expert knowledge will be 
needed to identify present capacity and to determine the assistance that 
should be requested. Poorer countries may lack this expertise internally or 
the finances to pay for the engagement of external expertise. They would, 
therefore, need assistance even in this regard. Therefore, Jatkar and 
Mukumba argue that the developing countries were correct to insist that their 
implementation be dependent on their capacity, and that developed countries 
 
627 UNECA  Op cit  note 329 at 43. 
628 See, for example, Yann Duval Cost and Benefits of Implementing Trade Facilitation 
Measures under Negotiations at the WTO: An Exploratory Survey, Asia-Pacific Research and 
Training Network on Trade (2006). 
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be compelled to give such assistance, especially since they were the 
demandeurs of the trade facilitation project in the WTO.629  
 
The TFA is advantageous over the regional agreements because it has 
provisions on technical assistance while the regional agreements lack any 
mechanisms for such. The SACU agreement and the SADC Trade Protocol are 
completely silent on the issue of technical assistance.630 The Protocol on Trade 
in Goods to the AfCFTA does contain provisions regarding technical 
assistance, capacity building and cooperation.631 It gives the Secretariat632 the 
role of coordinating these issues and of investigating the means to secure the 
resources that will be required for reforms. The problem, however, is that 
there are no concrete explanations of where the resources will be sourced, nor 
how they will be requested, nor how they will be implemented and monitored, 
etc. There is reference to ‘engagement with partners,’ but no mention of which 
partners these are, nor the channels or modalities for this engagement. There 
is just the awareness that resources will be needed, and that there is need for 
engagement and coordination. However, the provisions are too shallow to be 
helpful in practically assuring that any concrete assistance is ultimately 
secured. This compromises the effectiveness of the technical assistance 
provisions and will probably not assist the members to secure the funding 
that they will require to assist them to implement the regime. 
 
With respect to the international agreements, the instruments of the World 
Customs Organization do not have binding commitments on the provision of 
technical assistance. For example, the agreement on the Harmonised 
Commodity Description and Coding System provides that developing and 
developed members should engage with each other and agree on the terms of 
assistance. There is no mechanism that is outright provided for this 
engagement, nor any guarantee that a state will get the assistance sought. 
 
629 Op cit note 624. 
630 Save for that the latter agreement provides for undertaking joint training programmes to 
assist each other with capacity constraints. 
631 Art 28 of the Protocol on Trade in Goods to the AfCFTA. 
632 The AfCFTA Secretariat, as defined in art 1 of the main agreement, and established in art 
14. 
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Neither is there any monitoring of the fruits of these engagements. Likewise, 
past WTO agreements were also weak in that they either did not provide scope 
for technical assistance at all (for example the Agreements on Rules of Origin 
and Import Licensing Procedures) or they limited technical assistance (for 
example to the giving of advice633 ), or they framed the provisions on technical 
assistance in a non-binding manner (for example in the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures).634 
 
The Trade Facilitation Agreement represents only a slight improvement on the 
current regional and multilateral arrangements. Technical assistance is to be 
given by the more developed member states, either bilaterally or through 
multilateral organisations.635 However, the ‘commitment’ to render this 
support is worded very weakly. The agreement provides that the developed 
countries pledge to ‘facilitate (own emphasis) the provision of assistance and 
support for capacity building,’ not that they pledge to provide assistance and 
support. This evidences that there is no concrete obligation to render 
assistance. This has led some scholars to question the utility of the technical 
assistance provisions.636 The agreement requires that the transfer of 
assistance be mutually agreed upon between the parties. This is meant to 
avoid a situation where developing countries receive inappropriate assistance. 
However, it leaves the poorer countries at the mercy of the unequal power 
dynamics in such bilateral negotiations because the WTO is largely not 
involved in them, save for in a coordinating capacity to avoid duplications. 
 
633 For example, art 3 of the Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspections and art 11 of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. 
634 Art 9 of the agreement uses the phrasing ‘Members agree to facilitate the provision of 
technical assistance’ and members ‘shall consider providing’ technical assistance. Similarly, 
art 3(3) of the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection reads ‘Exporter Members shall offer to 
provide to user Members, if requested, technical assistance directed towards the achievement 
of the objectives of this Agreement on mutually agreed terms’. Such statements do not bind 
developed members to extend concrete assistance as a justiciable commitment. 
635 Art 21 of the TFA. See also Nora Neufeld The Long and Winding Road: How WTO Members 
Finally Reached A Trade Facilitation Agreement (2014). 
636 ‘WTO negotiations on trade facilitation: development perspectives South Centre Bulletin 
78, 4 March 2014, available at https://www.southcentre.int/question/wto-negotiations-on-
trade-facilitation-development-perspectives/, accessed18 May 2020. Also, in Communication 
TN/TF/W/191 of 26 April 2013 members complained that the provisions on technical 
assistance were not precise, effective, or operational, and that there were no mechanisms to 
ensure efficient, timely, and secure delivery of assistance. 
 191 
The lesser developed WTO members are expected to describe the assistance 
that they will require. For example, Least Developed Countries have two years 
after the entry into force of the agreement to notify the assistance that they 
are seeking. Precision in the formulation of a request is very important. The 
member has to know exactly what assistance is needed and to couch the 
request as clearly and as specifically as possible. This will assist donors to 
determine whether, and to what extent, they can assist. It has already been 
argued that lesser developed countries may experience challenges with 
making such determinations, without assistance to do so. This could result 
in the request of inappropriate assistance, which would undermine the 
effectiveness of the eventual support that is gained. For these reasons, at the 
behest of developing country members, the WTO launched a Trade Facilitation 
Agreement Facility (TFAF) on the 22 July 2014. Among other functions, it 
assists these members to identify their technical assistance needs and 
potential development partners (be they bilateral donors, or regional or 
international agencies) that can assist them with those needs.637 
 
Transparency and monitoring are critically important elements for ensuring 
aid effectiveness. WTO members have one year after the entry into force of the 
TFA to inform the Committee on Trade Facilitation of the arrangements that 
have been agreed upon between a donor and a recipient with respect to the 
furnishing of technical assistance. Going forward they are required to update 
the committee on progress in the delivery of the assistance.638 This is meant 
to monitor whether there has been any assistance that has actually been 
rendered, or merely empty promises. It is a way to determine whether the 
recipient is any closer to implementation of the agreement, having had its 
capacity needs met. This is a positive aspect of the TFA in support of 
implementation. The major limitation is that the committee cannot take any 
action if assistance has not been forthcoming. This is because there is no 
obligation for assistance to be given. This may, thus, compromise the 
 
637 World Trade Organization, About the Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility, 
https://www.tfafacility.org/about-the-facility, accessed 20 June, 2019. 
638 Arts 16, 21 and 22. 
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effectiveness of these efforts.639 However, a redeeming feature is that the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement Facility offers some limited assistance in the form of 
grants if a member is unable to secure any other source of funding.640 This is 
an important role, although limited in scope. 
 
Lastly, in support of implementation, the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
requires members to establish national trade facilitation committees.641 These 
are very important to implementation prospects because they provide a forum 
for domestic stakeholders to consult, collaborate and strategize on the 
national position with respect to TFA implementation (i.e. to ‘facilitate both 
domestic coordination and implementation of the provisions of [the] 
Agreement’).642 Chapter 5 and 6 discussed how the lack of domestic 
organisation and collaboration can scupper implementation efforts.643 
Therefore, this is an advantageous aspect of the TFA in that it attempts to 
address this challenge. 
 
7.5. Conclusions 
Chapter 1 asked: can the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation 
Agreement be leveraged by the countries in the Southern African Development 
Community to increase their implementation of trade facilitation measures in 
support of their development? In order for this to be able to happen, the treaty 
would have to provide measures in support of compliance and 
implementation. This chapter set out to determine whether the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement does so. This would entail determining whether it 
provides SADC countries with sufficient flexibility to comply with the 
 
639 It has been argued that it may be difficult for developing countries to implement the 
agreement in light of the lack of binding commitments on the nature of the support that they 
can expect from the developed countries. ‘WTO’s MC9: Summary of Issues, South Centre 
Informal Note SC/TDP/AN/MC9/1 November 2013, available at 
https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/AN_MC9_1_WTOs-MC9-
Summary-of-Issues_EN.pdf, accessed on May 18 2019 and D Ravi Kanth ‘What happened at 
the Bali WTO meet and why(2014) XLIX (2) Economic and Political Weekly  at 17. 
640 Ibid note 637. 
641 Art 23 of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
642 Art 23.2. 
643 Section 5.8 above. 
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agreement, with the capacity building and technical assistance to implement, 
and with strong institutions to monitor their implementation. 
 
The chapter analysed the content and structure of the agreement using 
insights from compliance theories – enmeshment, the managerial approach 
to compliance as well as embedded liberalism. This was with a view to 
determining its suitability for application by the SADC countries in their drive 
to reduce trade obstacles in their region. It found that, normatively, it is an 
improvement on the regional and multilateral agreements that came before it. 
This is because it has many provisions which target the trade facilitation 
challenges that were shown to be hindrances in the conduct of trade in 
SADC.644 It has more norms than many of the previous agreements and 
deeper provisions. Secondly, it provides for institutional support of 
compliance in the form of the Trade Facilitation Committee and National 
Trade Facilitation Committees. Lastly, in support of compliance, the unique 
structure of the agreement affords an opportunity to the SADC states to 
control the extent and timing of their assumption of commitments. This 
flexibility is argued to improve compliance prospects because it should ensure 
that the states do not assume commitments that are beyond their capacity. It 
will remain incumbent upon the SADC states to carefully consider the crafting 
of their category notifications so that they can benefit from this privilege. 
 
In terms of supporting implementation, Hoekman argues that the TFA 
‘addresses the concerns of developing nations regarding implementation costs 
and capacity constraints’.645  This, he says, is because it provides avenues for 
international organisations to collaborate in the extension of technical 
assistance to developing and least developed members.646 This chapter has 
argued that this is not an entirely accurate assessment. What is commendable 
about the agreement is that it recognises the importance of technical 
assistance and capacity building for lesser-developed states. Secondly, that 
 
644 Discussed in chapter 5, above. 
645 Bernard Hoekman The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement: Milestone, Mirage, or Mistake? 
(2014) at 1. 
646 Ibid at 11-12. 
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institutional arrangements have been established to coordinate and to review 
progress on the rendering of such assistance. However, two failings have also 
been discovered. First, that the provisions on technical assistance and 
capacity building are couched in non-binding terms, thus rendering the 
‘commitments’ unjusticiable, and therefore, of limited assistance to the 
African countries. Secondly, the developed members and developing members 
are expected to negotiate assistance bilaterally or under the auspices of 
international organisations. This takes the negotiations out of the WTO and 
renders them subject to the flaws of power politics in North-South aid 
negotiations. These two issues may undermine the resolution of 
implementation constraints. 
 
However, despite these shortcomings, this chapter concludes that the TFA is 
a useful agreement and that it is positive that the SADC states elected to 
participate in it. Although it is still too early to judge its impact on the 
ground,647 it nevertheless appears to be an improved regulatory framework 
over the regional and multilateral frameworks that predate it. The Trade 
Facilitation Agreement is just one of the many instruments that the SADC 
states now have in their arsenal. One report predicts that  ‘the TFA has the 
potential to be quite structurally transformative for African countries’.648 
Perhaps. It remains to be seen. However,  it will be for the states to figure out 
how to best exploit the agreement so that it can assist them to meet their 




647 Although the agreement entered into force three years ago the member states have not 
been fully implementing the commitments therein. This is because of the scheduling of 
commitments that was explained in section 7.3 above. Some commitments became 
implementable immediately after entry into force of the agreement (category A), others will 
only become implementable after a designated transitional period, and yet others will remain 
unimplementable as long as technical assistance is not forthcoming. It will take time for 
parties to make these notifications and to engage in negotiations for technical assistance. So 
far only 319 notifications have been made: 121 category A, 104 category B and 94 category 
C. This means that less than 38% of commitments are currently implementable. This makes 
it difficult to conclude on the impact of the agreement at this point in time. 
https://www.tfafacility.org/notifications accessed 1 November 2020. 
648 Dr. Christian Kingombe Op cit note 626. 
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Chapter 8 – Thesis Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
A problem statement was outlined in the introduction of this thesis. The 
puzzle that was identified for research was as follows: the governments in the 
Southern African Development Community have signed onto several 
agreements over the years with the intention of ameliorating the costs and 
delays that are associated with their cross-border trade. However, despite 
this, there has been little visible evidence of the quickening and cheapening 
of trade in the sub-region. Furthermore, there have been few improvements 
in their development indicators. Consequently, the thesis identified a number 
of research questions:  
 
1. How can trade facilitation support development? 
2. What compliance and implementation challenges have obstructed the 
efficacy of trade facilitation agreements in SADC?  
3. Can the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement assist 
the SADC countries to overcome their compliance and implementation 
challenges?  
 
The first section of this chapter discusses the thesis conclusions. These are 
the main theoretical and empirical insights that are gained from this study. 
The second section makes some recommendations for academic scholars and 
for policy makers. 
 
8.1. Thesis Conclusions 
Three main conclusions can be made in answer to the three research 
questions. First, facilitating trade can have positive effects on development. 
The concept of ‘development’ goes beyond merely the expansion of economic 
indicators (such as national income and income per capita, etc.). Development 
is a multifaceted phenomenon that includes social, political, cultural, 
environmental and other improvements. Chapters 2 and 3 asked whether 
trade facilitation initiatives can help SADC countries to achieve this 
multidimensional nature of development. The conclusion is that yes it can 
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support this goal; but not on its own. For example, open markets can give 
consumers access to diverse goods, traders access to inputs, technologies and 
markets for their exports, and governments increased revenues from greater 
trade flows. All of these can contribute to improved livelihoods and 
development indicators. However, there are also disadvantages to trade 
facilitation. There will be winners and losers. For example, non-competitive 
domestic industries may be harmed if trade facilitation leads to an influx of 
more competitive imports.649 Despite the potential drawbacks, it is argued 
that it is more beneficial for a country to promote trade with others, rather 
than to pursue autarkic policies which will leave it excluded from accessing 
trade privileges, and also subject to trade barriers and retaliation from other 
nations.  
 
Mercantilism and classical economics were studied and found to be unhelpful 
in explaining the link between trade and development. Instead, heterodox 
economics was found to be more useful because it explains that under-
development can affect the outcome of trade openness. It advises that a 
cautious and pragmatic approach be taken to trade openness by developing 
countries, such as the SADC states. This includes determinations of which 
measures are appropriate and when and how to implement them. 
 
This thesis has argued that participating in regional and international 
agreements is an important component of a country’s strategy to facilitate 
trade. However, it has found that there are many challenges to international 
compliance, as well as to domestic implementation of treaties. It has argued 
that these need to be addressed in order for the agreements to be effective. 
 
649 Jeronim Capaldo argues that the TFA ‘requires all countries to implement reforms from 
which only some countries will be able to benefit. Who wins and who loses remains to be seen 
but … trade facilitation is likely to reinforce the current pattern of global income distribution, 
with potential negative impacts on developing countries and already disadvantaged 
individuals therein. Trade facilitation is only useful to trade expansion if countries face 
enough net external demand. But all countries cannot at the same time face higher net 
external demand. To believe they can is a trade hallucination.’ Jeronim Capaldo, Trade 
Hallucination: Risks of Trade Facilitation and Suggestions for Implementation, No 14-02, GDAE 




The thesis investigated the challenges to compliance and to implementation 
of trade facilitation agreements in SADC. Some significant insights can be 
drawn from the empirical studies that were undertaken in chapters 5 and 6. 
These identified several compliance and implementation challenges such as: 
lack of financial capacity to implement reforms, outdated laws that fail to 
install efficient structures and procedures in support of implementation, lack 
of political will, poor domestic and regional organisation, weak institutions 
that lack political and/or economic power to enforce commitments,650 
inadequate supporting infrastructure for reforms (e.g. ICT services), 
conflicting and duplicating commitments in diverse arrangements, human 
resource deficiencies, deficiencies in the agreements themselves,651 and the 
agreements being too strict, in the sense that they do not leave room for 
variable geometry and, instead, insist on all of the members assuming the 
same obligations without flexibility and special and differential treatment.  
 
The reason why states are willing to spend time and resources working on 
treaties is because they believe that, ultimately, they will reach an accord to 
cooperate to improve a situation to their mutual benefit. If, after all of those 
efforts, some states are unable to comply, or are able to evade their 
commitments, this will undermine the entire negotiation process and will 
threaten the willingness of other states to continue to comply and to 
implement the agreement. The compliance theories and Yong-Shik Lee’s law 
and development theory provide us with insights on the connection between 
compliance and implementation deficiencies and the lack of progress in 
attaining treaty objectives. These theoretical insights highlight that factors 
such as the appropriateness of treaties to the country context, regulatory 
design, the quality of institutions and flexibility and capacitation are all 
necessary to support compliance and implementation. 
 
 
650 The weakness can relate to their structure, powers, functionality or funding. 
651 For example, those that contain shallow provisions on trade facilitation, or fail to impose 
specific legally binding obligations on the parties, thus preventing the provisions from being 
usable as the basis of any concrete programmes on trade facilitation, or for any action to be 
taken to force compliance, because there is no concrete obligation. 
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The third concluding insight relates to the World Trade Organization’s Trade 
Facilitation Agreement itself. This research finds that the TFA has many 
features that make it advantageous over the other frameworks for trade 
facilitation, and that these features make it likely that it will have a more 
positive impact on trade facilitation in the region. Its advantages were 
discussed in Chapter 7. At least four significant advantages for developing 
countries, such as those in SADC, can be highlighted. First, it allows members 
to assume only those obligations which they adjudge are within their capacity 
to implement and they may implement at their own pace.652 This is important 
given that implementation challenges are unique to each country. The 
developed nations have already been implementing TFA-like provisions for 
years, so it is not as burdensome for them to comply with the TFA as it would 
be for poorer countries which are in the process of attempting to catch up. 
They also generally have more resources for the infrastructure, technologies, 
and the human capital that are needed to improve border functioning. 
Conversely, developing nations have less experience with implementing such 
measures. In addition, they often have other pressing developmental 
challenges that they are required to deal with. Their budgets do not easily 
allow for the accommodation of the costs of trade facilitation measures. 
Therefore, they will need more time and flexibility to implement such. The TFA 
provides for these flexibilities. 
 
Secondly, it is likely that the TFA will be successful because there are many 
indications of the seriousness with which members take the agreement. For 
example, the protocol amending the Marrakesh agreement provides that 
“reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this 
Protocol without the consent of the other members.”653 This was meant to 
fortify the security of the agreement.  Further, the speed, and the spread of 
 
652 Articles 13 –19. 
653 WT/L/940. The SADC Trade Protocol and the Southern African Customs Union agreement 
are both silent on the issue of reservations. Where a treaty is silent on the making of 
reservations the law is that reservations can be made as long as they are not ‘incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty.’ Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1969. The AfCFTA, following the Trade Facilitation Agreement, provides, in its article 
25, that ‘no reservation shall be made to this agreement.’ 
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the ratifications which were received for the TFA might also indicate that 
members were keen to sign on to the regime. We also see its provisions being 
replicated again and again in various other agreements. For example, the 
African Continental Free Trade Agreement copies much of the TFA. This would 
not have been the case if the contents of the agreement were negatively 
perceived. 
 
Thirdly, treaties are more likely to be successful if there is monitoring of 
implementation. This is made possible by the TFA’s Trade Facilitation 
Committee. This oversight mechanism means that it will be perceivable if a 
country falls behind schedule in implementation and support can be extended 
to address the challenge. The agreement is also advantageous because the 
parties are required to establish national trade facilitation committees. This 
also improves monitoring and can also assist the SADC countries to overcome 
challenges that stem from domestic coordination failures. A further positive 
aspect is that the SADC states are protected from dispute resolution 
procedures in the TFA, for a certain period, as they adjust to its disciplines. 
There is also some scope (although limited and not concrete) for assistance 
from developed members and from the Trade Facilitation Facility. These 
elements all contribute to the addressing of some of the implementation 
challenges which have stymied the improvement of trade facilitation in 
southern Africa. 
 
Finally, the TFA is also likely to be impactful because its contents are 
consistent with the SADC states’ existing regional trade facilitation objectives 
and projects. No state is starting from scratch as far as trade facilitation 
reforms are concerned. The agreement contributes to ongoing efforts that 
involve development partners that are supporting the countries’ 
implementation of trade facilitation measures. One example is the World 
Customs Organization’s (WCO) Mercator Programme that was launched in 
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June 2015 as an initiative to support the implementation of the TFA.654 It will 
be beneficial to have all of these ongoing programmes brought under the 
auspices of the TFA (by the Trade Facilitation Committee) because this may 
help to avoid coordination failures.655  
 
These conclusions do not mean that the TFA is a perfect instrument. Nor that 
it is guaranteed to finally put an end to the trade facilitation challenges in 
SADC. It has been shown that the TFA is not without its faults or its critics.656 
The TFA is a highly controversial instrument. Many have levelled criticisms 
about the history of its creation, as well as its contents. For example, there 
are those who contend that the poorer WTO members were forced into 
agreeing to the agreement in order to obtain, or to continue to benefit from, 
 
654 The WCO is one of the implementing agencies of the TFA through its Annex D status (along 
with the International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development and the World 
Bank), and special relationship with the WTO. Two days after the conclusion of the TFA, the 
WCO Policy Commission met in Dublin (9-11 December) and issued a document entitled the 
Resolution of the Policy Commission of the World Customs Organization on the Conclusion 
of an Agreement on Trade Facilitation by the World Trade Organization” (also known as the 
Dublin Resolution). The resolution welcomed the new agreement and committed to engage 
with the WTO on how the WCO could assist WTO members in the practical aspects involved 
in the implementation of the agreement (for example, needs-assessment, technical 
assistance). The WCO established a Working Group on the Implementation of the TFA 
(TFAWG). The history of cooperation and collaboration between the WCO and the WTO is also 
discussed in Hans Van Houtte, The Law of International Trade, Second Edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2002, at 87 - 88. 
655 UNECA Op cit note 329 at  47 – 48. 
656 See for example, Alessandrini, Donatella, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trade 
Regime: The Failure and Promise of the WTO's Development Mission (2010) Hart Publishing,  
Oxford; & Portland Ore. 
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certain concessions.657 Other analysts aver that trade facilitation is not a 
pressing need for the SADC states. They note that these countries are 
grappling with more pressing developmental challenges and that, therefore, 
trade facilitation should not have been a priority area for their concern and 
their expenditure, in light of other greater challenges.658  
 
Further criticisms are that that the provisions on technical assistance and 
capacity building are very weak and that this may render them ineffective. 
Trade facilitation interventions have been shown to be very costly. Many 
reforms will require huge capital investments which may take years to yield 
any observable positive effects. Other reforms will require recurrent 
expenditure. Developing countries cannot begin to plan and to effect such 
reforms without adequate assurance of sustainable support. The TFA does 
not extend such assurances. That the arrangements for funding are largely 
placed beyond the purview of the WTO is worrying. The WTO is only informed 
of progress in negotiations for funding, but it is not involved in monitoring the 
actual negotiations. This leaves room for exploitation and other consequences 
 
657 The Third World Network reports that the Philippines (speaking on behalf of the Core 
Group of Developing Countries in the WTO) made a statement during a meeting of the NGTF 
(7th to 9th February 2005) wherein they quoted from a World Bank publication on trade 
facilitation which cautioned against ‘trying to compel countries’ reforms to adopt particular 
institutions or forms under threat of trade sanctions.’ Third World Network Info Service on 
WTO and Trade Issues,17 February 2005, https://twn.my/title2/twninfo184.htm, accessed 
June 28 2019. The African countries had attempted to insist that entry into force of the TFA 
be provisional on the conclusion of other DDR issues. World Trade Organization, Negotiating 
Group on Trade Facilitation, TN/TF/M/3, 21 March 2005. Summary Minutes of the Meeting, 
held on 7 and 9 February 2005. However, the WTO Director General responded to this by 
stating that their actions ‘could compromise what was negotiated in Bali last December. As 
Chair of the Trade Negotiations Committee, I have no doubt that you are all very much aware 
of the implications of revisiting what was agreed in Bali. It would not only compromise the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement — including the technical assistance element. All of the Bali 
decisions — every single one of them — would be compromised. Everything we worked together 
to achieve in Bali would potentially be lost. (own emphasis). Trade Negotiations Committee, 
Informal TNC Meeting at the Level of Head of Delegation, JOB/TNC/39, 25 June 2014. This 
could be interpreted as an attempt to pressurise developing countries to abandon their 
proposal, even though it was in line with paragraph 47 of the Doha Declaration. Trade 
Negotiations Committee, Informal. 
658 Shawn Donnan ‘US calls time on Doha trade negotiations‘ Financial Times, December 13, 
2015, available at https://www.ft.com/content/2f9a7ee4-a190-11e5-bc70-7ff6d4fd203a, 
accessed on 7 April  2020. Rorden Wilkinson, Erin Hannah & James Scott Op cit note 555 at 
1041. 
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that can stem from traditional development assistance programmes.659 
Therefore, as things stand, there is the potential for a stalemate where poor 
countries will argue that they cannot implement and the rich countries will 
argue that they cannot help.  
 
These criticisms, and the politics behind them, are not irrelevant or to be 
swiftly over-looked or under-estimated. However, they do not completely 
negate the value of the agreement, nor what it may be able to achieve. They 
do not detract from its utility as yet another important tool at the disposal of 
the SADC states for facilitating their trade. The TFA’s provisions cover many 
of the challenges that have been plaguing trade facilitation in SADC.660  
Therefore, the overall conclusion is that the World Trade Organization’s Trade 
Facilitation Agreement will potentially contribute favourably towards the 
process of improving trade facilitation in SADC. 
 
The Trade Facilitation Agreement cannot rectify all that is going wrong with 
trade and development in SADC. Trade facilitation is not, in and of itself, a 
main driver of trade flows or of economic development. Instead, there are a 
multitude of other factors that are also responsible for growth in the flows and 
value of trade, which the TFA cannot address. Therefore, other complimentary 
interventions will need to be under-taken, alongside trade facilitation reforms, 
if trade and development prospects are to improve. This brings us to 
recommendations on how the SADC countries should seek to maximise 
benefits from their participation in the TFA. 
 
8.2. Thesis Recommendations 
In terms of the theoretical insights gained, mercantilism and classical 
economics have been found to be largely unhelpful in convincingly explaining 
 
659 As supposed by the dependency theory. This theory was conceived in the late 1950s by 
the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch. See, for example, Love, Joseph, Raul Prebisch and 
the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange, Latin American Research Review 15, no. 3 
(1980): 45-72. 
660 For instance: publication (art 1), stakeholder consultations (art 2), advance rulings (art 3), 
appeal and review mechanisms (art 4) and border agency cooperation (art 8). 
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the relationship between trade and development. This is because they tend to 
be idealised and to ignore the realities of developing countries and the 
potential harm that could arise from them opening up their trade without due 
circumspection. The approach of heterodox economics is more useful to our 
analysis. It favours openness over closed markets. However, it equally 
recommends that a thoughtful and measured approach be taken to adopting 
measures to liberalise, as well as to facilitate trade. This approach is more 
appropriate, given the development context of the SADC countries. Therefore, 
on the guidance of heterodox economics, the SADC countries are advised to 
adopt a nuanced and strategic approach to their assumption and 
implementation of trade facilitation policies. They must carefully consider 
what policies are needed to advance their holistic development, and not just 
accept measures for acceptance sake. This will require them to base their 
decisions on concrete data. Time Release Studies, or other similar studies, 
can assist the countries to determine where the bottlenecks lie. They will need 
to accurately assess their needs (financial, technical and otherwise) and their 
current capacity to implement reforms.  From there, they can then begin to 
plan needed reforms, prioritising those interventions that can be met more 
easily and which most align with their development goals.  
 
SADC members need to recognise that inefficient borders are not an isolated 
phenomenon. The Word Bank has reported that there is a correlation between 
performance in trade facilitation and the general ease of doing business in an 
economy.661 Therefore, the countries must address issues that are related to 
broader structural transformation in their economies (for example, 
corruption, transparency, weak institutions, efficacy of dispute resolution 
etc.). Doing so might relieve some of the problems that are experienced at their 
borders.  
 
In order to benefit from trade facilitation, SADC countries have to structurally 
transform their economies and move away from the production and export of 
 
661 Op cit note 337.  
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primary goods (which are of low value, and where export prices are highly 
volatile). They have to increase their competitiveness. They need to focus on 
moving up the value chain. Without the development of supply side capacity, 
traders will not be able to take advantage of trade facilitation reforms. There 
needs to be recognition that there will be winners and losers when trade is 
facilitated. Therefore, the states will need to instal compensatory policies to 
ameliorate any potential negative effects that may befall those who might lose 
out from increased competition following increased trade inflows. Trade 
facilitation must not be seen as an event, but as a process. The TFA is indeed 
a useful tool for the SADC states to have in their arsenal, but only if they 
implement the complementary strategies that are required to make it effective. 
 
Yong-Shik Lee’s theory on law and development was also used in the thesis 
analysis. He had applied the theory to understand the development outcomes 
in South Korea, South Africa and the United States.662 This thesis applied the 
theory generally to the SADC region, and in particular to the Kingdom of 
Lesotho. This has expanded our academic understanding of the applicability 
of the theory because the thesis has shown that it is applicable in a wider 
context and that it assists to explain many of the hindrances to facilitated 
trade in SADC and in Lesotho. The theory moves us to recommend that, in 
order for their laws to more effectively impact development, SADC states 
should establish clear and time-bound implementation targets. They should 
install monitoring mechanisms to ascertain whether implementation is being 
carried out in an effective manner. Redress mechanisms should be applied 
where necessary. In addition, there needs to be the measuring of progress and 
the dissemination of findings to all stakeholders, (internally within the 
countries, regionally and globally). The obligation to report would encourage 
accountability as well as provide opportunity for engagements on assistance, 
should progress be found to be stalling. Furthermore, reporting allows for 
good practices to be identified and copied. 
  
 
662  Le Op cit note 94. 
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Finally, some insights have been gained from the compliance theories. The 
enmeshment theory elucidates the importance of strong norms and 
institutions for the successful implementation of reforms. This theory has 
been found to be relevant in explaining the trade facilitation challenges that 
persist in SADC. Many of the region’s previous regional and multilateral 
agreements  have weak norms. These have failed to, by and large, impose 
concrete and actionable obligations on members. The failure to install 
empowered institutions that focus exclusively on monitoring and enforcing 
trade facilitation commitments is a further critical omission that has led to 
the inefficacy of the agreements. Therefore, it is recommended that the states 
consider rectifying these shortcomings. It has been argued that the entry into 
force of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade 
Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement will go a long way towards 
addressing these weaknesses, as both frameworks are slightly stronger, both 
normatively and institutionally. 
 
The managerial approach to compliance argues that non-compliance with 
treaty commitments is not due to intended deviance but that, instead, it is a 
result of lack of capacity.663 This was tested to see whether it can, in part, 
explain non-compliance with trade facilitation agreements in SADC. It was 
found that indeed this is the case. The instruments that the SADC states 
participated in pre-the TFA, did not pay sufficient attention to closing gaps in 
the members’ technical and financial capacity. This played a role in the lack 
of compliance and, therefore, the lack of success of the treaties in alleviating 
trade facilitation barriers. This leads us to recommend that, alongside 
prioritising the formal enforcement of measures, the states should similarly 
concentrate on securing assistance to address their capacity deficits. Reforms 
to facilitate trade will require finances and this will require appealing for 
technical assistance in the form of the transfer of finances (for example, for 
 
663 Chayes & Chayes Op cit note 118 at 204. 
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acquiring and improving infrastructure,664 equipment and systems),665 
training (capacity-building), technology (e.g. ICT), and legal reform. SADC 
states have individually requested assistance through their submissions of 
Category C notifications to the WTO. However, it may be worthwhile for them 
to seek assistance jointly for regional priority areas. If they consolidate their 
requests, then perhaps donors would be more keen to give support knowing 
that the impact will be wider.  
 
Although the TFA is an avenue for requesting technical assistance towards 
trade facilitation, it is emphasised that the SADC countries do not have to 
only rely on that mechanism. This is because there are many other 
programmes that have been assisting them hitherto. There are programmes 
that are run by entities such as the World Bank,666 the World Customs 
Organization,667 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),668 
the African Union, the African Development Bank (ADB),669 the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), the Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA), the European Union (EU), the Norwegian Agency 
for Development Cooperation (NORAD), UKAID,670 USAID Trade Hubs,671 
China-Africa Co-operation Forum, the United Kingdom’s Department for 
 
664 Infrastructure upgrades are a big part of what led to reduced delays in Churundu.  
665 Annex I: Almaty Programme of Action: Addressing the Special Needs of Landlocked 
Developing Countries within a New Global Framework for Transit Transport Cooperation for 
Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries. A/CONF.202/3. Page 21. And UNECA Op cit 
note 275. 
666 Through the Trade Facilitation Support Program (TFSP) which has provided assistance to 
countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, eSwatini and Zambia to 
implement trade facilitation measures. 
667 For example, through the Mercator Programme, available at http://www.wcoomd.org/-
/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/wto-atf/mercator-programme/councilwco-mercator-
programme.pdf?la=en, accessed on 1 March 2017. 
668 For instance its Container Control Programme in collaboration with the World Customs 
Organization. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/container-control-
programme.html, accessed 1 March 2017. 
669 It supports trade facilitation measures such as the implementation of one-stop border 
posts, coordinated border management and customs reform and modernisation. It does much 
to support trade facilitation through the Africa Trade Fund https://www.africatradefund.org/ 
and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Union, African Development 
Bank, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area 
About, 2017. Op cit note 372. 
670 Improving hard and soft trade infrastructure, modernising customs systems, procedures 
and facilities. 
671  For the delivery of trade-related technical assistance, such as improvements in customs 
procedures in order to facilitate trade and further regional integration. 
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International Development (DFID), the United States’ Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), and the United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). In addition ‘there are a range of project preparation 
funds operating in Africa providing finance for early stage development of 
regional projects, such as the NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Fund 
(IPPF)’.672 Some of these programmes are more transparent than the TFA’s 
framework for technical assistance and, therefore, may be preferable to it.  
 
It will be important for the states to ensure that assistance is effective. The 
African Development Bank is a large donor on the continent. It has studied 
and reported on the factors that enhance the effectiveness of technical 
assistance.673  
 
§ Aid effectiveness begins with good research about needs  
§ Recipients must request concrete and targeted assistance  
§ Requests for aid should be aligned with national priorities and 
regional programmes 
§ Recipient nations need to take ownership of the programmes by 
ensuring that it’s what they need, and what they can commit to. 
 
Therefore, the SADC countries are advised to not only place faith in donor-
driven implementation, but to themselves, as far as possible, take 
responsibility and accountability for addressing their trade facilitation 
challenges. This is because much has been written about the dangers of donor 
dependency. SADC is already very donor dependent.674 Donors can hijack 
agendas, support only what they will benefit from and impose harsh 
conditionalities. In addition, donor assistance is not stable or reliable funding, 
 
672 Kennedy K Mbekeani Understanding the Barriers to Regional Trade Integration in Africa 
(2013) at 27. 
673 For example, African Development Bank  A Roadmap for Improving Performance on Aid 
Effectiveness and Promoting Effective Development: 
Turning Commitments Into Action available at 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Rev%20-
%20Roadmap%20Aid%20Effectiveness.pdf accessed 12 July 2019. 
674 According to the African Union 79% of SADC’s budget comes from donor funds.  
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and therefore projects that it supports might not be sustainable. Therefore, 
the states should seek external funds cautiously, when it becomes strictly 
necessary. It is recommended that they should focus on collaborating with 
each other. If they share their resources this could potentially make them 
stretch a long way. They can also mobilise domestic funding in support of 
trade facilitation reforms. In order to do this, they will have to address current 
deficiencies such as weak tax administration; high tax evasion and tax 
avoidance; corruption and pronounced incidents of illicit financial flows. They 
should also approach the private sector to partner with governments in trade-
facilitating investments by way of public–private partnerships. To do so they 
would have to convince the private sector of the short, medium and long-term 
benefits of trade facilitation. The role of domestic resources in funding 
development was confirmed at the United Nations conference on Financing 
for Development.675  
 
It is recommended that, in implementing reforms, they should begin with less-
resource intense interventions. Some trade facilitation hindrances require 
mainly creativity. Borders can be redesigned to enable smooth and seamless 
movement from one process/station to another. The redesign should 
incorporate adequate signage and segregated lanes for commercial and 
private traffic, as well as parking bays for those vehicles that are still awaiting 
clearance. The layout should be such that perishable goods and non-
perishable goods do not form part of a single traffic flow, and that the policies 
that apply to their clearance should be sensitive to the priority of clearing 
perishable products first and speedily. These important improvements do not 
require vast amounts of funding and, thus, the states may be able to achieve 





675 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 2015. 
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§ Improving transparency and communication channels so that traders 
are able to know, before-hand, the applicable policies, laws and 
procedures and, therefore, have time to adequately prepare to comply 
with them 
§ Amending policies and laws that are causing unnecessary delays and 
compounding costs 
§ Simplifying trade requirements, for example, by reducing the number 
of documents and the steps in clearance processes676  
§ Making pre-clearance the norm.677  
 
In final conclusion, it is encouraging that the TFA came about at a time when 
there had been significant pessimism about the World Trade Organization and 
wide speculation of its imminent collapse.678 Members on both sides of the 
economic divide had become disillusioned with the WTO’s arrangements.679 
Not only was the institution under threat, but the Doha Development Round 
(DDR) and Trade Facilitation Agreement negotiations themselves were nearly 
scuppered at several points due to the animosity that existed between 
 
676 This may require money for consultancy services to identify where the excesses are, but 
the governments might be able to conduct that exercise on their own.  
677 The pre-clearance of goods has been a very useful contributor to the alleviation of gridlocks 
in Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
678 For example, Faizel Ismail cites key criticisms against the WTO, being the asymmetry and 
imbalanced outcomes that emerged after each ministerial conference, especially since 2008, 
and that processes became more exclusionary (for example decisions being taken by principal 
with increasing marginalisation of, in particular, the African Group, ACP and LDCs. Op cit 
note 604. 
679 See, for example, Jean-Pierre Lehmann, in The Global Trade Agenda is in a Terrible Mess, 
Prospects are Grim -- Business Leadership is an Urgent Imperative (2015), available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jplehmann/2015/03/24/the-global-trade-agenda-is-in-a-
terrible-mess-prospects-are-grim-business-leadership-is-an-urgent-
imperative/#38e097a63838, accessed on 23 April 2020.  Here he alleges that the GATT was 
a ‘First World Trade Organization’, and that its agenda was dictated by the interests of the 
West, to the exclusion of the South and that this caused greater acrimony as rounds 
progressed. He writes, ‘I attended the following ministerial held in Cancún, Mexico, in 
September 2003. It was clear at the outset that the mood was confrontational, mercantilist 
and uncompromising: a dialogue of the deaf between North and South’. He continues ‘[i]n the 
last dozen years since Cancún, the global trade agenda has become murkier and far more 
convoluted. The failure to conclude a multilateral trade regime has spawned the huge 
proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements, most of which in fact contribute little 
to trade, adding layers of opaque complexity, and some of which cause outright trade 
distortion.’ Experts point to examples such as the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (T-Tip), the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), Brexit and US intentions to review 
their (North Atlantic Free Trade Area) NAFTA membership in support of such views. 
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members.  This led some writers, like Susan Schwab, to write that the DDR 
could not be resuscitated.680 Yet, the TFA emerged as the one agreement that 
was rescued out of the Doha round. The TFA would likely not have 
materialised had members been entirely unconvinced of its importance. This 
also lends confidence that there are good prospects that it will be successful. 
Although it may be argued that the TFA is unbalanced, it is not easy to have 
a global outcome that is completely balanced. It is apparent, from the 
provisions of the TFA, that there has been a genuine attempt to accommodate 
the diverse interests and challenges of the WTO members. 
 
The TFA is not a perfect instrument. The SADC countries are encouraged to 
make the best use of its flexibilities, protections, and opportunities. This will 
require very careful categorisation by the countries, as well as adequate, 
effective and sustainable technical assistance and capacity building from 
development partners. It will take time before the gains of the TFA can be 
judged. This is because the lesser developed members still have many reforms 
to put in place. It will also take time for the assistance to come through and 
for implementation to begin. Therefore, it will be a while before we can 
concretely argue about the precise value of the agreement. All that we can do 
now is to speculate, anticipate, hope and advise the SADC countries on how 
best to chart their way forward in a manner that will allow them to reap the 
maximum benefits of this new regime. They should continue to pursue greater 
market access for their products. Improved market access, coupled with more 
efficient borders, will work best to their advantage. Being granted market 
access in the face of inefficient borders will render the access nugatory. 
Market access and trade facilitation should go hand in hand. Trade facilitation 
may also assist developing countries to trade amongst themselves. This would 
be of particular benefit to African developing countries because the rates of 
intra-Africa trade are comparatively lower than other intra-regional trade 
lows. 
 
680 Susan C Schwab ‘After Doha: Why the negotiations are doomed and what we should do 
about it’ (2011 ) May/June Foreign Affairs,, available at  
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-04-09/after-doha, accessed on 23 April 2020. 
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In conclusion on this work: this thesis set out to explain the relationship 
between trade and development, to establish the reasons for the lack of 
effectiveness of trade facilitation agreements in SADC and to determine the 
unique advantages of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. The introductory 
chapter explained that there are different impediments to facilitated trade. 
This thesis has shown how these impediments manifest in the Southern 
African Development Community in particular. In addition, the chapter also 
introduced the concept of trade facilitation and argued that, like trade 
liberalisation, it is an important component of a country’s foreign trade policy 
because of its potential benefits to development, holistically speaking. 
 
The introduction argued that agreements are important tools for countries to 
use to effectuate cooperate in facilitating trade. Chapter 4 examined the 
agreements that SADC countries are bound by and evaluated their strengths 
and weaknesses. It concluded that the agreements are generally sound, 
however, compliance and implementation issues prevent them from being 
more effective. This was the argument that was proposed from the very 
beginning. The introduction had argued that it is problematic that the 
agreements are not being effective because it means that they are unable to 
contribute to developmental efforts. Chapter 4 interrogated the challenges to 
compliance while chapters 5 and 6 explored challenges to implementation.  
 
The argument was made, in chapter 1, that the World Trade Organization’s 
Trade Facilitation Agreement has unique advantages that give it the potential 
to assist in the resolution of these compliance and implementation issues. 
Chapter 7 considered what these features are. It concluded that they are 
primarily the flexibilities that are availed through the extension of special and 
differential treatment,681 the scope for technical assistance, as well as the 
strength of the institutional arrangements, at the organisational level, as well 
as at member country level.682  
 
681 By the freedom to categorise commitments. 
682 Through the Committee on Trade Facilitation and National Committees on Trade 
Facilitation. 
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Therefore, this thesis has made three main contributions to the academic 
literature. First, it has provided academics with an extensive and detailed 
review of the legal and academic literature on trade facilitation in the 
Southern African Development Community. Secondly, by way of a focused 
case study, it has provided a review of the legal frameworks on trade 
facilitation in Lesotho. This included a detailed exploration of the 
implementation problems that are experienced by the country in attempts to 
fulfil the trade facilitation commitments that it has undertaken in regional 
and international agreements. This is important because it indicates the 
peculiar circumstances and challenges of, not only a SADC country, but also 
a land-locked least developed country, which is the type of country that is 
most likely to experience and to have its economy harmed by trade that is not 
appropriately facilitated.  
 
Lastly, the thesis has made a contribution to the theory of law and 
development by applying it in a setting (the SADC region) and to a topic (trade 
facilitation) where it has, hitherto, not been applied. This thesis has also 
provided policy makers and trade negotiators with several insightful policy 
recommendations on developing country perspectives in international 
negotiations. This includes the need for selectivity in electing to participate, 
careful consideration of commitments, greater assertiveness in securing their 
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Annex 1- Lesotho – South Africa Borders 
 
There are thirteen border posts between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the 
Republic of South Africa.  Five are designated as ‘commercial border posts.’ 
Trade can only be conducted through commercial borders posts. The other 
border posts can only be used for the movement of persons.  
 
 
Lesotho Border Post 
 
South Africa Border Post Opening Hours 
Maseru Bridge* Maseru Bridge 24 hrs 
Maputsoe* Ficksburg Bridge 24 hrs 
Caledonspoort* Caledonspoort 06:00 - 22:00 
Qacha's Nek* Qacha's Nek 06:00 - 22:00 
Van Rooyen's Gate* Van Rooyen's Gate 06:00 - 22:00 
Tele Bridge Tele bridge 06:00 - 22:00 
Makhaleng Bridge Makhaleng Bridge 08:00 - 16:00 
Peka Bridge Peka Bride 08:00 - 16:00 
Ramatšeliso Ramatšeliso 08:00 - 16:00 
Sani Pass Sani Pass 08:00 - 16:00 
 










Annex 2 – Policies and Laws Regulating Trade in Lesotho 
 
Policies 
National food safety policy (2014). 
National industrial policy (2010). 
National vision 2020 (2003). 




Agricultural marketing act No. 26 of 1967. 
Companies act No. 25 of 2011. 
Customs and excise act No. 10 of 1982. 
Export and import control act No. 16 of 1984.  
Import restrictions (amendment) regulations No. 24 of 2009. 
Road traffic act No. 8 of 1981. 
Toll gates (amendment) regulations 2018. 
Trading enterprise act No. 11 of 1993. 















Annex 3 - Goods Subject to Permits or Licensing Requirements in Lesotho685 
 
Goods Requiring Import Permits 
 
 
Source: World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Assess, No. WT/TPR/S324, 
2015.686 
 
685 Source: World Bank Group, World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement 
Lesotho Validation and Reform Map, Working Draft, May 2016. 




Goods Requiring Export Permits 
 
 




















Annex 4 – List of Fieldwork Respondents 
 
I. Representatives of Regulatory Institutions687 
 
The Ministry of Trade is the principal policy maker in terms of issues related 
to cross-border trade. The Ministry of Public Works is responsible for state 
infrastructure. The Ministry of Agriculture approves the import and export of 
agricultural products and implements sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
The Ministry of Health approves the import and export of certain products on 
account of their health implications. The Lesotho Revenue Authority is 
responsible for customs collection. The Lesotho Mounted Police Services is  
responsible for security at the border post. 
 
Respondent Name  Title      Institution 
Tseko Nyesemane  Deputy Commissioner Customs LRA 
Motheba Malibeng Chief Trade development Officer MTI (NTFC) 
Limpho Sopeng  Marketing Manager   LNDB 
Hlouhla Lelosa  Operations Manager   DTT 
Liau Ramokoatsi  Clerk      DoA (Livestock) 
Mofokeng Kolo  Assistant Commissioner   Police Services 
Bataung Koenene  Head Crops Division   DoAR 
Motlatsi Molatela  Senior Researcher   DoAR 
Tšepiso Mosasane  Director     Immigration 









687 One requested anonymity. 
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II. Border Officials688 
 
Respondent Name  Title     Institution 
Tseko Ngatane  Border Manager   LRA  
Mohlomong Mothabeng Inspector    DTT (Weighbridge) 
T’seliso Lethunya  Inspector    DoA (Livestock) 
Melida Lethola  Inspector    Port Health  
Liteboho Mahase  Team Leader   LRA  
Inspector Nkhasi  Officer Commanding   Police Services 
‘Marapelang Nyane Chief Immigration Officer Immigration 






Respondent Name  Name of Company  Type of Business  
Barbara Saunders Office National- Manager Stationary Shop  
Mosito ‘Noto  Triangle Freight   Clearing Agents  
Motjopi Molise  Game Stores   Retail    
Nthabiseng Makakole Unitrans- Depot Manager Fuel Transport  
Mphatsa Molefe    -   Clearing Agent  
John Maema  CNA- Manager   Stationary Shop  
‘Mannuku Sekome Steers - Franchisee  Food    
Julia Mahata  Ackermans - Manager  Retail    







688 Two requested anonymity. 
689 Five requested anonymity. 
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IV. Other Stakeholders 
 
Respondent Name  Title      Institution 
Bocalasa Senooe  Principle Investigation Officer  DCEO 
Tšeliso Phafoli  Senior Statistician   BOS 
Lieketseng Mokhahlane Senior Statistician (Transport)  BOS 
‘Mamoiloa Raphuthing Planning and Research Manager LNDC 
Lefa Thamae  Director- Science & Technology MCST 
Tšotetsi Makong Former Counsellor at the Lesotho Mission and Africa 
Group Chief Negotiator in the TFA 
Nkopane Monyane Former Lesotho Ambassador to the WTO 




















Annex 5 – Sample Questions for Policy Makers690 
 
Ministry of Trade – Qualitative interviews  
 
The policies, laws and processes related to cross border trade:  
§ Do they include the inputs of traders when they are being devised?  
§ Are they communicated timeously to those to whom they apply, so 
that they can prepare to comply with them?  
§ Are they based on international best practice?  
§ Are they appropriate in number, in coverage, and in what they require 
from traders?  
§ Are they current and regularly amended in order to keep pace with 
global trends in the regulation of trade?  
§ Are they responsive to the needs of users?  
§ Are they transparently and consistently applied?  
§ Do they sufficiently penalise non-compliant behaviour so as to be a 
deterrent?  
 
Ministry of Public Works – Qualitative interviews  
 
§ What is the extent of, and causes of, congestion at the Maseru border?  
§ What markings and designations have been implemented at the 
border (e.g. are there designated bays for cargo handling, designated 
areas for inspections etc)?  
§ Are there facilities to assist traders and to mitigate the effects of 
delays at the border, for example, bonded warehouses or cold storage 
facilities for perishable goods etc?  
§ Is there the use of technology and mechanisation to speed up 




690 Other secondary and related questions may emerge during the course of an interview.   
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Border Officials (From Customs, Agriculture and Health) – Qualitative 
interviews  
 
§ What documents are required for trading (including licenses, 
certificates etc.)?  
§ What are the steps involved in border compliance (the methodology of 
trade)?  
§ What costs are levied on traders (duties, charges, fees, levies, 
penalties etc.)?  
§ What trade restrictions and prohibitions are currently applicable and 
what is their rationale?  
§ What inspections are conducted, for what purpose, how are they done, 
and how long do they take to execute?  
§ What are the dispute settlement rules and procedures to resolve 
complaints by traders?  
§ Questions on staffing  
o Is the quantity of staff adequate to run the border?  
o Is the quality of staff adequate (in terms of training), including the 
quality of the managerial staff?  
o Are there resources available for training staff (e.g. in the use of 
new technologies etc)?  
o Is there automation and other tools to assist staff to expedite the 
discharge of their functions?  
o Are staff sufficiently paid and incentivised to maximize their 
productivity?  
o What mechanisms exist to encourage co-operation and co-
ordination between border authorities and to avoid occurrences 
such as turf wars and the duplication of efforts (e.g. is there dual 
recognition of forms and processes? Are documents transferable? 
Are systems linked? Do the same standards apply? etc.  
§ What do they believe would make the border more efficient?  
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§ Are they aware of regional and multilateral commitments by the two 
countries to facilitate trade? Why do they believe these have not been 
implemented?  
§ Are they aware of whether the following practices happen at the 
border post?  
o Collusion between border officials and fraudulent traders  
o Informal fees  
o Forgeries: examples (e.g. double-invoicing etc.)  
o Illicit Trading e.g. smuggling, trade in counterfeit goods, trade in 
products that breach intellectual property rights, or that breach 
health and safety standards, drug trafficking, money laundering, or 
terrorist financing, trans-shipping etc.  
o Tax evasion and tax avoidance  
o Other cross-border crimes?  
 


















Annex 6 – Questionnaire for Traders 
 
Respondent: ___________________________________________________ 
Contact Details: _______________________________________________ 
Date and Place of Interview: ___________________________________ 
 
Section 1. Questions on Bureaucracy  
1. Are the documentation/certification requirements for trade at Maseru 
Bridge reasonable?  
(a) Yes (Explain):  
________________________________________________________________________  
 
(b) No (Explain):  
________________________________________________________________________  
 
2. How many documents do you typically need in order for your import/export 
to be processed?  
(a) Import: _________  
(b) Export: _________  
 





(e) ________________________________________________________________________  
(f) ________________________________________________________________________ 







4. Rate the efficiency of the border clearance procedures at Maseru Bridge.  
(a) Excellent  
(b) Very Good  
(c) Good  
(d) Poor  
(e) Very Poor  
 
 





















6. How long does it typically take to process your trade?  
(a) Import: ________________  
(b) Export: ________________  
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8. (i) Are you aware that Lesotho and South Africa have bilateral, regional and 
international commitments to facilitate trade?  
(a) Yes  
(b) No  
 
(ii) Do you believe that the commitments are being followed?  
(a) Yes (Explain): _________________________________________________________ 
(b) No (Explain): __________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 2: Questions about the Cost of Compliance  
1. Are the fees related to cross-border trade reasonable?  
(a) Yes (Explain): _________________________________________________________ 
(b) No (Explain): __________________________________________________________ 
 
2. What are the fees that you typically have to pay when you trade (before and 










3. How much do you typically pay when you conduct your trade (per 
transaction)?  
M ______________  
 
4. Are you aware of any penalties that are charged for non-compliance with 
border procedures/requirements?  
(a) Yes  
(b) No  
 








6. Are the penalties for non-compliance reasonable?  
(a) Yes (Explain): __________________________________________________________ 
(b) No (Explain): ___________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Is there transparency in the manner of the charging of costs and penalties 
at the border?  
(a) Yes (Explain): _________________________________________________________ 
(b) No (Explain): __________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Do you believe that high fees and penalties contribute to bribery?  
(a) Yes (Explain): __________________________________________________________ 











Section 3: Questions on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms at the Border  
1. Are you aware of any dispute settlement mechanisms that you can access 
at the border should you have any dispute related to the conduct of your 
trade?  
(a) Yes  
(b) No  
 
2. Are the dispute settlement procedures clear and handled timeously?  
(a) Yes  
(b) No  
 
3. Are there managers at the border who can intervene to quickly resolve 
disputes?  
(a) Yes  
(b) No  
 
4. Are there efficient appeals procedures?  
(a) Yes  
(b) No  
 
5. Are you aware of whether any of the following practices happen at the 
border post?  
(a) Collusion between border officials and traders in the commission of 
illegalities  
(b) Informal fees being charged  
(c) Forgeries (for example double invoicing)  
(d) Illicit trading (for example smuggling, trade in counterfeit goods etc)  
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(e) Tax evasion and tax avoidance  
(f) Other cross-border illegalities __________________________________________ 
 





7. What mechanisms are you aware of that are being used at the border to 























Annex 7 - List of Preferred Traders 
 
 Name of Company Sector 
 
1 AfriSam (Lesotho)(Pty)Ltd Retail 
2 Liqhobong  Mining Development Co. Mining 
3 Shoprite Lesotho Retail 
4 U-save Supermarkets Retail 
5 OK Bazaars Retail 
6 Lesotho Milling Company Manufacturing 
7 Let'seng Diamond Mining 
8 Maseru Toyota/Pioneer Motors Retail  
9 Maputsoe Toyota (Maputsoe Motors) Retail 
10 China Geo-Engineering Corporation  Construction 
11 Action Statistical Investments (PicknPay) Retail 
12 Woolworths Lesotho Retail 
13 Cool Foods (Gentle Giants, Ltd) Distribution 
















Annex 8 - Working Shifts at the Maseru Bridge 
 






6:00am – 2:00pm 
2:00pm – 10:00pm 
10:00pm – 6:00am 
For imports: on 
average, 13 per 
day shift & 8 per 
night shift, 
(because there is 
generally less 
traffic at night). 
The busiest shift is 
2:00pm - 10:00pm 
For exports: 1  
Fewer staff on 
weekends because 
there is less traffic 





tend to be the 
busiest days for 
trade. More staff 
can be added as 
temporary workers 
during peak times 




7:00am - 3:00pm 
3:00pm - 10:00pm 
10:00pm – 7:00am 
1  Staff shortage 
means that 
inspections can 
take long and 
leave the office 
vacant. In 
addition, it is not 
possible to attend 
training because 
that would leave 
the office vacant. 
Port Health 7:00am - 5:00pm 
5:00pm - 7:00am 
1  An employee will 
be on day duty for 
three consecutive 
days, then on 
night duty for 
three consecutive 
nights, then off 





6:00am – 2:00pm 
2:00pm- 10:00pm 
10:00pm-6:00am 
3 per shift  
 
691 NB they also serve at the toll gates. 
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Annex 9 – Selected Fieldwork Findings 
 








Section 1: Questions on Bureaucracy 
Question 1 sought to discover the perceptions of traders regarding the 
reasonableness, or otherwise, of the trade documentation/certification 
requirements at Maseru Bridge. The majority of traders answered that the 




The main reason that was given by those who judged the requirements to be 
reasonable was that the requirements are not unduly difficult to comply with. 
The main complaint of those who responded that the requirements are 
unreasonable was that the requirements change too often and that they 
Yes No Don't Know It Depends
Are the Documentation/Certification Requirements at 
Maseru Bridge Reasonable?
Disclaimers:  
This presents the inputs of traders in Lesotho. The inputs of other trade facilitation stakeholders could 
not be quantified because there was no commonality in the questions that were posed to them, and, 
further, all of the questions were open-ended.  
Not every question from the traders questionnaire is diagrammatised hereunder. Only the responses 
to select questions that raise interesting insights are presented.  
The charts may not be perfectly accurate because they are based on the subjective perceptions, 
experiences and recommendations of the traders. The quality of the responses, rather than the quantity 
of responses was what was of the essence. 
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become ever more demanding when they do change. This thesis has argued 
that a major cause of delays at SADC borders is the plethora of trade 
requirements. Furthermore, that, when the requirements change often, and 
without much advance warning to the affected traders, this also leads to 
increased time and cost of trading. This is because uninformed traders will 
arrive at borders unprepared for what is expected to process their trade, and, 
thus, likely non-compliant with the requirements.  
 
4 out of the 14 interviewed traders explained that they don’t know whether or 
not the requirements are reasonable because they employ the services of 
clearing agents and, therefore, they are not personally familiar with what the 
requirements are. This is a common trend in Lesotho. In order to escape the 
frustrations of cross-border trading procedures, many businesses 
commission clearing agents. Although this may lessen the duration of trade 
(because the agents become adept at speedily manoeuvring the diverse 
procedures) this adds to the trading costs for traders. One trader reported 
having incurred a cost of M15, 000 in one month in clearing agent fees.692 
One clearing agent answered the question as “it depends.” The explanation 
given was that, the requirements are reasonable when intra-SACU trade is 
involved, but unreasonable when extra-SACU products are in issue. 
 
Questions 2 and 3 in the questionnaire are related. Traders were asked how 
many documents they are typically required in order to import and / or 
export, and what the documents are. The point of the question was not to find 
out what the documents are, per se. The point was to discover whether the 
traders know what the required documents are. This might give an idea of the 
extent of transparency and communication in the regulation of trade in 
Lesotho. Chapter 3 of the thesis explained that, where there is a lack of 
transparency and insufficient strides taken by the authorities to ensure that 
traders are apprised of the trading requirements, this leads to confusion and 
 
692 The Loti is equivalent to the South African Rand. This is approximately USD 925. Rate as 




lack of preparedness  on the part of traders and these become major causes 
of increasing the time taken to process trade.  
 
There were inconsistencies in the responses that were given. Traders reported 
requiring 2, 3, 4 or 9 documents. Six traders (including one clearing agent) 
admitted to being unsure of what documents are actually required. Some 
traders mentioned documents that are never requested to process cross-
border trade.  
 
Similar confusions were discovered when the traders were asked about their 




Only three of the traders were able to accurately describe the trade procedures 
at Maseru Bridge. One of these was a clearing agent. Six traders attempted to 
list the processes, but missed/confused some of the steps. Five traders 
reported that they don’t know what the procedures are because they engage 
clearing agents who take care of the procedures for them and they have never 






Ability to Accurately Describe the Procedures that Apply to 
Importing and Exporting at Maseru Bridge
Accurate description of procedures Incorrect description of procedures Don't know the procedures
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Question 4 required traders to rate the efficiency of the border clearance 
procedures at Maseru Bridge. The options were: (a) Excellent, (b) Very Good, 




No respondent judged the efficiency of the border procedures as excellent or 
very poor. The one trader who judged it as “very good” was a clearing agent. 
Of those who judged it to be good, one was a preferential trader and one was 
a fuel and gas trader. It would be expected that they would likely give generous 
ratings because preferential traders are not subjected to the same level of 
strictness with respect to conforming to the border procedures, as ordinary 
traders are. Likewise, because fuel carriers convey dangerous items, the 
processing of their trade is expedited due to the risk of any potential accident 
that may arise from their delay at such a small, highly populated area. The 
one trader who was reluctant to give a rating explained that it was because 
they have a clearing agent that takes care of the procedures, thus they feel 








Rate the Efficiency of the Border Clearance Procedures at 
Maseru Bridge
Very Good Good Poor Don't Know
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Responses to question 6 (on how long it typically takes to process trade) 
ranged from: 
 
§ 20 - 30 minutes (reported by a clearing agent - who clarified that this 
depends on whether one’s documents are compliant and nothing is 
queried and also if there is little traffic at the border) 
§ 1 – 2 hours (reported by a fuel transporter) 
§ “maximum 2 hours” (reported by a preferential trader) 
§ 4 hours 
§ 1 day, if minor inspections are required or if there is a lot of traffic at 
the border, for example, during the end of the month 
§ Up to 3 days if thorough physical inspections are undertaken. 
 
The final question in section 1 of the questionnaire aimed to discover whether 
traders know that Lesotho and South Africa have international commitments 
to facilitate trade, and whether, in their opinion, based on their experience of 
trading in Lesotho, the commitments are being implemented, as apparent on 
the ground in their trading. 
 
 Aware that Lesotho and 
South Africa have 
commitments to facilitate 
trade 
 
Believe that the 
commitments are being 
implemented 
Yes 8 1 
No 2 5 
Don’t Know 0 2 
No Response 4 6 
 
Those who opined that the commitments are being implemented explained 
that they do see some improvements in efficiency, for example, by the use of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s Automated 
System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) to process customs declarations. Those 
who responded that there is no evidence of compliance with the commitments 
said there have not been any improvements in the efficacy of the processing 
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of cross border trade. They speculated on possible reasons why this may be 
so. These were: 
 
§ the lack of implementation plans and strategies 
§ the lack of financial capacity to implement certain reforms, for example, 
automation.  
§ implementation is being sabotaged by certain interest groups. The 
argument was that there is political will at the top but not at the 
operational level. That border staff have a conflict of interest; they have 
an interest in the ongoing inefficiency. 
 
Section 2 of the questionnaire focuses on the costs of trading – fees and 
penalties. The intention behind the questions was, first, to determine whether 
traders know the applicable trade fees, charges and penalties. One argument 
that is made in the thesis is that when governments apply numerous charges 
and penalties this risks increasing, not only the cost of trade, but also the 
time to trade. This is because of the added complexity of administering the 
diverse payments. This could, in turn, encourage the commission of unlawful 
practices, such as bribery and corruption, as traders attempt to evade the 















Questions about the Costs of Compliance and Non-Compliance 
 
 Are trade 
fees 
reasonable? 





















Yes 3 7 0 1 6 
No 2 7 1 2 1 
It 
depends 




8 - 13693 11 14 
 
The one respondent who reported that the reasonableness “depends” clarified 
that “it depends on the type of goods being imported.” The fees that are 
charged for trading in some types of goods are exorbitant, whereas for other 
categories of goods they are reasonable.  
 
In question 2 traders listed their typical trade costs as being:  
§ depot costs 
§ clearing agency fees 
§ standing time of trucks 
§ fees for permits 
§ costs of traders licenses 
§ tax clearance certificate fees 
§ Value Added Tax 
§ toll gate fees 
§ customs duties 
§ provisional payments for the temporary importation of goods.  
 
 
693 These respondents reported that they have not been charged any penalties. 
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Only 50% of the interviewed traders reported being aware of there being 
penalties for non-compliance. Those that were aware that there are penalties 
reported knowing about the following infractions as being punishable:  
 
§ vehicles being parked on the bridge between the South African side of 
the border and the Lesotho side 
§ the overloading of vehicles 
§ the lodging of false declarations  
§ the submission of trade expired permits.  
 
They only knew of two penalties that could be imposed for non-compliance: 
fines and the confiscation of goods. Some traders complained that they have 
been penalised for minor transgressions, such as inadvertently making errors 
in their declarations. They felt that border agents should learn to make a 
distinction between attempted criminality and honest mistakes. They argued 
that a lot of time is wasted arguing with officials and trying to convince them 
to pardon the error. As an example, one trader who complained about the 
implementation of penalties at the Maseru Bridge is an importer of South 
African newspapers and magazines. Their suppliers require that any items 
that are not sold within a particular timeframe are to be returned. The trader 
reported that they had always been returning (exporting) the unpurchased 
materials without declaring them. They had believed that they only had to 
declare when they imported the items for sale, but were not aware that they 
also had to declare them upon export.  On one occasion their vehicle was 
searched by customs officials and the items were found. The trader was 
informed that it is illegal to not declare returns and they were penalised. The 
trader felt wronged because they claimed that there was no notice anywhere 
regarding rules on the declaration of returns. Secondly, they felt that, as a 
first offence that was conducted in ignorance, the authorities should have 





Section 3: Questions on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms at the Border 
 
Section 3 asked traders about their knowledge and experience of the efficacy 
of the dispute settlement procedures at Maseru Bridge. It is a principle of 
trade facilitation that there be transparent and efficient dispute resolution 
procedures, including appeal and reveal procedures.  
 




Are the procedures 
handled timeously? 
Are there managers at 
the border to quickly 
resolve disputes? 
Yes 6 4 5 
No 8 2 0 
Don’t 
Know 
- 2 9 
Never 
Used 
- 6 - 
 
The majority of the respondents (57%) were not aware of the dispute 
settlement channels at Maseru Bridge. Of those who knew about them, 67% 
judged the procedures as being expeditious. The two who answered that they 
don’t know about the efficacy or otherwise said that: 
 
(1) they always just pay a bribe, so they don’t know what the actual 
procedures for resolving disputes are. Paying a bribe is a quick way of getting 
around a dispute and  
 
 
(2) their clearing agent has been involved in resolving disputes with border 
agents so they do not have personal experience of what is involved.  
 
Finally, the research was interested in discovering traders’ perception of 
cross-border irregularities. Trade facilitation requires that, not only is trade 
fast and cost-effective but also that it is secure. One element of security is the 




Traders suggested that the causes of illegal practices are: 
§ Traders attempts to avoid the inefficiency of the formal cross-border 
processes 
§ The stringency of trade regulations. For example, that traders cannot 
legally import certain prohibited goods, or goods in desired quantities 
etc. 
§ Traders want to increase their profits by evading payments that may 
arise from legitimate trade 
§ The poor working conditions of border staff (including salaries) 












Perceptions of cross-border trade 
irregularities
